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Meritless ERISA Claims, the Cunningham v.
Cornell Burden-Shift and Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Pushback
By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
April 23, 2026
Article at 52 Journal of Pension Planning & Compliance 1 (Summer 2026) :
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_6JUGOJEpYQBpwXdjnVqvVgZnRQjerZI/
See Addendum below
The Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Cunningham
v. Cornell University lowered the initial hurdles of ERISA litigation. These
lawsuits typically take the form of excessive fee class actions. Plaintiff
firms use template complaints (often with investigative information shared by
the DOL) to allege that fiduciaries (i) failed to monitor recordkeeping fees,
(ii) retained underperforming funds, or (iii) used expensive retail share
classes instead of institutional ones. Cunningham v. Cornell University
shifted the burden of proving exemptions for routine service contracts to plan
sponsors. This made it easier for plaintiffs to survive early motions to
dismiss.
However, 2026 has brought strong pushback
against meritless ERISA claims and the lowered pleading standard. It’s clear
that courts and lawmakers are looking for ways to stop baseless claims. This
article explores (i) the practical consequences of the Cunningham
burden-shift, (ii) recent judicial efforts to filter meritless claims using
standing and fee-shifting to plaintiff attorneys for frivolous claims, (iii)
new legislative attempts to restore the burden of proof to plaintiffs, and (iv)
a 2026 change in DOL Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA)
enforcement policy and prohibition of EBSA using secret common interest agreements with the plaintiff bar.
ERISA § 408 Exemptions as Affirmative Defenses
In Cunningham
v. Cornell University, 604 U.S. 693 (Apr. 17, 2025), the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to recordkeeping and administrative fee arrangements in
Cornell University’s defined contribution retirement plans. Participants
alleged that the plans paid excessive compensation to recordkeepers and other
service providers and that plan fiduciaries failed to prudently monitor those
arrangements, thereby permitting the payment of allegedly unreasonable
compensation for necessary services in alleged breach of their duties of
loyalty and prudence under ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). In addition to
these fiduciary-duty claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the same fee payments
constituted prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. §
1106(a)(1)(C), on the theory that the payments were made to service providers
that were “parties in interest” to the plans. The district court and the Second
Circuit rejected the prohibited transaction claim, reasoning that plaintiffs
were required at the pleading stage to allege facts showing that the statutory
prohibited-transaction exemption for reasonable compensation for necessary
services under ERISA § 408(b)(2)(A) did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a plaintiff states a prohibited-transaction claim under §
406(a)(1)(C) by plausibly alleging the existence of a transaction between a
plan and a party in interest, and that the applicability of a § 408 exemption
is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by defendants rather
than negated by plaintiffs in the complaint.
Practical
Consequences for Routine Service Arrangements
Because
recordkeepers and similar service providers are, by definition, parties in
interest under ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), Cunningham renders
routine service arrangements prima facie prohibited transactions at the
pleading stage, subject only to later proof of an applicable exemption. Taken
to its logical conclusion, the Court’s reasoning means that most routine
contracts between a plan and a service provider constitute a prohibited
transaction under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C) for pleading purposes unless and until
the fiduciary affirmatively establishes the applicability of a § 408 exemption.
Absent that exemption, ordinary plan relationships, including recordkeeping,
trustee, custodial, investment advisory, and actuarial arrangements, would be
presumptively unlawful at the pleading stage, notwithstanding their ubiquity
and arm’s-length nature.
Although the
Court acknowledged concerns that its interpretation could expose ordinary plan
arrangements to costly “fishing expeditions,” it emphasized that
district courts retain procedural tools to screen weak claims, including
Article III standing requirements, Rule 7(a) orders, limits on discovery, Rule
11 sanctions, and fee-shifting under ERISA § 502(g)(1). In practice, however,
these tools typically operate only after litigation has commenced and often
after substantial defense costs have already been incurred.
Against that
backdrop, in light of Cunningham, plan sponsors and fiduciaries should assume
that ordinary service contracts are more likely to be challenged even in the
absence of any specific wrongdoing, and should be prepared to explain, on paper
and in plain terms, why each service provider was selected, how fees were
reviewed, and why the arrangement makes sense for the plan.
Criticism of
Cunningham as Expanding Prohibited-Transaction Litigation Beyond Its Intended
Scope
Although the
Supreme Court described Cunningham as a straightforward application of ERISA’s
statutory structure, many commentators have questioned whether the decision
aligns with economic reality and the historical purpose of ERISA’s
prohibited-transaction rules and fiduciary-duty framework. By allowing
prohibited-transaction claims to proceed without any allegation that
compensation was excessive, unreasonable, or the result of a flawed fiduciary
process, Cunningham permits plaintiffs to challenge routine, arm’s-length
service arrangements that have traditionally been viewed as permissible so long
as compensation is reasonable and services are necessary.
From a
litigation standpoint, Cunningham makes it easier for plaintiffs to add
prohibited-transaction claims to otherwise weak excessive-fee complaints in
order to avoid the more demanding pleading standards that apply to ERISA § 404
prudence claims. Plaintiffs use the prohibited transaction rules as a backdoor
to revive excessive fee claims when they lack direct evidence of actual
fiduciary imprudence or unreasonable market rates. Because nearly all service
providers qualify as parties in interest, plaintiffs generally need only allege
the existence of a service relationship to survive a motion to dismiss under §
406. This shifts early litigation away from whether fees were excessive or
fiduciary decision-making was imprudent and instead places immediate pressure
on plan sponsors to defend ordinary plan operations. As a result, ERISA’s
prohibited-transaction provisions—originally intended to prevent self-dealing
and other prohibited transactions—risk being used primarily as a procedural
tool to increase settlement leverage in cases where no concrete fiduciary
misconduct or participant harm has been plausibly alleged.
Post-Cunningham
Reduction in Successful Motions to Dismiss in ERISA Fee Cases
Since the
Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Cunningham, motions to dismiss ERISA
fee cases, particularly prohibited-transaction claims under ERISA § 406, have
been granted less frequently. Courts are increasingly allowing cases to proceed
based solely on allegations that a plan paid fees to a service provider that
qualifies as a party in interest. As a result, lawsuits that likely would have
been dismissed before Cunningham are now advancing into costly
discovery, including cases involving mid-sized plans that historically were not
frequent litigation targets.
Judicial
Pushback
Rule 7(a)
Orders. In response to Cunningham, more
courts are utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) to require plaintiffs
to file a reply to an answer regarding reasonableness and exemptions before
allowing discovery to proceed, as the Supreme Court in Cunningham
suggested. For example, in Dalton v. Freeman, No. 2:22-cv-00847, 2025 WL
3771345 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025), a California federal court ordered a Rule
7(a) reply to compel plaintiffs to address ERISA exemptions with
“specific, nonconclusory factual allegations” before discovery could
begin. Although the plaintiffs had survived a motion to dismiss by alleging a
“prohibited transaction” under the Cunningham standard, the
court used Rule 7(a) to address the “procedural issue” that otherwise
allows “meritless” cases to reach discovery.
Article III
Standing. A recent 2026 ruling highlights how courts
are using Article III standing as a “constitutional gatekeeper” to
dismiss prohibited transaction claims that might otherwise satisfy statutory
pleading requirements. In Peeler v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc., No.
1:24-cv-00231-MR, 2026 WL 208630 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2026), a North Carolina
federal court dismissed an ERISA class action for lack of Article III standing,
holding that a “bare allegation” of a relationship with a party in
interest is insufficient without specific allegations of a concrete injury. The
court held that despite recent Supreme Court guidance lowering the statutory
pleading bar for prohibited transactions, plaintiffs must still identify a
non-speculative financial loss actually affecting their individual accounts to
satisfy constitutional requirements. Ultimately, the court found the
plaintiffs’ allegations were too speculative because they failed to show that
their own account balances declined or that the recordkeeping and advisory
services provided weren’t worth what the plan paid. The court dismissed the
claims without prejudice, reinforcing that statutory violations alone do not
confer standing.
Fee-Shifting
and Attorney Accountability. Beyond procedural rules, courts are
exploring fee-shifting to deter meritless litigation. In November 2025, a U.S.
district judge granted summary judgment to the defendants in Whipple v.
Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-04583-SAL (D.S.C. Nov. 25,
2025), dismissing a class action that alleged the company paid $3.5 million in
excessive 401(k) recordkeeping fees. The ruling for the employer hinged on the
court’s Daubert exclusion of the plaintiffs’ sole expert witness, which
prevented them from establishing loss causation under ERISA. Following this
dismissal, the defendants filed a motion in early 2026 under ERISA § 502(g)(1)
to shift over $1 million in defense costs specifically to the plaintiffs’ law firm
(but not to the named participants). In an unusual but growing trend, the
defense cited Cunningham guidance to argue that the firm itself bear
these costs to deter “baseless” class actions that exploit lower
pleading standards to force expensive discovery.
Legislative
Developments
Congress has
recently focused on the practical consequences of recent ERISA litigation
trends. On December 2, 2025, the House Education and Workforce Subcommittee
held a hearing entitled “Pension Predators: Stopping Class Action Abuse
Against Workers’ Retirement,” which examined whether developments such as Cunningham
have contributed to an increase in ERISA class actions driven more by
procedural leverage than by demonstrable fiduciary misconduct. Witnesses and
members of Congress expressed concern that lower pleading thresholds may impose
substantial litigation costs on plans and ultimately reduce retirement benefits
borne by participants.
On March 17,
2026, the House Education and Workforce Committee passed the ERISA Litigation
Reform Act (H.R. 6084) by a vote of 19-13. This bill aims to (i) shift the
burden of proof back to plaintiffs, requiring them to plausibly allege that a
transaction isn’t exempt under Section 408 at the pleading stage, (ii) require
“meaningful benchmarks” for performance claims, (iii) mandate an
automatic stay of discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending, and (iv)
require plaintiffs to prove that service provider fees were neither reasonable
nor necessary. Proponents argue this restores the “innocent until proven
guilty” principle for plan fiduciaries.
DOL New Enforcement Guidance and
Restrictions of DOL Information Sharing with Plaintiff Bar
Recent
congressional hearings exposed a troubling alliance between the DOL and
plaintiff attorneys. On July 22, 2025, the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce investigated the DOL EBSA’s use of secret common interest agreements.
It was recently discovered and reported at the hearing that the EBSA uses these
of secret common interest agreements with plaintiff attorneys to spoon-feed
confidential investigative data to those law firms. This practice gives
plaintiff attorneys unfair leverage in the case. Lawmakers heavily criticized
this practice, with some calling it a blatant abuse of the law. See https://tinyurl.com/412636.
In response, the DOL Inspector General launched an official audit into the
information sharing by EBSA and plaintiff attorneys. A bill was also introduced
in Congress, the Balance the Scales Act (H.R. 2958), to force the agency to
disclose all future common interest agreements.
To address
this controversy and other issues, the DOL issued Field Assistance Bulletin
2026-01 on April 14, 2026, which significantly shifts the EBSA 2026 enforcement
priorities. It outlines that the DOL will shift its focus to (i) egregious
conduct and loyalty breaches, (ii) avoid regulation by enforcement, (iii)
require senior leadership review for critical initiatives, and (iv) ensure
timely investigations. Also, the bulletin specifically prohibits agency staff
from coordinating enforcement activities with plaintiff attorneys pursuing
private actions. The bulletin also sets strict investigation deadlines, with
routine investigations required to close within 18 months, and complex cases
required to close within 30 months.
Evolving
Theories: Pleading Standards and Loss Causation
Supreme Court
Seeks Solicitor General Input. Following Cunningham, the Supreme
Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States
on whether to grant certiorari in two ERISA class actions highlighting
significant circuit splits. On December 9, 2025, the Solicitor General urged
the Court to grant certiorari in Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Johnson and Pizarro
v. Home Depot, Inc. (both cited below) and supported plan sponsor and
fiduciary defendants on the merits. This reflected a shift toward a more
pragmatic interpretation by endorsing meaningful-benchmark pleading standards
and rejecting expansive burden-shifting theories of loss causation.
Pleading
Standards in Parker-Hannifin and Intel Corp.
In Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Johnson, 122 F.4th 205 (6th Cir. 2024), the
Sixth Circuit allowed an investment-performance challenge to proceed without
requiring the plaintiff to plausibly allege a “meaningful benchmark,”
which allows the court to determine whether plaintiffs have alleged plausible
claims to survive a motion to dismiss, an approach taken by some circuits,
while other circuits merely require a showing of meaningful comparability.
While the Solicitor General urged the Court to hear the case and reverse the
Sixth Circuit’s lenient standard, the Supreme Court is still considering
whether to grant certiorari as of March 2026. However, the Court has already
agreed to resolve this specific “meaningful benchmark” split in a
related case, Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, the
Court granted certiorari in January 2026.
Loss
Causation in Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc. In Pizarro
v. Home Depot, Inc., 111 F.4th 1165 (11th Cir. 2024), the Eleventh Circuit held
that ERISA plaintiffs retain the burden of proving loss causation even after establishing
a breach of fiduciary duty and a loss, rejecting a burden-shifting framework
adopted by several other circuits. The Solicitor General supported this view,
arguing that the burden should remain with the plaintiffs. Following the filing
of the Solicitor General’s brief, the plaintiffs chose to abandon their appeal,
and the Supreme Court therefore dismissed the petition on January 8, 2026.
Meaningful
Benchmarks in Anderson v. Intel. In Anderson
v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, 137 F.4th 1015 (9th Cir. 2025),
participants in its retirement plans alleged that trustees imprudently
invested in risky hedge funds and private equity that yielded lower returns
than traditional investments. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
participants’ claims, ruling that they failed to plausibly allege a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA as the complaint did not provide meaningful benchmarks with similar investment
aims, risks, and objectives. The Supreme
Court granted review on January 16, 2026, to resolve whether plaintiffs
challenging investment underperformance must identify a “meaningful
benchmark” at the pleading stage to satisfy ERISA’s duty of prudence.
