Meritless ERISA Claims, the Cunningham v.
Cornell Burden-Shift and Judicial, Legislative, and Administrative Pushback
By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
April 23, 2026
Article at 52 Journal of Pension Planning & Compliance 1 (Summer 2026) :
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1_6JUGOJEpYQBpwXdjnVqvVgZnRQjerZI/
See Addendum below
The Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Cunningham
v. Cornell University lowered the initial hurdles of ERISA litigation. These
lawsuits typically take the form of excessive fee class actions. Plaintiff
firms use template complaints (often with investigative information shared by
the DOL) to allege that fiduciaries (i) failed to monitor recordkeeping fees,
(ii) retained underperforming funds, or (iii) used expensive retail share
classes instead of institutional ones. Cunningham v. Cornell University
shifted the burden of proving exemptions for routine service contracts to plan
sponsors. This made it easier for plaintiffs to survive early motions to
dismiss.
However, 2026 has brought strong pushback
against meritless ERISA claims and the lowered pleading standard. It’s clear
that courts and lawmakers are looking for ways to stop baseless claims. This
article explores (i) the practical consequences of the Cunningham
burden-shift, (ii) recent judicial efforts to filter meritless claims using
standing and fee-shifting to plaintiff attorneys for frivolous claims, (iii)
new legislative attempts to restore the burden of proof to plaintiffs, and (iv)
a 2026 change in DOL Employee Benefits Security Administration (EBSA)
enforcement policy and prohibition of EBSA using secret common interest agreements with the plaintiff bar.
ERISA § 408 Exemptions as Affirmative Defenses
In Cunningham
v. Cornell University, 604 U.S. 693 (Apr. 17, 2025), the Supreme Court
considered a challenge to recordkeeping and administrative fee arrangements in
Cornell University’s defined contribution retirement plans. Participants
alleged that the plans paid excessive compensation to recordkeepers and other
service providers and that plan fiduciaries failed to prudently monitor those
arrangements, thereby permitting the payment of allegedly unreasonable
compensation for necessary services in alleged breach of their duties of
loyalty and prudence under ERISA § 404(a), 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a). In addition to
these fiduciary-duty claims, the plaintiffs alleged that the same fee payments
constituted prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C), 29 U.S.C. §
1106(a)(1)(C), on the theory that the payments were made to service providers
that were “parties in interest” to the plans. The district court and the Second
Circuit rejected the prohibited transaction claim, reasoning that plaintiffs
were required at the pleading stage to allege facts showing that the statutory
prohibited-transaction exemption for reasonable compensation for necessary
services under ERISA § 408(b)(2)(A) did not apply. The Supreme Court reversed,
holding that a plaintiff states a prohibited-transaction claim under §
406(a)(1)(C) by plausibly alleging the existence of a transaction between a
plan and a party in interest, and that the applicability of a § 408 exemption
is an affirmative defense that must be pleaded and proved by defendants rather
than negated by plaintiffs in the complaint.
Practical
Consequences for Routine Service Arrangements
Because
recordkeepers and similar service providers are, by definition, parties in
interest under ERISA § 3(14), 29 U.S.C. § 1002(14), Cunningham renders
routine service arrangements prima facie prohibited transactions at the
pleading stage, subject only to later proof of an applicable exemption. Taken
to its logical conclusion, the Court’s reasoning means that most routine
contracts between a plan and a service provider constitute a prohibited
transaction under ERISA § 406(a)(1)(C) for pleading purposes unless and until
the fiduciary affirmatively establishes the applicability of a § 408 exemption.
Absent that exemption, ordinary plan relationships, including recordkeeping,
trustee, custodial, investment advisory, and actuarial arrangements, would be
presumptively unlawful at the pleading stage, notwithstanding their ubiquity
and arm’s-length nature.
Although the
Court acknowledged concerns that its interpretation could expose ordinary plan
arrangements to costly “fishing expeditions,” it emphasized that
district courts retain procedural tools to screen weak claims, including
Article III standing requirements, Rule 7(a) orders, limits on discovery, Rule
11 sanctions, and fee-shifting under ERISA § 502(g)(1). In practice, however,
these tools typically operate only after litigation has commenced and often
after substantial defense costs have already been incurred.
Against that
backdrop, in light of Cunningham, plan sponsors and fiduciaries should assume
that ordinary service contracts are more likely to be challenged even in the
absence of any specific wrongdoing, and should be prepared to explain, on paper
and in plain terms, why each service provider was selected, how fees were
reviewed, and why the arrangement makes sense for the plan.
Criticism of
Cunningham as Expanding Prohibited-Transaction Litigation Beyond Its Intended
Scope
Although the
Supreme Court described Cunningham as a straightforward application of ERISA’s
statutory structure, many commentators have questioned whether the decision
aligns with economic reality and the historical purpose of ERISA’s
prohibited-transaction rules and fiduciary-duty framework. By allowing
prohibited-transaction claims to proceed without any allegation that
compensation was excessive, unreasonable, or the result of a flawed fiduciary
process, Cunningham permits plaintiffs to challenge routine, arm’s-length
service arrangements that have traditionally been viewed as permissible so long
as compensation is reasonable and services are necessary.