Looking Ahead
11-17-26 Addendum
Update — November 17, 2026: Further Developments in ERISA
Litigation
Since
this article was posted on April 23, 2026, several developments have reinforced
the growing judicial and legislative scrutiny of meritless ERISA class actions.
Supreme Court Review of ERISA Pleading Standards. On October
6, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Anderson v. Intel Corp.
Investment Policy Committee, No. 25-498, involving the requirement that
plaintiffs challenging investment underperformance identify a meaningful
benchmark. The Ninth Circuit had dismissed the claims because plaintiffs failed
to identify sufficiently comparable investments. During oral argument, several
Justices appeared receptive to requiring meaningful comparisons, although the
appropriate degree of comparability remains disputed. A decision is expected
during the Court’s 2026–2027 Term. Unlike Cunningham v. Cornell University,
which addressed prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406, Anderson
concerns the pleading requirements for fiduciary imprudence under § 404. See Supreme
Court docket.
Judicial Safeguards Against Weak Claims. Courts have
continued exploring the procedural protections identified in Cunningham.
In Dalton v. Freeman, No. 2:22-cv-00847, 2025 WL 3771345 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
31, 2025), the court required plaintiffs to respond under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 7(a)(7) to defendants’ prohibited-transaction exemption defense.
However, the case subsequently proceeded toward discovery, illustrating the
limitations of this safeguard. In Peeler v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc.,
No. 1:24-cv-00231-MR, 2026 WL 208630 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2026), the court
dismissed claims for lack of Article III standing, emphasizing that Cunningham
did not eliminate the requirement of concrete injury.
Legislative Developments. The ERISA
Litigation Reform Act (H.R. 6084), which the House Education and Workforce
Committee ordered reported on March 17, 2026, remains pending. The legislation
would impose more demanding pleading requirements, including provisions
addressing statutory exemptions and meaningful investment benchmarks, and would
restrict discovery while certain dismissal motions are pending. No legislation
reversing Cunningham has been enacted.
DOL Enforcement and Information Sharing. The DOL’s
April 14, 2026 Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01 remains an important change in
enforcement policy. It emphasizes serious violations, discourages regulation
through enforcement, establishes 18-month and 30-month administrative
investigation targets subject to exceptions, and restricts coordination with
private plaintiffs’ attorneys. These policies do not alter the rights of
private litigants or create enforceable deadlines for investigations. See DOL
Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01.
Practical Significance. Although Cunningham continues to
expose routine service-provider arrangements to prohibited-transaction
litigation, courts and policymakers are considering ways to prevent weak claims
from imposing disproportionate litigation costs. The forthcoming Anderson
decision may provide important additional guidance concerning speculative
investment-performance claims. Meanwhile, plan fiduciaries should continue
documenting the reasonableness of service-provider compensation, investment
selection, and ongoing monitoring procedures.
SECURE Act of 2019 EBEC Summary
SECURE Act Summary
“SECURE Act” (Setting Every Community Up for Retirement Enhancement
Act of 2019) was enacted part of the Further Consolidated Appropriations Act,
2020, P.L. 116-94, H.R. 1865 (with basically the same provisions of H.R. 1994,
originally passed by the House on May 23, 2019). The SECURE Act
makes significant changes to retirement savings law. This
legislation is the first significant retirement benefit legislation in more
than a decade.
in the SECURE Act:
Contribution Plans
the use of multiple employer plans (“MEPs”) by allowing totally
unrelated companies to use a single shared defined contribution MEP provided
the third-party plan administrator is a pooled plan provider registered with
the IRS and acknowledges that it is a named fiduciary of the
plan. (SECURE Act § 101 adding IRC § 413(e) and ERISA §§ 3(43) and 3(44)) The
Committee Report 116-65 on an earlier version of the SECURE Act (which was
substantially the same as the version passed) (May 16, 2019) (the
“Committee Report”) notes that this change will make MEPs more
attractive by eliminating barriers to the use of MEPs and improving the quality
of MEP service providers. Under prior guidance, an open MEP used by
unrelated employers even without commonality of interests or not in same
industry or locality would run afoul of Department of Labor guidance. Under
the SECURE Act and IRC § 413(e)(4), the Treasury is directed to issue guidance
as to how to spin of assets of a non-compliant employer into a separate plan
(so as to avoid the one bad apple issue). The new rules are
effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2020.
Enrollment Safe Harbor Cap after First Year of Enrollment
that for automatic enrollment safe harbor 401(k) plans, there is a cap on the
default contribution rate to 10% of an employee’s compensation. The
SECURE Act increases the automatic enrollment limit for salary deferrals under
the automatic enrollment safe harbor from 10% to 15% of compensation for any
year after the first year of participation. (SECURE Act § 102 amending IRC §
401(k)(13)(C)(iii)) This is effective for plan years beginning after
December 31, 2019.
Harbor 401(k) Rules.
SECURE Act, with respect to non-elective
safe harbor plans, i.e., 401(k) plans that provide employer contributions of 3%
of each employee’s compensation regardless of whether the employees make
deferrals, provides for elimination
of the annual safe harbor notice requirement, although participants must still
receive an annual notice to make or change elections which is required for all
401(k) plans. However, employers that make safe harbor matching contributions
will still need to give the advance notice. This change is effective
for plan years beginning after December 31, 2019. SECURE Act § 103
amending IRC § 401(k)(12).
SECURE Act also provides with respect to non-elective safe harbor plans an allowance of a retroactive amendment to a plan to become a
non-elective safe harbor 401(k) plan at any time before the 30th day preceding
the close of the plan year, and allowance of an amendment after that time if it
provides for a nonelective contribution of at least 4% of compensation (rather
than 3%) for all eligible employees for that plan year, if the amendment is
made no later than the last day for distributing excess contributions for the
plan year, that is, by the close of following plan year. SECURE Act § 103
amending IRC § 401(k)(13). This relief does not apply to safe harbor
matching contribution plans. These provisions are effective for plan years
beginning after December 31, 2019.
Credits
Credit for Small Employer Pension Plan Start-Up Costs – The
SECURE Act increases the credit for small employer pension plan startups by
changing the calculation of the flat dollar amount limit on the credit to the
greater of (a) $500 or (b) the lesser of (i) $250 multiplied by the number of
non-highly compensated employees of the employer who are eligible to
participate in the plan or (ii) $5,000. The credit applies for up to three
years. (SECURE Act § 104 amending IRC § 45E)
Credit (up to 3 years) – The SECURE Act creates a new tax credit of up to $500 per year
(up to 3 years) to employers of small businesses (100 or less employees) to
defray startup costs for new section 401(k) plans and SIMPLE IRA plans that
include automatic enrollment. (SECURE Act § 105, adding IRC §
45T)
Contributions to Traditional IRAs After Age 70-1/2 Maximum Age for Traditional
IRA Contributions
SECURE Act repeals the prohibition on contributions to traditional IRAs by
individuals who have attained age 70-1/2. (SECURE Act § 107 striking
IRC § 219(d)(1)) The Committee Report notes that as Americans live
longer, an increasing number continue employment beyond traditional retirement
age. This is effective for contributions made on or after January 1,
2020.
through Credit Cards Not Allowed
prohibits plans from making plan loans accessible to participants through
credit cards or any other similar
arrangement. (SECURE Act § 108 adding IRC §
72(p)(2)(D)) The Committee Report notes that the change will ensure
that plan loans are not used for routine or small purchases, which would
deplete retirement savings. This rule is effective for loans made
after December 20, 2019.
Options
the use of annuity options in retirement plans, the SECURE Act permits
tax-qualified defined contribution plans, section 403(b) plans, and eligible
457(b) plans to be amended to provide for (i) direct rollovers to other
employer-sponsored retirement plans or IRAs of a lifetime annuity income
investment or (ii) distributions of an annuity income investment in the form of
a qualified distribution, if the annuity income distribution option is no
longer authorized to be held as an investment option under the existing
plan. (SECURE Act § 109, amending IRC §§ 401(a)(38),
401(k)(2)(B)(i)(VI), 401(k)(2)(B)(iii), 403(b)(11)(D), 403(b)(7)(A),
457(d)(1)(A)(iv) and 457(d)(1)(D)) The Committee Report notes that
this change will permit participants to preserve annuity their income
investments and avoid surrender charges and fees. This is effective
for plan years beginning after December 31, 2019.
Lifetime Income Provider
provides that fiduciaries (i) have an optional safe harbor to satisfy the
prudence requirement with respect to the selection of insurers for guaranteed
retirement income contract (annuity options) and (ii) are protected from
liability for any losses that may result to the participant or beneficiary due
to an insurer’s inability in the future to satisfy its financial obligations
under the terms of the contract. The safe harbor requires that fiduciary (i) engages
in an objective and thorough search to identify the insurer, (ii) considers the
financial capability of such insurer to satisfy its obligations under the
guaranteed retirement income contract and (iii) considers the cost (including
fees and commissions) of the guaranteed retirement income contract; and on the
basis of such consideration, (i) the fiduciary concludes that at the time of
selection the insurer is financially capable of satisfying its obligations
under the guaranteed contract, and (ii) the relative cost of the
selected guaranteed contract is reasonable. The fiduciary must
obtains written representations from the insurer that (i) the insurer is
licensed to offer guaranteed retirement income contracts, (ii) the insurer, at
the time of selection and for each of the immediately preceding seven plan
years operates under a certificate of authority from the insurance commissioner
of its State, has filed audited financial statements in accordance with state
law, maintains reserves which satisfies all the state statutory requirements
and is not operating under an order of supervision, rehabilitation, or
liquidation. In addition, the insurer must undergo at least every
five years a financial examination (under state law) domiciliary State (or
representative, designee, or other party approved by such commissioner) by the
insurance commissioner or its designee, and the insurer must notify the
fiduciary of any change its representation. The statute provides
that nothing in this provision shall be construed to require a fiduciary to
select the lowest cost contract. A fiduciary may consider the value of a
contract, the insurer’s financial strength and the cost of the contract.
(SECURE Act § 204 adding ERISA § 404(e)) These provisions are effective December
20, 2019.
403(b) Plans
that, not later than six months after the date of enactment, the Treasury shall
issue guidance under which if an employer terminates a 403(b) custodial
account, the final distribution to participants needed to effectuate the plan
termination may be the distribution of an individual custodial account in kind
to the participant. The individual custodial account will be maintained on a
tax-deferred basis as a 403(b) custodial account until paid out, subject to the
403(b) rules in effect at the time that the individual custodial account is
distributed. The Treasury guidance is to be retroactively effective for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 2008. (SECURE Act § 110)
Relating to Church-Controlled Organizations
amends IRC § 403(b)(9) to clarify that individuals who may be covered by
retirement income accounts maintained by church-controlled organizations may
include not only duly ordained or licensed ministers but also employees of
tax-exempt church-controlled organizations that are controlled by or associated
with a church or a convention or association of churches (e.g.,
church-affiliated hospitals and universities). (SECURE Act § 111 amending IRC §
403(b)(9).) This is effective for years beginning on or after December 20,
2019.
Working for 3 Years to Participate in 401(k) Plans
employees who work less than 1,000
hours per year can under current law be excluded from participating in a
qualified retirement plan. The SECURE Act will require employers to
maintain a 401(k) plan to have a dual eligibility requirement of (i) completing
1,000 hours of service or (ii) having three consecutive years of service where
the employee completes at least 500 hours of service in each. (SECURE
Act § 112 amending IRC §
401(k)(2)(D)) This rule will not apply to collectively bargained plans. With
respect to long-term part-time employees who are eligible under the above
provisions matching or other employer contributions are not required, relief is
provided from the nondiscrimination and top-heavy rules for such
coverage. New IRC § 401(k)(15). The effective date is for plan years beginning after December
31, 2020.
Adoption
for withdrawals from retirement plans of up to $5,000, even before 59-1/2 and
without the IRC § 72(t) 10% early distribution penalty in the year following
the birth or adoption of a child. (SECURE Act § 113 adding IRC §
72(t)(2)(H)) This is effective for distributions made after December
31, 2019.
distributions would generally be taken from retirement plans or IRAs beginning
with the year in which the employee or IRA owner attains age 70-1/2 (or April 1
following the first year in which this occurs). The SECURE Act of
2019 changes the required beginning date on which the required minimum
distributions must begin from the calendar year in which the participant
attains age 70-1/2 to the calendar year in which the participant attains age
72. (SECURE Act § 114 amending IRC §§ 401(a)(9)( C)(i)(I),
401(a)(9)(B)(iv)(I) and 401(a)(9)( C)(ii)(I), last sentence of § 408(b) and §
457(d)(1)(A)(i)) According to the Committee Report, although the
policy behind the required minimum distribution rule is to ensure that
individuals spend their retirement savings during their lifetime and not use
their retirement plans for estate planning purposes, nevertheless, age 70-1/2
was first applied in the early 1960s and has never been adjusted to take into
account increases in life expectancy. This applies for distributions made after
December 31, 2019 for individuals who attain age 70½ after such
date.
Pension Funding Relief
generally family-owned, non-publicly traded, independent newspapers. The SECURE
Act provides pension funding relief for community newspaper plan sponsors by
increasing the interest rate to calculate those funding obligations to 8%.
Additionally, the SECURE Act provides for a longer amortization period of 30
years from 7 years. (SECURE Act § 115 adding IRC § 430(m)) These two
changes would reduce the annual amount struggling community newspaper employers
would be required to contribute to their pension plan. This is
effective for plan years ending after December 31, 2017.
Compensation for Determining Retirement Contribution Limitations
workers do not have a taxable income because their only compensation comes from
“difficulty of care” payments exempt from taxation under IRC §
131. Because such workers do not
have taxable income, they cannot save for retirement in a defined contribution
plan or IRA. The SECURE Act allows home healthcare workers to contribute to a
plan or IRA by amending IRC sections 415(c) and 408(o) to provide that tax
exempt difficulty of care payments are treated as compensation for
purposes of calculating the contribution limits to defined contribution plans
and IRAs. (SECURE Act § 116 adding §§ 408(o)(5) &
415(c)(8)) This is effective for plan years beginning after December
31, 2015 and for IRA contributions made after December 31,
2019.
IRC § 401(b) to provide that a qualified retirement plan is adopted before the due date
(including extensions) of the tax return for the taxable year may be treated as
having been adopted as of the last day of the taxable year. (SECURE
Act § 201 amending IRC § 401(b)) The Committee Report notes that
this additional time to establish a plan provides flexibility for employers
considering adopting a plan and the opportunity for employees to receive
contributions for that earlier year and begin to accumulate retirement
savings. This is effective for plans adopted for tax years beginning
after December 31, 2019. See also below regarding SECURE Act § 601
relating to provisions relating to Plan amendments needed for implementing
SECURE Act.
the IRS and DOL to provide for the filing of a consolidated Form 5500 for
similar plans. Plans eligible for consolidated filing would be defined
contribution plans with the same trustee, the same named fiduciary under ERISA,
and the same administrator, using the same plan year, and providing the same
investments or investment options to participants and
beneficiaries. (SECURE Act § 202) The Committee Report
notes that the change will reduce aggregate administrative costs, making it
easier for small employers to sponsor a retirement plan. This is
effective for plan years beginning after December 31, 2021.
to require that benefit statements provided to defined contribution plan
participants must include a “lifetime income disclosure” at least once
every 12-months. The lifetime income disclosure would show the monthly payments
the participant would receive if the total account balance were provided as
lifetime income streams, including a qualified joint and survivor annuity for
the participant and the participant’s surviving spouse and a single life
annuity. The DOL is directed to develop a model disclosure. Disclosure in terms
of monthly payments will allow participants to correlate the funds in their
defined contribution plan to lifetime income. Plan fiduciaries, plan sponsors,
or other persons will have no liability under ERISA solely by providing annuity
income stream equivalents that are derived in accordance with permitted
assumptions and guidance and that include the explanations contained in the
model disclosure. (SECURE Act § 203 adding ERISA §§
105(a)(2)(B)(iii) and 105(a)(2)(D)) This applies to benefit
statements furnished more than 12 months after the latest to occur of the DOL
issuing (i) interim final rules, (ii) the model disclosure or (iii) the
assumptions that may be used in the disclosure.
Closed Defined Benefit Plans
provides relief from nondiscrimination, minimum coverage and minimum
participation rules for defined benefit plans that are closed to new
participants but allow existing participants to continue to accrue benefits.
This relief is subject to the plan satisfying certain requirements, including
that the plan’s benefits were nondiscriminatory during the year in which the
plan was closed and the two following years. The modification will protect the benefits for
older, longer-service employees as they near retirement. This is
generally effective on the date
of enactment – December 20, 2019, although plan sponsors can elect an earlier
effective date.
funding rules were adopted for three types of pension plans: single-employer,
multiemployer and cooperative and small employer charity (CSEC) plans. The
SECURE Act provides flat-rate premiums of $19 per participant, and variable
rate premiums of $9 for each $1,000 of unfunded vested benefits for CSEC
plans. (SECURE Act § 206 adding ERISA §§ 4006(a)(3)(A) & 4006(a)(3)(E)(v)) This is effective presumably on the date of
enactment – December 20, 2019.
529 education savings accounts to cover costs associated with registered
apprenticeships, homeschooling, up to $10,000 of qualified student loan
repayments (including those for siblings) and private elementary, secondary, or
religious schools. (SECURE Act § 302 adding IRC §§ 529(c)(8) and
529(c)(9)) This is effective for distributions made after December
31, 2018.
Rules
the required minimum distribution rules with respect to defined contribution
plan and IRA balances upon the death of the employee or account owner. Under
the SECURE Act, distributions to individuals are generally required to be
distributed by the end of the tenth calendar year following the year of the
employee or IRA owner’s death; provided, however, that this 10-year requirement
will not apply to the surviving spouse of the employee (or IRA owner), to
disabled or chronically ill individuals, to individuals who are not more than
10 years younger than the employee (or IRA owner), or to children of the
employee (or IRA owner) who have not reached the age of
majority. (SECURE Act § 401 amending IRC § 410(a)(9)(E) and adding §
401(a)(9)(H)) This is generally effective for distributions with
respect to employees who die after December 31, 2019. However, for
collectively bargained plans, this applies with respect to employees who die in
calendar years after the earlier of (i) the later of the date of termination of
the collective bargaining agreement or December 31, 2019 or (ii) December 31,
2021.
Distributions (from Division M)
different section (to offset certain expenses arising in that section) allows
in-service distributions under a defined benefit, money purchase plans or
governmental section 457(b) plan at age 59 ½ (rather than age 62 that was
permitted for pension plans or age 70 ½ that was permitted for
457(b) plans). This is effective for plan years beginning after
December 31, 2019. (SECURE ACT Division M § 104).
Return
provision, the SECURE Act increases the penalty for failure to file a tax
return to the lesser of $435 or 100% of the amount of the tax due. (SECURE Act
§ 402 amending IRC § 6652) According to the Committee Report,
increasing the penalties will encourage the filing of timely and accurate
returns which will improve overall tax administration. This is
effective for tax returns for which the due date with extension is after
December 31, 2019.
Retirement Plan Returns
the failure to file penalties for retirement plan returns. The Form 5500
penalty would be increased from $25 to $250 per day, not to exceed $150,000 (up
from $15,000). Failure to file a registration statement would incur
a penalty of $10 per participant per day (up from $1), not to exceed $10,000
(up from $1,000). Failure to provide a required withholding notice
would result in a penalty of $100 for each failure (up from $10), not to exceed
$50,000 for all failures during any calendar year (up from $5,000). (SECURE Act
§ 403 amending IRC §6651)) This is effective for returns, statements
and notifications required to be provided/filed after December 31,
2019.
the IRS to share returns with the U.S. Customs and Border Protection for
purposes of administering the heavy vehicle use tax. (SECURE Act §
404 adding IRC § 6103(o)(3)) This is effective presumably on the date of enactment – December
20, 2019.
plans will need to be formally amended to reflect the requirements of the
SECURE Act. The deadline for such amendments is the end of the first plan year
beginning on or after January 1, 2022 (January 1, 2024 for collectively
bargained and governmental plans). However, tax-qualified plans must be
operated in accordance with the new law as of the respective effective
dates.
FOR PRACTITIONERS
participant loans from tax-qualified retirement plans often results in
increased Plan participation by non-highly compensated employees. Employers often choose to make loans available
from their plans as a matter of employee relations. However, plan loans are subject to complicated
rules under both ERISA and the Code, and they are a trap for the unwary if they
are not administered properly in compliance with these rules. Recent developments regarding participant
loans include certain changes made by the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017 and
other recent IRS guidance. This article
provides a roadmap for practitioners in advising clients on instituting and
operating a participant loan program.
qualified plans, especially § 401(k) plans, to obtain loans from such
plans is responsible in no small way for the popularity of the plans and the
increased participation of employees in such plans. Plan loans, however, are subject to a very
specific set of rules, which, if not followed, may subject such loans to income
and penalty taxes. Specifically, such
loans must comply with the conditions set forth in § 408(b)(1) of the
Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, as amended (ERISA), and
§ 72(p) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as amended (Code). If these conditions are not met, loans to
plan participants may be prohibited transactions under ERISA, may violate the “anti-alienation”
rules of ERISA and the Code and may be deemed to be taxable distributions to
the participants who received the loans.
This article attempts to chart the course that must be followed so that
unintended consequences are avoided.
§ 408. Part II examines the taxable
distribution rules of Code § 72(p), as well as issues relating to deemed
distributions and foreclosures. Other
miscellaneous issues are examined in Part III.
I – PROHIBITED TRANSACTION STATUTORY EXEMPTION
participant are prohibited extensions of credit from the plan to a party in
interest unless the requirements of the statutory exemption of ERISA
§ 408(b)(1) and Code § 4975(d)(1) are met.[1] The requirements of Code § 4975(d)(1)
must also be met in order that the loan not violate the anti-assignment rule of
Code § 401(a)(13) and ERISA § 206(d).
of ERISA § 408(b)(1) and Code § 4975(d)(1) are that the loans must:
be available to all participants
and beneficiaries on a reasonably equivalent basis;
(2)
not be available to highly
compensated employees in an amount greater than to other employees;
(3)
be made in accordance with the
loan provisions set forth in the plan;
(4)
bear a reasonable rate of
interest; and
(5)
be adequately secured.[2]
of Plan-Wide Availability on a Reasonably Equivalent Basis
participants and beneficiaries on a reasonably equivalent basis.[4] To meet this requirement, (1) the loans
must be available without regard to race, religion, gender, etc.;
(2) consideration must be given only to factors that would be considered
in normal commercial circumstances by an entity in the business of making
similar types of loans, including, for example, the creditworthiness and
financial need of the applicant; and (3) the loans in actual practice must
not be unreasonably withheld from any applicant.[5]
Limited to Parties in Interest. The
availability requirement is required only with respect to parties in interest,
and that a plan may limit loans to parties in interest.[6] Active employees of the sponsoring employer
are all parties in interest. Former
employees are typically not parties in interest, but certain former employees
by reason of some other relationship to the company or plan may be parties in
interest.[7] A plan could therefore not exclude all former
participants where some are parties in interest.
feature subject to the nondiscriminatory availability test of Treas. Reg.
§ 1.401(a)(4)-4. Most loan programs
easily meet this rule for active employees.
However, because plan loans are only required to be made available to
those former employees who are also parties in interest, the potential for
discrimination with respect to former employees in favor of highly compensated
former employees is greater. In
recognition of this problem, the § 401(a)(4) regulations provide that
former employees who are parties in interest may be treated as active
employees.[8]
without violating the reasonably equivalent basis requirement.[9]
Allowed. A plan is allowed to limit
the availability of loans to specific purposes such as hardship, college tuition,
home purchases, etc., provided that loans continue to be made available to
participants and beneficiaries on a reasonably equivalent basis.[10]
Bargaining Unit Employees. A plan
whose participants are members in several unions and makes a loan feature
available only as their collective bargaining agreements are renegotiated would
not violate the reasonably equivalent requirement, if within a reasonable time
period all bargaining units approve the loan feature.[11]
Loans to Executive Officers Under Sarbanes Oxley Act. The Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibits
loans to directors or executive officers.
There is no clear authority as
to whether the Sarbanes Oxley Act of 2002 prohibition on loans to executive
officers would apply to 401(k) plan loans, as extensions or arrangements of
credit by the issuer. A joint memo by 25
law firms “Interpretive Issues Under § 402 – Prohibition on Certain
Insider Loans,” (Oct. 15, 2002) argued that 401(k) loans should be
permitted, since the officer is effectively borrowing from himself and the loan
is from the plan rather than the issuer, but there has been no SEC guidance on
the matter. The
possible restrictions on loans to officers and directors under the Sarbanes
Oxley Act would not cause a plan to violate the reasonably equivalent basis
rule for participant loans under ERISA § 408(b)(1)(A).[12]
regulations makes it clear that fees may be charged to cover the administrative
cost of making loans.[13]
That Loans Not Be More Available to Highly Compensated Employees than to Other
Employees
employees[14]
in an amount greater than to other employees.[15] To meet this requirement, it must be
determined upon consideration of the facts and circumstances that the program
does not operate to exclude large numbers of participants from receiving
loans. A loan program will not fail
because it limits loans to a maximum dollar amount or to a maximum percentage
of a participant’s vested accrued benefit, despite the fact that under a
percentage limit the maximum loan amount will vary with the size of the
participant’s accrued benefit.[16]
That the Plan Document Specifically Permit Loans
loan provisions set forth in the plan.[17] Regulations provide that plan provisions must
contain explicit authorization for the establishment of a loan program.[18] In addition, the plan document or a written
document forming part of the plan must include:
(1) the identity of the person or position authorized to administer
the loan program; (2) a procedure for applying for loans; (3) the
basis on which loans will be approved or denied; (4) limitations (if any)
on the type of loans offered; (5) the procedure for determining a
reasonable rate of interest; (6) the types of collateral that may secure
the loan; and (7) the events constituting default and the steps that will
be taken to preserve plan assets in the event of such default.[19]
Description (SPD). The enumerated
items described in the preceding paragraph affect the rights and obligations of
participants and therefore must be set forth in a plan’s SPD.[20] The preamble to the final regulations notes
that the SPD alone can satisfy the plan provision requirement if it contains
the required loan provisions and is a document forming part of the plan.[21]
plan loan provisions (contained in the plan or SPD), loan application
guidelines, a loan application, a loan disclosure statement, and a promissory
note and security agreement.
of a Reasonable Interest Rate
provide the plan with a return commensurate with the interest rates charged by
persons in the business of lending money for loans that would be made under similar
circumstances.[23] A strict reading of the regulations may
require different interest rates depending on each participant’s
creditworthiness.[24] Thus, if local banks would lend the participant,
taking into account his or her creditworthiness and the collateral offered, at
a fixed rate of 12%, a plan that loaned at 8% would not be charging a
reasonable rate of interest and would not be entitled to the relief provided by
ERISA § 408(b)(1).[25]
Relevant. State usury laws may not
be used to justify a low rate of interest.[26]
Commonly Used. Some courts have
analyzed reasonable interest taking into account that the loan is a
compensating balance loan with the loan secured by a sum of money deposited by
the borrower with the lender, and therefore, according to expert testimony
cited in one case, a rate of one or two percent above the certificate of
deposit rate would be reasonable. [27] Many plans have been charging the prime
interest rate plus 1 or 2 percentage points.
However, because the prime rate in recent years has been low,
that prime plus 2 percent is currently what the
deems to be a reasonable rate of interest.[28] Other plans charge the prevailing rate for
home equity loans.
Renewals. When a loan is subject to
renewal, the prevailing market rate at the time of renewal must be
charged.[29]
Adjustable Rates. Most plans charge
a fixed interest rate for the loan for administrative convenience, although
adjustable rates are also permitted.
of Adequate Security
Foreclosed With “No Loss.”
The loans must be adequately secured.[30] To meet this requirement, the security posted
must be: (1) something more than a mere
promise to pay; (2) capable of being foreclosed on or otherwise disposed of in
the event of default in an amount equal to the amount due; and (3) of such
value and liquidity that it is reasonably anticipated that there will be no
loss of principal or interest.[31]
Participant’s Vested Accrued Benefit as Security. A participant’s vested accrued benefit may be
adequate security, but only up to 50% of such benefit may be so utilized.[32]
as a distribution, spousal consent to waive the qualified joint and survivor
annuity requirement, where applicable, must be obtained. Spousal consent rules apply mainly to defined
benefit plans (and money purchase pension plans).[33] The spousal consent rules can be met by
obtaining spousal consent to the loan and foreclosure not more than 90 days
before the date the loan is made.[34] The adequate security requirement of ERISA
§ 408(b)(1) may require that spousal consent be obtained at the time a
loan is made from a plan subject to the spousal consent rules.[35]
Code § 72(p)(3) provides that an interest deduction may not be taken with
respect to a plan loan if it is: (i)
made to a key employee (as defined in Code § 416(i)), or (ii) secured by
the participant’s § 401(k) elective deferrals. If a loan to a non-key employee is secured by
the participant’s principal residence (i.e.,
a mortgage) rather than by his or her § 401(k) account, the mortgage
interest deduction would be allowed.[36]
investment programs making mortgages available to individuals including plan
participants will not be subject to the limits of Code § 72(p) with
respect to the participant loans.[37]
Proceeds. Typically, participant
loans from defined contribution plans are taken directly from the participant’s
account. Often a special loan subaccount
is created.[38] The loan then becomes an investment of the
individual account but not of the entire plan.
Under another method most commonly used by plans that do not have individual
accounts, the participant borrows from the plan as a whole and, as the loan
principal and interest are repaid, they accrue to the entire plan rather than
to the participant’s account. The loan
is then considered a general investment of the entire plan.
Collateral on “No Loss” Rule.
Where a loan is treated as an investment attributable solely to the
participant’s account, the adequate security requirement will be met and the “no
loss” rule satisfied even if the security interest cannot be immediately
foreclosed on (e.g., because of “in-service distribution”
restrictions).[39] However, if the loan investment is allocated
to the plan as a whole, the preamble to the 1989 DOL regulations states that
the security of the accrued benefit may not be sufficient without some
additional security, such as mandatory payroll deduction or discounting the
value of the vested accrued benefit to take into account the time delay between
any possible default and the first distributable event with respect to the
borrowing participant’s account.[40]
regulations provide that to meet the requirements of ERISA § 408(b), there
must be a legitimate loan program that is administered by the fiduciary
primarily in the interest of participants.[41] The legitimacy of a loan program will be
determined by consideration of all facts and circumstances.[42] Where there is, for example, no intention
that the loan be repaid by the participant, the loan is not exempt. Likewise, a loan program designed to benefit
a party in interest other than a participant is not exempt.[43]
II – CODE RULES TO PREVENT TAXABLE DISTRIBUTIONS; DISTRIBUTION VERSUS
FORECLOSURE
§ 72(p) Generally
beneficiaries from a qualified plan (i.e.,
under Code §§ 401(a), 403(a), or 403(b)) will be treated as taxable
distributions from the plan,[44]
unless:
the loan does not exceed statutory
dollar limit or percentage limit;
the loan requires repayment within
5 years (or a longer period if the loan is used to acquire a principal
residence);
the loan requires substantially
level amortization over its term; and
the loan is evidenced by a legally
enforceable agreement in writing or acceptable electronic medium.[45]
under Code § 401(a); (ii) Code § 403(a) and Code § 403(b) annuity plans; and
(iii) governmental 457 plans.[46] However, loans cannot be taken from Individual
Retirement Accounts (IRAs) or Simple Employee Pensions (SEPs).
Be Limited in Amount
of all outstanding loans of the participant from the plan[47]
may not exceed the lesser of:
reduced by the excess, if any, of (A) the highest outstanding balance of loans
during the one-year period ending on the day before the date of the loan, over
(B) the outstanding balance of loans from the plan on the date the loan is
made;[48]
or
greater of (A) one-half the present value of the participant’s nonforfeitable
accrued benefit, or (B) $10,000.[49]
Typically Relevant. Despite the
statutory authority to do so, plans do not typically provide that a participant
may borrow $10,000 regardless of the size of his or her nonforfeitable accrued
benefit, because the ERISA adequate security requirement,[50]
discussed in Part I above, precludes plans from considering more than 50%
of the participant’s vested accrued benefit as collateral, and would require
additional collateral. For example, a
vested accrued benefit of $18,000 would not be adequate security for a $10,000
loan.
Restated in Simpler Way. The complex
statutory formulation of the $50,000 prong of the loan limit may be more simply
stated: the maximum amount of any
individual new loan is limited to $50,000 reduced by the highest outstanding
balance of loan(s) during the one-year period before the new loan is made.[51]
plan loans of a participant during the preceding year is $25,000, and the
outstanding balance of prior loans immediately before taking the new loan is
$15,000, the maximum aggregate loan balance the participant may have (under the
statutory formulation) cannot exceed $50,000 reduced by $10,000 (the excess of
$25,000 over $15,000), or $40,000. Since
the $15,000 prior loan is still outstanding, the maximum new loan cannot exceed
$25,000. The same result is reached by
simply limiting the new loan itself to $50,000 minus the highest outstanding
loan balance during the preceding year ($50,000 minus $25,000).
72(p)(2)(A) must still be met on an aggregate basis for all loans from
controlled group plans, and cannot be simplified in the above manner.
Outstanding for Maximum Permitted Amount After Deemed Distribution and
Additional Security for Subsequent Loans.
For purposes of calculating the maximum permitted amount of a subsequent
loan under Code § 72(p)(2)(A), a loan that has been deemed distributed under
§ 72(p) and has not been repaid (such as by plan loan offset) is still considered
outstanding until the loan obligation has been satisfied for purposes of
determining the maximum amount of any subsequent loan to the participant.[52]
loan is deemed distributed to a participant and has not been repaid (such as by
plan loan offset), then no payment made thereafter to the participant will be
treated as a loan for purposes of § 72(p)(2), unless there is an enforceable arrangement among the plan,
participant, and employer, under which repayments will be made by payroll
withholding or the plan receives adequate security in addition to the
participant’s accrued benefit for the additional loan. [53]
may be outstanding at any time. Others
provide for waiting periods between loans.[54]
That the Loan Be Repaid within Five Years
within five years.[55] If the loan is not required to be repaid
within five years, it is an immediate taxable distribution. In addition, if a loan providing for
repayment over five years is not repaid during such period, the amount
remaining payable at the end of the five years is a taxable distribution.[56] If there are required periodic payments, the
first of which is due to be made within two months of the date the loan was
made, legislative history indicates that the five-year repayment period will be
measured from the due date of that first payment, but some practitioners recommend
amortization over 59 months in such cases.[57]
Loans. Loans used to acquire a
principal residence are an exception to the five-year repayment requirement.[58] Nonetheless, plans typically do impose some
limit on principal residence loans, such as 10, 15 or 20 years. A principal residence loan that is for a
significantly longer period than the period under commercially available loans
(e.g., longer than 30 years) may not
be permissible.[59]
Code § 121 (relating to exclusion of gain from sale of principal
residence).[60] There is no requirement that it be a
principal residence for any specific period of time.[61] Tracing rules similar to those applicable
under Code § 163(h)(3)(B) (relating to the deduction for home acquisition
indebtedness) apply.[62] Refinancings do not qualify as principal
residence loans, although a plan loan that would otherwise qualify may be used
to repay a bank loan.[63]
of Level Amortization
term of the loan is required, and participants must make payments no less
frequently than quarterly.[64]
and Written or Electronic Authorizations.
Most plans provide for loan repayment by payroll deduction.
deductions be in writing. These laws,
however, may be preempted by ERISA. For
example, a 1994
Opinion held that a New York Law requiring written authorization for payroll
deductions, is preempted by ERISA to the extent it prevents a plan from
implementing a salary reduction arrangement by a telephone voice response
system.[65] Similarly, a 1996
Advisory Opinion held that ERISA preempts a
law that allows authorized payroll deductions only for contributions to pension
plans and not for loans.[66]
Payments during Leave of Absence.
The level amortization requirement will not be violated if repayments
cease while an employee is on a leave of absence for a period of up to one
year.[67] However, the loan (plus interest accruing
during the leave of absence) must still be paid within the original five-year
period, and therefore when the employee returns to work an accelerated payment
schedule or a lump sum repayment at the end of the five year period would be
necessary.[68] If repayments cease while an employee is on a
military leave of absence even for a period beyond one year as permitted under
Code § 414(u)(4), the suspension will not cause the loan to be deemed
distributed, as long as loan repayments resume upon the completion of the
military service, the amount then remaining due on the loan is repaid in
substantially level installments thereafter, and the loan is fully repaid by
the latest permissible term of a loan (five years for a non-principal residence
loan) plus the period of the military service.[69]
in Loan Refinancings. Regulations as
added in 2002 provide that while a loan can be refinanced and additional
amounts may be borrowed, the prior loan and additional loan must each satisfy
the requirements in § 72(p)(2)(B) and (C) that each loan be repaid in level
installments, not less often than quarterly, over five years.[70] The loans collectively must satisfy the
amount limitations of § 72(p)(2)(A). A
refinancing is, in effect, treated as a new loan that is then applied to repay
a prior loan if the new loan both replaces a prior loan and has a later repayment
date. This rule does not apply to a refinancing loan under which the amount of
the prior loan is to be repaid by the original repayment date of the prior
loan.[71]
Requirement of an Enforceable Agreement in Writing or Electronically
in order to avoid a deemed distribution under Code § 72(p): the loan must be evidenced by a legally
enforceable agreement (which may include more than one document), and the terms
of the agreement must demonstrate compliance with the requirements of Code
§ 72(p) (specifying the amount of the loan, the date of the loan and the
repayment schedule in accordance with the rules of § 72(p)).[72]
must be in a written enforceable agreement or in an electronic medium
reasonably accessible to the participant under a system (i) reasonably designed
to preclude anyone other than the participant from requesting a loan, (ii) that
provides a reasonable opportunity to review the terms of the loan and to confirm,
modify or rescind the terms of the loan, and (iii) that provides a confirmation
of the loan terms through a written document or an electronic medium.[73] If an electronic medium is used to provide
confirmation of the loan terms, it must be reasonably accessible and must be provided
in a manner no less understandable than a written paper document. Also, the participant must be advised of the
right to receive a copy of the confirmation on a written document without charge.[74] The regulations provide that the loan
agreement does not have to be signed if the agreement is enforceable under
applicable law without signature.[75]
the loan application, executed promissory note, proof that loan proceeds were
used to purchase or construct a primary residence (if applicable), proof of
loan repayments, in the event of default, proof of collection activities, and
if there is a deemed distribution on Form 1099-R.[76]
of Violating Code § 72(p)
in Operation. A deemed distribution
will occur when the requirements of Code § 72(p) are not satisfied in form
or in operation.[77]
at Time Loan Is Made.[78] If the terms of the loan do not require
repayment within five years and level amortization or are not evidenced by an
enforceable agreement in accordance with § 72(p) and the regulations, the
entire amount of the loan is deemed distributed at the time the loan is made. If the terms of the loan merely fail to
satisfy the amount requirement of § 72(p)(2)(A), only the amount in excess
of the permissible loan amount is a deemed distribution at the time the loan is
made.
Making Level Installment Payments.
If the loan initially satisfies the requirements of Code § 72(p),
but repayments are not being made in accordance with the level amortization
requirement of Code § 72(p)(2)(C), a deemed distribution occurs at the
time of such failure.[79] However, the plan administrator may allow a
cure period extending up to the end of the calendar quarter following the
calendar quarter in which the required installment payment was due and not
made. Such cure period given by the plan
administrator will avoid a deemed taxable distribution until the end of the
grace period.[80] If the installment payment is not made before
the expiration of the cure period, the entire outstanding balance of the loan
(including accrued interest) will be a deemed distribution.[81]
Chief Counsel Advice 201736022
provides two examples of failures to make loan payments under a qualified plan
that were timely corrected, so that a loan default was avoided, and the loan
was deemed to be satisfactorily reinstated.[82]
Deemed Distributions for Not Making Timely Payments.
There are various cases regarding deemed distribution under Code § 72(p)
with income tax and Code § 72(t) early distribution tax for failure to make
timely payments on participant loans. [83]
Several cases have held that failure to provide documentary evidence of
the loan would result in a deemed distribution with ordinary income (and a 10%
early distribution tax). [84]
Included in Income. Interest that
accrues after a deemed distribution under Code § 72(p) is not included for
purposes of Code § 72, and therefore the additional interest is not
treated as an additional loan and does not result in an additional deemed
distribution under Code § 72(p).[85]
loan, in addition to the income tax under § 72(p) there will also be a 10% Code
§ 72(t) early distribution tax if the deemed distribution occurs prior to
age 59-1/2.[86]
between Taxable Deemed Distribution and Foreclosure
Is Not Necessarily an Actual Distribution.
Even if Code § 72(p) is violated and there is a deemed taxable
distribution under Code § 72(p), such distribution is not treated as an
actual distribution for purposes of the in-service distribution restrictions
under § 401 regulations for money
purchase plans, the eligible rollover distribution rules of Code § 402,
the in-service distribution restrictions of Code § 401(k)(2)(B), or the
vesting requirements of Treas. Reg. § 1.411(a)-7(d)(5) (regarding graded
vesting schedule where prior distribution occurred).[88] Thus, it is possible to be taxed on the deemed
distribution at an earlier time than the actual distribution. A deemed
distribution will therefore not be considered an in-service distribution or an
eligible rollover distribution. After a
taxable deemed distribution occurs, the participant may still want to repay the
loan, in order, for example, to be able to take a new plan loan.
(But Not a Default Alone) Is Treated as an Actual Distribution. The regulations provide that an actual
distribution occurs when, under the terms governing the plan loan, the accrued
benefit of the participant is reduced (offset) in order to repay the loan.[89] This might occur, for example, where the
terms governing the plan loan require that if a participant requests a
distribution, a loan must be repaid immediately or treated as in default. A distributable event under the plan, e.g.,
age 59-1/2 or severance from employment, may be required to offset the
loan. The amount of the account balance
that is used to offset the loan is treated as an actual distribution. On the other hand, an event of default under
the loan documents without an actual offset does not automatically cause there
to be a Code § 72(p) taxable event.
procedures may provide for offset for failure to make payments when due if a
distribution is permitted. Other common offset
triggers are termination of employment or termination of the plan.[90]
Be Avoided if Restrictions on In-Service Distributions Apply. Restrictions on in-service distributions (e.g., under
Code § 401(k)(2)(B)) are violated if foreclosure occurs and the
participant’s accrued benefit is offset by the loan amount.[91] (The same should apply with respect to the
Code § 72(t) 10% penalty tax on early distributions.) A taxable distribution under § 72(p) by
itself, however, is not considered an in-service distribution, as stated above.
Foreclosure with Requirement of Participant Consent to Actual Distributions. Plan distributions in excess of $5,000
require a participant’s consent under Code § 411(a)(11). Thus, plan loan documents should provide that
the participant consents both to the taking of the loan and to a foreclosure in
the event of a default.
Spousal Consent Requirements. To
foreclose on a plan loan, spousal consent, if applicable, is required. Code § 417(a)(4) requires that no part
of a participant’s accrued benefit may be used as security for a loan from a
plan subject to the qualified joint and survivor annuity rules and the
qualified pre-retirement survivor annuity rules of Code § 401(a)(11)
unless there is spousal consent.
Accordingly, spousal consent should be obtained at the time the loan is
made. See above, Pt. I, discussion of
adequate security and spousal consent.
Eligible Rollover Distribution; 20% Withholding Obligation. A distribution from a qualified plan is
subject to 20% mandatory withholding if the distribution is an “eligible
rollover distribution” and the participant fails to elect a direct
rollover. As stated above, if a loan
becomes a deemed taxable distribution because it does not comply with Code
§ 72(p), it is not an eligible rollover distribution and cannot be rolled
over.[92] The pre-1993 10% voluntary withholding rules
apply in such case.[93]
however, there is an actual distribution, and if this offset occurs prior to a
deemed distribution this offset is considered an eligible rollover distribution
which may be rolled over and is subject to 20% withholding.[94] Although the foreclosed amount constitutes an
eligible rollover distribution and is included in the amount subject to
withholding, withholding need only be made from cash or other property
distributed, and if there is no other cash or property distributed, there is
nothing to withhold from.[95]
results in income at a date after the loan is made, withholding is required
only if a transfer of cash or property is made to the participant or
beneficiary from the plan at the same time.[96]
Trust-to-Trust Transfers of Notes. A
trust-to-trust transfer of assets (under Code § 414(l)) from one plan to another can include the transfer of a
participant note.[97] Ordinary rollovers, where amounts are first
distributed to participants and then rolled over, should intuitively not be
able to be made with a note because the interest of the lender and the borrower
will merge once the note is distributed to the participant. Nevertheless, recent regulations and rulings
provide that a direct rollover under Code § 401(a)(31) may be made with a
note even though a direct rollover is considered a distribution.[98]
Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017. If an
offset of a loan occurs before the amount has been taxed as a deemed
distribution (e.g., on account of termination of employment or termination of
the plan), the offset loan is eligible for a tax-free rollover to an eligible
retirement plan (including a qualified plan or an IRA) under Code §
402(c)(3)(A).[99] Prior to the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017,
the offset loan rollover would have to be made within 60 days from the date of
offset. The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act added Code
§ 402(c)(3)(C) to provide that, for plan loan offsets in tax years beginning
after Dec. 31, 2017, the period during which a “qualified plan loan offset
amount” (i.e., an offset due to termination of employment that results in
failure to meet repayment terms of loan, or an offset due to termination of the
plan) may be rolled over to an eligible retirement plan is extended from the 60
day period after the offset to the due date (including extensions) for filing
an income tax return for the tax year in which the plan loan offset occurs.[100]
Note that a rollover of an offset loan cannot be made where there was already a
deemed distribution, since the tax was already paid.
III – MISCELLANEOUS ISSUES
from Truth-in-Lending Requirements
statement requirements under Regulation Z of the Truth-in-Lending Act. However, effective
amended to specifically exempt 401(a), 403(b) and 457(b) participant loans from
the truth-in-lending disclosure requirement, provided that the loan is
comprised of fully vested funds from the participant’s account and the loan is
in compliance with the requirements of the Internal Revenue Code.[101]
of Loan Provisions to Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs)
are subject to the Code § 4975 excise tax on prohibited transactions.[102] Furthermore, pursuant to Code
§ 408(e)(2), if in any year an individual for whose benefit an IRA is
established engages in any transaction prohibited by Code § 4975 with
respect to the IRA, the IRA ceases to be an IRA as of the first day of such
year (and all of the assets of the IRA on the first day of such year are
treated as having been distributed on such day).[103]
in Bankruptcy
Consumer Protection Act of 2005 (“BAPCPA”) provides that all
retirement funds exempt from taxation under Internal Revenue Code §§ 401, 403,
408, 408A, 457 or 501(a) are protected from bankruptcy creditors. Bankruptcy Code §§ 522(b)(3)(C) &
522(d)(12). (IRAs are limited to $1
million as adjusted. Bankruptcy Code §
522(n).) With regard to participant
loans, BAPCPA provides in Bankruptcy Code § 362(b)(19) that the bankruptcy
petition does not operate as a stay for the withholding of wages to pay for
participant loans under ERISA § 408(b)(1) or Code § 72(p). Thus, withholding from wages for participant
loans could remain in effect even though the participant is in bankruptcy.
liquidations, BAPCPA introduced a means test (measuring monthly disposable
income), and there are some cases regarding whether amounts withheld to repay
participant loans are counted as part of the means test.[104] This issue would not be applicable to a
Chapter 13 individual bankruptcy filing, as the means test does not apply to
Chapter 13 filings (and in fact was instituted to limit Chapter 7 filings to
encourage Chapter 13 filings instead).
of Loan Repayments on Code § 415 Annual Additions
§ 411(d)(6)-Anti-Cutback Protection Not Applicable
optional forms of benefit and may be cut back or taken away without violating
the anti-cutback rules.[106]
(“EPCRS”) program in Revenue Procedure 2016-51 provides that where
there is a failure to repay a plan loan by the end of the calendar quarter
following the quarter in which the payments are due, which generally would be a
taxable deemed distribution under § 72(p), the voluntary correction program
(“VCP”) of EPCRS can be used by reamortizing the loan balance over
the remainder of the loan period or by repaying the arrears in lump sum, or a
combination of the two.[107] This may cure not just the operational
failure but can also avoid the deemed distribution under § 72(p) (and a Form
1099-R reporting the deemed distribution will not be required), provided relief
is specifically requested from the IRS that the loan failure will not result in
§ 72(p) deemed distribution tax.[108] Alternatively, the VCP relief can be limited
to reporting the deemed distribution in the year of correction instead of the
year of failure.[109] Examples when the IRS may limit the VCP
relief to reporting the deemed distribution in the year of correction instead
of the year of failure (and not avoiding the deemed distribution tax entirely)
could be, for example, where the affected employee is a key employee or an
owner-employee[110]
or where the loan cannot be reamortized within the five year term and will need
to be defaulted in the correction year. [111]
to 2018, there were reduced VCP correction fees for loan failures based on the
number of participants: (i) $300 for 13 or fewer affected participants; (ii)
$600 for 50 or fewer affected participants; (iii) $1,000 for 100 or fewer affected
participants; (iv) $2,000 for 150 or fewer affected participants; and (v)
$3,000 for greater than 150 affected participants.[112] However, Rev. Proc. 2018-4
eliminates the reduced VCP fees for loan errors and provides for uniform VCP
user fees (for all failures) based on the entire plan’s assets as follows: (i)
$1,500 if the plan’s assets are of $500,000 or less; (ii) $3,000 if the plan’s assets
are $500,001 to $10,000,000; and (iii) $3,500 if the plan’s assets are of over
$10,000,000.[113]
ERISA § 408(b)(1) and Code § 4975(d)(1) mirror each other. There are some differences, however. For example, ERISA applies even to
nonqualified plans. In addition, any
employee of a plan sponsor is a party in interest under ERISA § 3(14);
only a highly compensated employee is a disqualified person under Code
§ 4975(e)(2). Therefore, prohibited
transaction excise taxes under § 4975 would only apply to prohibited loans
to employees who are highly compensated or are otherwise disqualified persons.
regulations cited below apply equally to the ERISA requirements and the Code requirements
pursuant to § 102 of Reorganization Plan No. 4 of 1978, which transferred the authority relating to these
provisions from the Treasury Department to the Labor Department. See,
§ 408(b)(1) and Code § 4975(d)(1); DOL Reg. § 2550.408b-1.
provide that loans that meet the conditions of ERISA § 408(b)(1) are
exempt not only from the prohibited transaction rules of ERISA § 406(a)
(for extensions of credit to a party in interest) but also from the
self-dealing prohibitions of ERISA § 406(b)(1) and (2).
Reg. § 2550.408b-1(a)(1). Such
loans, however, are not exempt from the anti-kickback rule of ERISA
§ 406(b)(3) or the fiduciary duties of ERISA § 404.
Reg. § 2550.408b-1(a)(2). As
stated above, the conditions of the above exemption must also be met so that
the loan does not violate the anti-alienation rules of ERISA § 206(d)(2)
and Code § 401(a)(13)(A).
§ 408(b)(1)(A).
Advisory Opinion 89-30A; Preamble to
Regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 30522 (July 20, 1989).
loan cannot be made available to certain owner-employees or certain shareholder-employees
because the exemptions of ERISA § 408(b) do not apply to these individuals. ERISA § 408(d). (See,
a loan to a participant who later becomes an owner employee, quoted in 26 BNA
Pen. & Ben. Rptr. 2437 (October 18, 1999).)
§ 1.401(a)(4)‑10(c).
2003).
30520, 30522 (July 20, 1989). See
expenses associated with taking a plan loan may be charged to the participant’s
account.
highly compensated employees are: those
earning over $120,000 in 2017 (who, if the top-paid group election is made, are
also in the top 20% group), or 5% owners.
Code § 414(q).
§ 408(b)(1)(B).
§ 408(b)(1)(C).
30520, 30523 (July 20, 1989).
§ 408(b)(1)(D).
plan-wide rates are typically used, possibly in recognition of the fact that
the 50% account balance collateral makes participants’ other creditworthiness
less meaningful.
to final
1989). See, also, McLaughlin v. Rowley, 698 F. Supp. 1333 (N.D. Tex.
1988), which held that state usury laws with respect to plan loans are preempted
by ERISA.
1333 (N.D. Tex. 1988) (where trustees of a defined contribution plan were held
liable, among other things, for charging less than a prudent interest rate on
plan loans to participants; the plan was an individual account defined
contribution plan, although assets were pooled for investment purposes; the
plan charged only 7% during the period 1977 to 1982; the DOL’s expert witness
testified that loans in such case are comparable to “compensating balance
loans,” which are loans that are secured by a sum of money deposited with
the lender; the expert further testified that prudent lenders would charge fair
market rates of interest at one or two percentage points above the rate paid on
the a borrower’s certificate of deposit; the rate would also vary in accordance
with the size and the term of the deposit; the fact that the security for the
loan is substantially the same as the amount of the loan does not matter; the
court rejected the claim that the participants were merely borrowing their own
money).
Loans IRS Phone Forum, Sept. 12, 2011,
https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-tege/loans_phoneforum_transcript.pdf; 38 BNA
Pension & Benefits Reporter 1694 (Sept. 20, 2011).
§ 408(b)(1)(E).
under Code § 72(p)(2)(A).
time the loan is taken, it is not clear if the 50% adequate security
requirement of
2550.408b-1(f)(2) must be met over the term of the loan.
§ 401(a)(11). Profit-sharing plans
are not subject to spousal consent rules if the participant’s entire accrued
benefit is payable on death to his or her surviving spouse (or another
designated beneficiary with the spouse’s consent) and a life annuity payment
form is not elected. Code
§ 401(a)(11)(B)(iii).
§ 1.401(a)-20, Q&A 24.
to Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)-20, 53 Fed. Reg. 31837, 31840 (August 22, 1988),
states that the
that a loan may not be adequately secured if consent to a reduction in the
accrued benefit is not obtained before the loan is secured. Mardy, Loesel & Hamburger, Guide to Assigning & Loaning Plan Money
¶ 416 (Thompson Publishing Group), provides that the
rule of the 1989
under which a delayed foreclosure is permissible as long as there are precautions
taken to avoid loss of principal or interest on the loan. It would seem, however, that since the
inability to foreclose without spousal consent could result in loss of
principal or interest on the loan, plans subject to the spousal consent
requirement should require such consent at the time of the loan.
8933018 (interest on loans made to non-key employees that are secured by recorded
deed on residence and not by amount attributable to § 401(k) deferrals is
deductible).
Conf. Rep. No. 97-760 (1982), which states that residential mortgage investments
made in the ordinary course of an investment program are not considered plan
loans under § 72(p) if the loans do not exceed the fair market value of
the property, are not self-directed investments of an individual account and
are not made to officers, directors or owners.
The fiduciary duty and prohibited transaction rules must still be
complied with. Id. See, also, Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 18 which states
that a mortgage investment program exists only if the plan has established, in
advance of a specific investment, that a certain percentage or amount of the
assets will be invested in residential mortgages. The above regulations also impose certain
additional requirements. See, also,
8824045 (mortgage loans made available only to plan participants are subject to
§ 72(p));
(mortgage loan program primarily for plan participants is subject to
§ 72(p));
(mortgage loan program as a plan investment must be prudent).
take the loan proceeds directly from a participant’s accounts, this is often
done in a certain order; for example, the following order: 401(k)
contributions, catch-up contributions, rollover contributions, matching contributions,
employer contributions, Roth contributions, Roth catch-up contributions, Roth
rollovers, after-tax contributions.
Reg. § 2550.408b‑1(f)(1) and Preamble to final
regulations, 54 Fed. Reg. 30520, 30526 (July 20, 1989).
Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 17 that if the loan is not bona fide (e.g., an understanding that the loan
will not be repaid) the amount transferred is treated as an actual distribution
and not as a loan or deemed distribution under Code § 72(p).
focus on: existence of a debt
instrument, security, interest and fixed repayment date, record of loan,
ability to repay, relationship of parties, and other factors. See,
e.g., Patrick v. C.I.R., T.C.
Memo 1998-30 (transfers from profit sharing plan to two participants who were
shareholders of the employer were taxable income to the participants and not
plan loans). See also, Fuller v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo. 1980-370,
1980 WL 4206 (1980) (as long as the proper formalities are observed, the burden
is on the IRS to prove that the transaction was not a loan; the court held that
even though the employer, sole shareholder and loan recipient was also one of
the plan’s trustees, and even though loan repayments had been sporadic, a loan
transaction in which the proper formalities had been observed was a loan,
rather than a taxable distribution, from the plan).
distribution, in turn, may also trigger a 10% early distribution penalty tax under
Code § 72(t), if applicable. Treas.
Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 11, 65 Fed. Reg. 46591 (July 31, 2000).
§ 72(p)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 3.
an employer (determined under the rules of subsections (b), (c) and (m) of Code
§ 414) are treated as a single plan for purposes of the loan rules. Code § 72(p)(2)(D)(i) and (ii).
repayment amount is to prevent an employee from effectively maintaining a
permanent outstanding $50,000 loan balance. 21 H.R. Rep. 99-426 at 735 (1985).
loan amount when the participant has prior loans, the IRS in Memorandum for
Employee Plans (EP) Examinations Employees, revised at TE/GE-04-0417-0020 (July
26, 2017) (to be incorporated into IRM 4.71.1.14), provides that the IRS will
permit two alternative methods for computing the highest outstanding balance
within one year of the request for a new loan. As stated in the Memorandum for
EP Employees, if a participant borrowed $30,000 in February which was fully
repaid in April, and $20,000 in May which was fully repaid in July, before applying
for a third loan in December, the plan may determine that no further loan would
be available, since $30,000 + $20,000 = $50,000. Alternatively, the plan may identify “the
highest outstanding balance” as $30,000, and permit the third loan in the
amount of $20,000. Both methods will be acceptable on audit.
§ 72(p)(2)(A). Note that the 50%
limit appears to be a requirement at the time the loan is made but not an ongoing
obligation. See Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1,
Q&A 4.
the sum of the highest outstanding balances for each loan during the one year
period or alternatively the highest outstanding balance of all loans combined
at any point during the one year period.
See discussion above regarding Memorandum for EP Employees (July 26,
2017).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 19(b)(1).
T.C. Memo. 2011-139, aff’d, 2012-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) P 50391, 2012 WL 2036776
(5th Cir. 2012) (an individual who was a long time U.S. Air Force employee had
borrowed money from his thrift savings plan; repayments were to be made by
payroll withholding; the individual lost his job and the plan notified the
individual that the remaining portion of the loan was due; he did not timely
repay the loan and received a Form 1099R for a deemed distribution; the
individual filed with the Tax Court, which held that he received a constructive
distribution and was subject to the additional 10% tax under IRC § 72(t) for a
premature distribution); Marquez v.
C.I.R., T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-80, 2009 WL 1405883 (T.C. 2009) (the
refinancing of a plan loan under which both the original and new loan were
treated as being outstanding for purposes of IRC § 72(p)(2), resulted in a
constructive distribution and the imposition of a 10% premature distribution
tax; when the refinancing was authorized, the participant was advised that an
additional loan could be made on the same terms as the original loan, or a new
loan for a smaller amount could be made, either of which alternatives would
have avoided exceeding the permissible loan limitation); Billups v. I.R.S., T.C. Summ. Op. 2009-86, 2009 WL 1519901 (T.C.
2009) (a participant refinanced a loan from a qualified plan, which resulted in
exceeding the permissible loan limitation under IRC § 72(p); the individual had
an outstanding loan balance of $27,013, and the participant refinanced it to
borrow an additional $12,630, thus increasing his loan balance to $39,748; Tax
Court determined that his loan would violate IRC § 72(p) limitations if it
exceeded one-half of his $52,863 loan balance; court concluded that the sum of
the new loan and the loan it replaced was $66,655 ($39,642 + $27,017), and that
amount exceeded the applicable 50% of his account balance (the highest amount
of permissible loan value without exceeding IRC § 72(p) limitation) by $39,748).
1.72(p)-1, Q&A 19(b)(2). 67 Fed.
Reg. 71821 (December 3, 2002).
below in section entitled “Proposed Amendments Regarding Refinancing and
Multiple Loans” regarding a controversial proposed regulatory limit of two
loans per year.
§ 72(p)(2)(B).
Report to TEFRA 1982; Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 4.
Committee of Taxation General Explanation to TEFRA 1982 (Blue Book) § IV.D.2.
§ 72(p)(2)(B)(ii).
to Assigning & Loaning Plan Money,” ¶ 465. See also, Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1 (“The
examples included . . . are based on the assumption that a bona fide loan is
made to a participant . . . with adequate security and with an interest rate
and repayment terms that are commercially reasonable”).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 5.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 6.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 7.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 8. See
Part I above regarding mortgage loans and mortgage investment programs.
§ 72(p)(2)(C).
telephone voice response system could be used to make salary deferrals into
pension plans because New York Labor Law § 193, which requires written
authorization for payroll deductions (implying that telephone requests are not
sufficient), is preempted by ERISA with respect to employee benefit plans.
one opinion that written authorization for payroll deductions may be satisfied
when a blanket authorization has been made in writing for any future loan
requests by electronic communications.
Butterworth, “Paperless Plan Administration: Electronic Communications from Employees,”
22 Tax Mgmt. Comp. Plan. J. 8 (August
5, 1994).
which allows payroll deductions in writing for purposes of mandatory
contributions to pension and savings plan, implying their payroll deductions
for purposes of repaying plan loans would not be permitted. The
held that § 5(g) is preempted by ERISA and ERISA § 514, since particularly, §
5(g) attempts to specifically regulate ERISA-covered plans.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 9(a).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 9(a) & Q&A 9(d) Ex. (1).
taken before a leave of absence was considered a plan distribution since the
participant failed to begin making payments even though she was received
paychecks from her employer while on leave).
service to 6% under the Soldiers & Sailors Civil Relief Act Amendments of
1942. See, Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1,
Q&A 9(d), Ex (2).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 20(a)(1). 67
Fed. Reg. 71821 (Dec. 3, 2002).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 20(a)(2).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 3(b).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 3(b)(2).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 3(b). In 65
Fed. Reg. 46677 (July 31, 2000) the Treasury asked for comments on the
impact of the Electronic Signatures in Global and National Commerce Act, P.L.
106-229, June 30, 2000, 15 U.S.C. §§ 7001-7031, on plan loan transactions.
News (April 1, 2015). See also Fidelity
Points of View (April 2015) criticizing the requirement to have documentation
verifying that the loan proceeds were used to purchase or construct the home.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 4(a).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 4(a) & 10(a).
The same is true for the other requirements of § 72(p) such as the
five-year repayment requirement. Treas.
Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 4(a).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 10(a).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 10(b).
the first situation, loan payments were missed in two consecutive months, March
31 and April 30, which fell in different calendar quarters. Loan payments
were resumed in the following two months and applied to the previously missed
payments. In the third calendar quarter, the individual caught up all
payments so that the loan was current. In the second situation, the
taxpayer missed payments for three consecutive months during the fourth quarter
of the year. In the following quarter, the taxpayer refinanced the loan
with a new replacement loan equal to the outstanding balance of the original
loan including the missed payments. In both cases Chief Counsel Advice
201736022 held that the missed loan payments were timely corrected, so that a
loan default was avoided.
v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ. Op. 2008-86, 2008 WL 2796058 (T.C. 2008)
(distribution following termination of employment includible in income under §
72(p) and subject to § 72(t) 10% penalty on early distribution on the
expiration of the 90-day grace period to repay the loan); Plotkin v. C.I.R.,
T.C. Memo. 2001-71, T.C.M. (RIA) P 2001-071 (2001) (money purchase plan loan to
sole shareholder violated the five year payment requirement and in addition to
being a taxable distribution under § 72(p) would also be subject to the
additional 10% early distribution tax under § 72(t)); Raymond H. v. C.I.R.,
T.C. Memo. 2011-139, T.C.M. (RIA) P 2011-139 (2011), aff’d, 2012-1 U.S. Tax
Cas. (CCH) P 50391, 109 A.F.T.R.2d 2012-2433, 2012 WL 2036776 (5th Cir. 2012)
(an individual who was a U.S. Air Force employee had borrowed money from his
thrift savings plan; repayments were to be made by payroll withholding; the
individual lost his job and the plan notified the individual that the remaining
portion of the loan was due; he did not timely repay the loan and received a
Form 1099-R for a deemed distribution; the individual filed with the Tax Court,
which held that he received a constructive distribution and was subject to the
additional 10% tax under IRC § 72(t) for a premature distribution); Matthews
v. C.I.R., T.C. Summ. Op. 2014–84, 2014 WL 4251116 (T.C. 2014) (a
participant who had a plan loan outstanding requested a distribution of funds
from his 401(k) plan; he asked that the funds be used first to pay off the
loan, a portion of the funds were withheld for income tax and the remaining
were distributed to him and used for a rollover IRA; the Tax Court held that
the 10% premature distribution penalty under IRC § 72(t) applied to the amount
of the distribution used for the loan payoff); El v. C.I.R., Tax Ct.
Rep. (CCH) 60251, Tax Ct. Rep. Dec. (RIA) 144.9, 2015 WL 1063061 (T.C. 2015)
(Tax Court held that the 10% tax imposed under IRC § 72(p) for exceeding the
permissible requirements for a loan under IRC § 72(p)(2) is not a penalty for
purposes of IRC § 7491(c); therefore, the IRS does not bear the burden of
proving that an assessment under § 72(p) is proper); Gowen v. C.I.R., TC
Summary Opinion 2017-57 (Tax Court held that a CPA who defaulted on a plan loan
during one tax year must include the deemed distribution once the cure period
for repayment expires in the next tax year; the CPA who had a master’s degree
in taxation allowed a loan payment to a qualified plan to go into default in
the third quarter of the year and failed to cure the default by the end of the
fourth quarter; the CPA argued that the failure should be reported in the
following tax year because he did not receive final notice from the plan
custodian until after the end of the year; however, the Tax Court held that the
failure was reportable for the year in which the failure occurred rather than
the following year).
C.I.R., T.C. Memo. 2012-119, 2012 WL
1392677 (holding that a distribution had to be included in gross income when the
record contained no loan documents or other evidence showing that the
distribution was evidenced by a legally enforceable agreement); Bormet v.
C.I.R., T.C. Memo 2017-201 (an individual who obtained an initial loan,
suffered an injury and received short-term and then long-term disability
benefits, was reported by the retirement plan’s TPA as being in default for
nonpayment of a loan for $26,954; the individual claimed that the loan had been
renegotiated but was unable or unwilling to offer any evidence that the loan
was renegotiated or evidence of his disability; the Tax Court concluded that
there was insufficient evidence of a renegotiated loan and determined that the
entire unpaid balance of $26,954 should be includable in the individual’s
income)..
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 19(a).
Q&A 11. See, e.g., Leon and Tilley v.
C.I.R., 2008 WL 2796058, 44 E.B.C. 2405 (2008) (distribution following
termination of employment includible in income under § 72(p) and subject
to § 72(t) 10% penalty on early distribution on the expiration of the 90
day grace period to repay the loan); Plotkin
v. C.I.R., T.C. Memo 2001-71 (2001) (money purchase plan loan to sole
shareholder violated the five year payment requirement and in addition to being
a taxable distribution under § 72(p) would also be subject to the
additional 10% early distribution tax under § 72(t)).
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 14.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 12. See also, Treas. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2,
Q&A 4(d), Treas. Reg. § 1.401(k)-1(d)(6)(ii), and Notice 93-3, 1993-1
C.B. 293.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 13; Treas. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2, Q&A 9(a).
procedures typically provide for various events of default. The most basic one is failure to make
payments when due. Some administrators
treat loans as being in default if payments are not made for three months,
since that is the period after which they will be considered to be taxable
distributions. Another common event of
default is termination of employment. Termination
of the plan will often cause an event of default. Once an event of default has occurred the
administrator may foreclose (unless otherwise prohibited from doing so) by
offsetting the account balance. A
foreclosure is generally treated as a distribution. Foreclosure occurs when the participant’s account
balance is offset by the loan amount.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 13(b).
§ 1.402(c)-2 Q&A 4(d); Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 12;
Notice 93-3, 1993-1 C.B. 293.
§ 35.3405‑1T, Q&A F‑4 & F-5.
§ 1.402(c)‑2, Q&A 9; Notice 93‑3, 1993-1 C.B. 293.
§ 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 15. To the
extent that a loan constitutes a deemed distribution that results in income at the
time the loan is made, withholding is required for such deemed distribution
regardless of whether there is other cash or other property to withhold
from. Id.
§ 1.401(a)(31)-1, Q&A 16 (“A plan administrator is permitted to
allow a direct rollover of a participant note of a plan loan to a qualified
trust”). See also,
(newly-transferred employees rolled over loan notes from one plan to another
plan, with the transferee plan requiring the participant to acknowledge that
transferee plan is new obligee;
held that the transfer of a loan note as a direct rollover under
§ 401(a)(31) could be made and would not be a taxable distribution under
Code § 402(a) or 72(p); also since substantive terms of loan have not
changed, not considered a revision or renegotiation of the loan and therefore
not a new loan under § 72(p);
9729042 (direct rollover of note is permissible, and will not be a taxable
distribution). See, also, Treas. Reg. § 1.402(c)-2, Q&A 9; 23 BNA Tax Mgmt. Compensation Plan. J. 195
(Aug. 4, 1995); 18 BNA Pen. Rptr. 2118 (Nov. 30, 1992); 92
direct rollover of a note would be considered like a new loan from the transferee
plan.
A deemed
distribution is not eligible to be rolled over to an eligible retirement plan
since it is not considered a distribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.72(p)-1, Q&A 12.
does not explicitly fit within the definition of disqualified person under Code
§ 4975(c)(2), the Conf. Rep. to ERISA, Rep. No. 43-1280 at 501, and
between the IRA and the IRA owner are prohibited transactions.
408(e)(2)(A) and (B). See, also, Code § 408(e)(4).
re Egebjerg, 574 F. 3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2009) (holding that a 401(k) loan is
not a debt since the participant is merely paying it to himself, and Egebjerg
could not include his payments on the participant loans as deductions for calculating
monthly disposable income for the means test).
See also, Welmerink, “Cleaning the Mess of the Means Test: The Need
for a Case-by-Case analysis of 401(k) Loans in Chapter 7 Bankruptcy Petitions,”
41 Golden Gate U.L. Rev. 121 (Fall 2010).
1.415-6(b)(3)(ii).
§ 1.411(d)-4, Q&A 1(d)(4).
2016-51, §§ 6.02(6) & 6.07. This
relief was originally provided in Rev. Proc. 2006-27, §§ 6.02(6) & 6.07.
2016-51, § 6.07(2)(a) & (3). See Rev.
Proc. 2016-51, § 6.02(6) that for defaulted loans the employer should pay a
portion of the correction payment equal to the interest that accumulates as a
result of such failure (generally determined at a rate equal to the greater of
the plan loan interest rate or the rate of return under the plan).
2016-51, § 6.07(1).
Form
14568-E (Model VPC Compliance Statement for Plan Loan Failures), § IIA & B,
provides that if the affected participant is either a key employee under Code §
416(i)(1) (e.g., an officer earning over $175,000 in 2018) or an owner-employee
under Code § 401(c)(3), relief will be limited to reporting the deemed
distribution in the year of correction instead of the year of failure.
See also Rev. Proc. 2016-51, § 6.07(2)(a), that
the IRS can deny correction to entirely avoid a deemed distribution if it deems
appropriate, e.g., where the loan failure is not caused by employer action.
Proc. 2018-4, at § 2.03(4) (eliminating specific reduced VCP fees, beginning in
2018); Rev. Proc. 2018-4, at § 2.03(1) and App. A .09 (beginning in 2018, VCP
user fees now based on plan assets).
COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS
|
Pension Plan and Related Limits
|
2017
|
2018
|
|
Pre-tax elective deferral maximum under IRC § 401(k),
403(b), and 457(b) plans |
$18,000
|
$18,500
|
|
Age 50 and older “catch-up” adjustment for 401(k), 403(b),
and governmental 457(b) plans and SEPs |
$6,000
|
$6,000
|
|
Annual compensation limit under IRC §§ 401(a)(17), 404(l) and 408(k)
|
$270,000
|
$275,000
|
|
Annual benefit limit for defined benefit plans under IRC §
415(b) |
$215,000
|
$220,000
|
|
Annual contribution limit for defined contribution plans
under IRC § 415(c) |
$54,000
|
$55,000
|
|
Highly compensated employee threshold for purposes of
nondiscrimination testing in the following year under IRC § 414(q)(1)(B) |
$120,000
|
$120,000
|
|
Key employee threshold for officers for top heavy plan
under IRC § 416(i)(1)(A)(i) |
$175,000
|
$175,000
|
|
IRC § 430(c)(7)(D)(i)(II) amount for
determining excess employee compensation for single-employer defined benefit plans where election has been made |
$1,115,000
|
No
longer applicable |
|
ESOP account balance for five-year and one-year
distribution rule under IRC § 409(o)(1)(C)(ii) |
$1,080,000
and $215,000 |
$1,105,000 and
$220,000 |
|
Minimum earnings level to qualify for SEP under IRC § 408(k)
|
$600
|
$600
|
|
SIMPLE plan elective deferral limit under IRC §
408(p)(2)(E) |
$12,500
|
$12,500
|
|
SIMPLE plan age 50 catch-up
|
$3,000
|
$3,000
|
|
Basic IRA/Roth IRA contribution limitation under IRC §
219(b)(5)(A)/§ 408A (age 50 $1,000 catch-up for IRAs does not have cost-of-living adjustment) |
$5,500
|
$5,500
|
|
Phase-out for
deductions for IRA for married couples filing jointly, in which the spouse who makes the IRA contribution is an active participant in an employer-sponsored retirement plan |
$99,000 to $119,000
|
$101,000 to $121,000
|
|
Adjusted gross
income ( married joint filers making contributions to a Roth IRA –
For single filers –
|
$186,000 to $196,000
$62,000 to
$72,000
|
$189,000 to $199,000
$63,000 to
$73,000
|
|
AGI limit for
retirement savings contributions (saver’s) credit for married couples filing jointly –
For single filers
– |
$62,000
$31,000
|
$63,000
$31,500
|
|
Health Savings Account
contribution limits (single and family) |
$3,400 and $6,750
|
$3,450 and $6,900
|
|
PBGC guaranteed benefit (yearly)
|
$64,432
|
$65,045
|
|
PBGC flat-rate
premiums per participant for a single-employer plans |
$69
|
$74
|
|
PBGC variable-rate
premium for single-employer plans per $1,000 of Unfunded Vested Benefits |
$34
|
$38
|
|
PBGC (flat-rate) premiums for multiemployer plans per
participant |
$28
|
$28
|
|
Taxable wage base subject to FICA tax
|
$127,200
|
$128,400
|
See “Employment Agreements (Including Severance, Parachute, Clawback, Noncompete and §409A Issues)” by Charles C. Shulman, at Tax Management Compensation Planning Journal 9-2-2016
The terms of employment agreements and severance arrangements are of particular relevance in corporate transactions. Executives may be terminated as a result of a transaction, and the general severance provisions in the employment agreements may be triggered.
Severance provisions are often triggered on termination of employment only if there is also a change in control of the employer, or the amount of severance may be more generous if the termination occurs after a change in control. Some agreements may allow an employee to quit for any reason and still receive severance, if the quitting is in connection with a change in control. Employment and change in control agreements often provide that options will vest on a change in control typically even without a termination of employment.
Sun Capital Partners III v. N. E. Teamsters Truck. Industry Pension Fund
employer as set forth in IRC §414(b) and (c) apply for termination liability,
multiemployer withdrawal liability, PBGC premiums, minimum funding obligations,
COBRA continuation coverage, etc.
test.
A parent-subsidiary controlled group will exist if there is a chain of entities
conducting trades or businesses that are connected through a controlling
interest with a common parent, with controlling interest being defined: (i) in
the case of corporation as at least 80% of the total combined voting power of
all classes entitled to vote or at least 80% of the total value of all shares;
(ii) in the case of a trust or estate an 80% actuarial interest; (iii) in the
case of a partnership (or entity taxed as a partnership) an 80% interest in
profits or capital; and (iv) in the case of a sole proprietorship 100%
ownership. IRC §1563(a)(1); Treas. Reg. §1.414(c)-2(b)(2).
test.
A brother-sister controlled group exists where there are two or more trades or
businesses which meet two tests: (i) the same five or fewer persons who are
individuals, estates or trusts own together 80% or more of “control” as defined
above in each of the entities; and (ii) such five individuals own together 50%
or more of the entities where ownership is taken into account only to the
extent it is identical with respect to each such trade or business. IRC §1563(a)(2); Treas. Reg. §1.414(c)-2(c).
That is, if corporations X, Y and Z are partially owned by individual A with a
20%, 30% and 40% interest, respectively, the identical ownership interest that
is counted for individual A is only 20%.
Trade or business. A trade or business is generally interpreted
to mean regular and continuous activities that are designed to produce
income. Neither ERISA nor the Treasury
Regulations define “trade or business.” Courts have generally adopted the
standard articulated in C.I.R. v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35, 107 S.
Ct. 980, 987, 94 L. Ed. 2d 25 (1987), where the Supreme Court held that in the
context of IRC §162: “to be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer
must be involved in the activity with continuity and regularity and that
the taxpayer’s primary purpose for engaging in the activity must be for
income or profit. Sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion
does not qualify.”
sole proprietor engaging in trade or business. Although individual
shareholders of corporations are not liable for the corporation’s Title IV
liabilities under the controlled group rules, a controlled group includes a
trade or business, and thus any unincorporated trade or business that an
individual operates, e.g., a sole proprietorship or a partnership, would
indirectly cause him or her to be individually liable for the plan
termination. Many courts have found
shareholders liable by reason of some activity they engaged in as a sole
proprietor.
Private Equity Funds are a Trade or Business
“trades or business” under common control are treated as part of an ERISA
controlled group. Neither ERISA nor the Treasury regulations define “trade or
business.” As stated above, courts have generally adopted the standard
articulated in C.I.R. v. Groetzinger, where the Supreme Court held that a trade
or business is an activity with continuity and regularity and for the primary
purpose for income or profit (while sporadic activity, a hobby, or an amusement
diversion does not qualify).
Opinion – Private Equity Investors are Not Passive Investors. With regard to private equity funds many
practitioners had taken the view that since they are generally passive
investment vehicles with no employees and minimal involvement in day-to-day
operations, they are not trades or businesses, and therefore separate portfolio
companies owned by a private equity fund or funds would not be in the same
ERISA controlled group. However, the PBGC ruled in a 2007 PBGC Appeals Board
Opinion that a private equity fund was a trade or business, because it was
engaged in an activity with the primary purpose of income or profit and
conducted business through an agent (the general partner) who managed fund
investments on a regular basis.
private equity fund.
According to this PBGC ruling, 80%-owned portfolio companies of a private
equity fund would generally be in the same ERISA controlled group (except in a
rare case where the fund’s activity does not meet the Groetzinger standard).
Case Affirming PBGC Opinion and Investment Plus. A 2010 Eastern District of Michigan case found
the 2007 PBGC Appeals Board Opinion to be persuasive and “investment plus” is a
trade or business. Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers National Pension
Fund v. Palladium Equity Partners, 722 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D. Mich. 2010)
(genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether three Palladium
limited partnerships, as well as Palladium Equity Partners, LLC which
served as advisor, were an ERISA controlled group parent liable for ERISA
multiemployer withdrawal liability of the Haden group of companies; the
court found the 2007 PBGC Appeals Board Opinion to be persuasive that although
investment alone is not a trade or business, where there is “investment plus,”
e.g., investment advisory and management services by the fund for the
benefit of its partners and compensation for the investment advisory and
management services, this would
constitute a trade or business; court found there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Palladium funds had a business purpose other
than merely investment; the Palladium funds joined their investments to exert
power over financial and managerial activities of the portfolio companies,
selected five of the seven board members and set up several committees to
control the internal operations of the portfolio companies; there was also
general issue of material fact regarding alter-ego liability).
Partners III, LP 2013 First Circuit Case.
A 2013 First Circuit case, Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New
England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, overturned a
district court case and it also found the PBGC Appeals Board Opinion to be
persuasive. 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir.
2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492 (2014):
- two private equity funds
managed by Sun Capital owned 70% and 30% of Scott Brass, Inc. which withdrew
from a multiemployer pension plan prior to filing for bankruptcy; Scott
Brass was indirectly wholly owned by Sun Fund III (30%) and Sun Fund IV (70%); - the district court
at 903 F.Supp.2d 107 (D. Mass. 2012), had granted the Sun Capital Partners
equity funds’ motion to dismiss holding that the private equity funds were
passive investors and not a trade or business and the 2007 PBGC
Appeals Board Opinion was found by the district court to be unpersuasive
because activity of the general partner should not have been attributed to
the investment fund and continuity and regularity of an activity should not be
found merely based on the size of the investment and profitability; - however, the First
Circuit overturned the district court ruling regarding the funds being a
“trade or business” and held that at least the larger of the two Sun funds (Fund
IV) was engaged in a trade or business under an “investment plus” analysis
since there was more than mere passive investment, noting that
the funds sought out
potential portfolio companies that were in need of extensive management
intervention,
the general partners
of the funds had wide range management authority,
the funds had the power
to appoint a majority of board members,
the general partners
of the funds could make decisions regarding hiring, termination and
compensation of employees in the portfolio companies, and
at least with respect to
Sun Fund IV (the 70% owners) the active investment in management provided a
direct economic benefit that an ordinary passive investor would not derive,
i.e., management fees the fund otherwise would have needed to pay its
general partner of the fund was offset by fees the underlying company was
paying to the general partner.
- both the district court and
the First Circuit found in regard to Sun Capital funds that the purchase of
Scott Brass, Inc. in a 70%-30% split was not done with a principal purpose
to evade or avoid liability under ERISA §4212(c), according to the district
court because there were legitimate business reasons for the investment
ownership in order to decrease investment risk for each fund and according to
the First Circuit because disregarding a 70%-30% split would leave zero
ownership; - the First Circuit remanded
the case to the district court to determine if there was a trade or
balance in Sun Fund III (the 30% owners) and to determine if there was
common control by the 70%-30% ownership (for example if the joint venture
is seen as common ownership).
2016 D.C. Mass. Decision on Remand.
from the First Circuit, the District Court in Massachusetts ruled that: (i)
both funds (the Sun Fund IV with a 70% investment and Sun Fund III with
a 30% investment) were trades or businesses, and (ii) that there was common
control under ERISA by reason of Fund III and IV being a “partnership
in fact.” Sun Capital
Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters and Trading Industry Pension Fund,
_ F. Supp. 3d _, 2016 WL 1239918 (D. Mass. March 28, 2016).
that:
- under the
“investment plus” analysis not only was Sun Fund IV a
trade or business, but Sun Fund III was also a trade or business
because it too had a direct economic benefit that a passive
investor would not have, i.e., an offset of fees otherwise owed by Sun
Fund III to its general partner for managing the investments that were
indirectly paid by the underlying portfolio company; and - with regard
to controlled group common ownership, Sun Fund IV and Sun
Fund III of Scott Brass, Inc. (with 70% and 30% ownership), while not
specifically meeting the requirements for an ERISA controlled group
because there was no 80% controlling interest, nevertheless Sun
Fund III and Sun Fund IV are a jointly controlled entity where
there was a partnership-in-fact since the two funds often co-invest
together, and despite the lack of permanently fixed co-investing, these
Sun Funds should be considered as joining together as a
“partnership-in-fact” to invest in Scott Brass. - The
district court noted that the fund split in ownership was done
because the fund was nearing the end of its investment cycle, a preference
for income diversification and a desire to keep ownership below 80%
to avoid ERISA withdrawal liability (though avoiding controlled group
liability was not the principal purpose of the transaction for purposes of
ERISA § 4212(c)).
Court decision to the First Circuit on April 8, 2016.
District Court Sun Capital Partners Case. The latter holding of the Sun Capital district
court case that there was an ERISA controlled group with regard to the funds
because of a partnership-in-fact (resulting in aggregation of the ownership
interests despite the lack of partnership formalities) is a puzzling holding for
the following reasons:
- partnership-in-fact
is tax law concept that should not be automatically applied to ERISA
controlled group liability situations; - finding
an ERISA controlled group could have consequences beyond withdrawal liability,
such as single employer plan termination liability, non-discrimination
testing, being a single entity for COBRA and IRC § 409A purposes and
defaults in credit agreements; and - the bright
line ERISA controlled group test was being expanded in a way not
contemplated by the statute or regulations.
Court Jan. 2015) Strikes Down
Inference for Collectively Bargained Retiree Health Benefits
Life; Court Holds Ordinary Contract Provisions Apply
Since
the early 1990s there has been a push by employers to cut back or terminate
retiree health plans.
In
contrast to pension (qualified plan) benefits, welfare benefits do not vest by
operation of law, but an employer can contractually obligate to vest benefits.
There
may be statements or communication implying lifetime benefits, but the plan
documents and communication often reserve the right to modify or discontinue
the benefits (so that there be no issue of a contractual lifetime obligation).
Where
retiree health benefits were the subject of collectively bargained negotiations,
the Sixth Court in International Union, United Auto, Aerospace and Agr.
Implement Workers of Am. (UAW) v. Yard-Man, Inc., 716 F.2d 1476 (6th Cir. 1983),
held that there is an inference that the intent was for these bargained-for benefits
to continue throughout retirement even after the expiration of the term of the
collective bargaining agreement.
The
First and Eleventh Circuits have followed this Sixth Circuit view of the Yard-Man inference. The Third, Fifth and Eighth Circuits have
rejected it. (The Seventh Circuit first adopted
the Yard-Man view, but then rejected
it.)
The
Sixth Circuit itself also cut back on the Yard-Man
inference, limiting it to retiree health, to actual retirees, to cases where
union contract evidences an intent to vest benefit and to where retiree health was
specifically bargained for.
In
a January 2015 decision, M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S.Ct. 926
(January 26, 2015), the Supreme Court reversed a Sixth Circuit 2013 decision
which had ruled in favor of retirees with respect to lifetime retiree health
benefits that were bargained for based on the Yard-Man inference that bargained-for benefits are presumed to
continue through retirement. The Supreme
Court struck down the Yard-Man
inference and held that collective bargaining agreements are subject to
ordinary principles of contract law. The
collective bargaining agreement in M & G Polymers did not promise the retiree
benefits for life, and in fact the agreement stated that the benefits would be
provided for the duration of the agreement and would be subject to renegotiation
in three years. The Court stated that traditional
contract rules would dictate that ambiguous writings in collective bargaining
agreements do not created lifetime promises, and contractual obligations will
cease in the ordinary course on termination of the bargaining agreement. Therefore the Supreme Court vacated the Sixth
Circuit ruling in this case, and this case was remanded to the lower court to
make a finding without the Yard-Man
inference.
Details
of the Case: M & G Polymers USA, LLC v. Tackett, 135 S.Ct. 926 (Jan. 26,
2015) (predecessor employer, Point Pleasant Polyester Plant, had provided to
union employees (who were eligible for a pension benefit) employer-paid retiree
health benefits, and this was negotiated in the pension & insurance agreement
attached to the collective-bargaining agreement; the agreement provided for the
benefits to be provided for the duration of the labor agreement (three-year
term until next negotiation); these provisions were also included in the
collective bargaining agreement negotiated by M & G Polymer USA, LLC, which
purchased the plant in 2000; in 2006 M & G Polymers announced that it would
begin requiring retirees to contribute to the cost of the retiree health
benefits; retirees sued arguing that they were promised lifetime employer-paid
benefits; the Sixth Circuit in 2009, 561 F.3d 478, held that, based on the Yard-Man Sixth Circuit 1983 decision,
there was an inference that bargained-for retiree benefits would vest for life,
and the district court then found for the retirees; the Sixth Circuit affirmed
this decision in 2013, 733 F.3d 586; the Supreme Court granted certiorari and reversed
the decision; the Court noted that welfare benefits do not vest under ERISA but
can be vested by contract, and that collective bargaining agreements are to be analyzed
according to ordinary principals of contract law, in contrast to the Yard-Man decision; the Court disagreed
with the Yard-Man inference, as
collective bargaining agreements should be governed by ordinary contract law,
and any inferences as to intent should be drawn from the specific facts;
without specific evidence there should be no presumption that the parties intended
to continue the benefits throughout retirement; durational clauses in
collective bargaining agreements should govern and contractual obligations
should generally cease on termination of the collective bargaining agreement;
ambiguous writings should not be construed to create lifetime promises; the
Court therefore rejected the Yard-Man
inference, and this case was remanded for the lower court to apply ordinary
principals of contract law to the facts; the decision, which was unanimous, was
written by Justice Thomas, but there was a concurrence by Justice Ginsburg noting
that in determining whether the parties intended to vest retiree health
benefits implied terms of the agreement, e.g., whether the retiree health benefits
were equated to pension benefits, should be examined, as should extrinsic
evidence).
COST-OF-LIVING ADJUSTMENTS 2015
|
Pension Plan and Related Limits
|
2014
|
2015
|
|
Pre-tax elective deferral maximum under IRC § 401(k),
403(b), and 457(b) plans |
$17,500
|
$18,000
|
|
Age 50 and older “catch-up” adjustment for 401(k), 403(b),
and governmental 457(b) plans and SEPs |
$5,500
|
$6,000
|
|
Annual compensation limit under IRC §§ 401(a)(17), 404(l) and 408(k)
|
$260,000
|
$265,000
|
|
Annual benefit limit for defined benefit plans under IRC §
415(b) |
$210,000
|
$210,000
|
|
Annual contribution limit for defined contribution plans
under IRC § 415(c) |
$52,000
|
$53,000
|
|
Highly compensated employee threshold for purposes of
testing in the following year under IRC § 414(q)(1)(B) |
$115,000
|
$120,000
|
|
Key employee threshold for top heavy plan under IRC §
416(i) |
$170,000
|
$170,000
|
|
IRC § 430(c)(7)(D)(i)(II) amount for
determining excess employee compensation for single-employer defined benefit plans where election has been made |
$1,084,000
|
$1,101,000
|
|
ESOP account balance for five-year and one-year
distribution rule under IRC § 409(o)(1)(C)(ii) |
$1,050,000
and $210,000 |
$1,070,000
and $210,000 |
|
SEP pension compensation threshold under IRC § 408(k)
|
$550
|
$600
|
|
SIMPLE plan elective deferral limit under IRC §
408(p)(2)(E) |
$12,000
|
$12,500
|
|
SIMPLE plan age 50 catch-up
|
$2,500
|
$3,000
|
|
Basic IRA/Roth IRA contribution limitation under IRC §
219(b)/§ 408A (age 50 $1,000 catch-up for IRAs does not have cost-of-living adjustment) |
$5,500
|
$5,500
|
|
Phase-out for
deductions for IRA for married couples filing jointly, in which the spouse who makes the IRA contribution is an active participant in an employer-sponsored retirement plan |
$96,000 to $116,000
|
$98,000 to $118,000
|
|
Adjusted gross
income ( married joint filers taxpayers making contributions to a Roth IRA |
$181,000 to $191,000
|
$183,000 to $193,000
|
|
AGI limit for
retirement savings contributions (saver’s) credit for married couples filing jointly |
$60,000
|
$61,000
|
|
Health Savings
Account contribution limits (single and family) |
$3,300 and $6,550
|
$3,350 and $6,650
|
|
Maximum monthly benefit guarantee by PBGC
|
$4943.18
|
$5,011.33
|
|
PBGC flat-rate
premium for a single-employer plans (as amended by MAP-21 2012 legislation) |
$49
|
$57
|
|
Taxable wage base subject to FICA tax
|
$117,000
|
$118,500
|
Rollover Safe Harbors
contribution it will be treated for purposes of the qualification rules as a
valid rollover contribution as long as the following two conditions are
satisfied. First, the plan administrator reasonably concludes that the
contribution is a valid rollover contribution. Second, if the plan
administrator of the receiving plan later determines that the contribution was
an invalid rollover contribution, the amount of invalid contribution plus
earnings must be distributed to the employee. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(31)-1, Q
& A 14(a).
of the first condition that the plan administrator must reasonably conclude
that the contribution is a valid rollover contribution, the regulations note
that while evidence of a favorable IRS determination letter is useful in
concluding that the contribution is a valid rollover contribution, a
determination letter is not necessary to conclude
that the contribution is a valid rollover contribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(31)-1, Q & A 14(a).
regulations give various examples where the plan administrator of the receiving
plan may conclude that the contribution as a valid rollover contribution. For example, a letter from plan administrator
of distributing plan that it has a favorable IRS determination letter can be
relied upon to conclude there is a valid rollover contribution. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(31)-1, Q & A 14(c),
Ex. 1. Alternatively, a letter from the
plan administrator of the distributing plan representing that the plan is
qualified and that the plan administrator is not aware of anything that would
result in disqualification could also be relied upon. Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(31)-1, Q & A 14(c),
Ex. 2.
a 2014 revenue ruling, a plan administrator of the receiving plan may rely on
the fact that Line 8a of Form 5500 for distributing plan, available on www.efast.dol.gov,
(or Line 9 of Form 5500-SF) does not include Code 3c for a nonqualified plan
for reliance that the contribution is a valid rollover contribution. Rev. Rul. 2014-9, Situation 1.
with regard to a rollover from a traditional IRA a check from the trustee
payable to the receiving plan that indicates on the pay stub that it is an IRA
of the employee (and the employee certifies that there are no after-tax amounts
and the employee is not age 70-1/2), the plan administrator may conclude that
the contribution from the IRA is a valid rollover contribution. Rev. Rul. 2014-9, Situation 2.