From a
litigation standpoint, Cunningham makes it easier for plaintiffs to add
prohibited-transaction claims to otherwise weak excessive-fee complaints in
order to avoid the more demanding pleading standards that apply to ERISA § 404
prudence claims. Plaintiffs use the prohibited transaction rules as a backdoor
to revive excessive fee claims when they lack direct evidence of actual
fiduciary imprudence or unreasonable market rates. Because nearly all service
providers qualify as parties in interest, plaintiffs generally need only allege
the existence of a service relationship to survive a motion to dismiss under §
406. This shifts early litigation away from whether fees were excessive or
fiduciary decision-making was imprudent and instead places immediate pressure
on plan sponsors to defend ordinary plan operations. As a result, ERISA’s
prohibited-transaction provisions—originally intended to prevent self-dealing
and other prohibited transactions—risk being used primarily as a procedural
tool to increase settlement leverage in cases where no concrete fiduciary
misconduct or participant harm has been plausibly alleged.
Post-Cunningham
Reduction in Successful Motions to Dismiss in ERISA Fee Cases
Since the
Supreme Court’s 2025 decision in Cunningham, motions to dismiss ERISA
fee cases, particularly prohibited-transaction claims under ERISA § 406, have
been granted less frequently. Courts are increasingly allowing cases to proceed
based solely on allegations that a plan paid fees to a service provider that
qualifies as a party in interest. As a result, lawsuits that likely would have
been dismissed before Cunningham are now advancing into costly
discovery, including cases involving mid-sized plans that historically were not
frequent litigation targets.
Judicial
Pushback
Rule 7(a)
Orders. In response to Cunningham, more
courts are utilizing Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 7(a) to require plaintiffs
to file a reply to an answer regarding reasonableness and exemptions before
allowing discovery to proceed, as the Supreme Court in Cunningham
suggested. For example, in Dalton v. Freeman, No. 2:22-cv-00847, 2025 WL
3771345 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 31, 2025), a California federal court ordered a Rule
7(a) reply to compel plaintiffs to address ERISA exemptions with
“specific, nonconclusory factual allegations” before discovery could
begin. Although the plaintiffs had survived a motion to dismiss by alleging a
“prohibited transaction” under the Cunningham standard, the
court used Rule 7(a) to address the “procedural issue” that otherwise
allows “meritless” cases to reach discovery.
Article III
Standing. A recent 2026 ruling highlights how courts
are using Article III standing as a “constitutional gatekeeper” to
dismiss prohibited transaction claims that might otherwise satisfy statutory
pleading requirements. In Peeler v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc., No.
1:24-cv-00231-MR, 2026 WL 208630 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2026), a North Carolina
federal court dismissed an ERISA class action for lack of Article III standing,
holding that a “bare allegation” of a relationship with a party in
interest is insufficient without specific allegations of a concrete injury. The
court held that despite recent Supreme Court guidance lowering the statutory
pleading bar for prohibited transactions, plaintiffs must still identify a
non-speculative financial loss actually affecting their individual accounts to
satisfy constitutional requirements. Ultimately, the court found the
plaintiffs’ allegations were too speculative because they failed to show that
their own account balances declined or that the recordkeeping and advisory
services provided weren’t worth what the plan paid. The court dismissed the
claims without prejudice, reinforcing that statutory violations alone do not
confer standing.
Fee-Shifting
and Attorney Accountability. Beyond procedural rules, courts are
exploring fee-shifting to deter meritless litigation. In November 2025, a U.S.
district judge granted summary judgment to the defendants in Whipple v.
Southeastern Freight Lines, Inc., No. 3:23-cv-04583-SAL (D.S.C. Nov. 25,
2025), dismissing a class action that alleged the company paid $3.5 million in
excessive 401(k) recordkeeping fees. The ruling for the employer hinged on the
court’s Daubert exclusion of the plaintiffs’ sole expert witness, which
prevented them from establishing loss causation under ERISA. Following this
dismissal, the defendants filed a motion in early 2026 under ERISA § 502(g)(1)
to shift over $1 million in defense costs specifically to the plaintiffs’ law firm
(but not to the named participants). In an unusual but growing trend, the
defense cited Cunningham guidance to argue that the firm itself bear
these costs to deter “baseless” class actions that exploit lower
pleading standards to force expensive discovery.
Legislative
Developments
Congress has
recently focused on the practical consequences of recent ERISA litigation
trends. On December 2, 2025, the House Education and Workforce Subcommittee
held a hearing entitled “Pension Predators: Stopping Class Action Abuse
Against Workers’ Retirement,” which examined whether developments such as Cunningham
have contributed to an increase in ERISA class actions driven more by
procedural leverage than by demonstrable fiduciary misconduct. Witnesses and
members of Congress expressed concern that lower pleading thresholds may impose
substantial litigation costs on plans and ultimately reduce retirement benefits
borne by participants.
On March 17,
2026, the House Education and Workforce Committee passed the ERISA Litigation
Reform Act (H.R. 6084) by a vote of 19-13. This bill aims to (i) shift the
burden of proof back to plaintiffs, requiring them to plausibly allege that a
transaction isn’t exempt under Section 408 at the pleading stage, (ii) require
“meaningful benchmarks” for performance claims, (iii) mandate an
automatic stay of discovery while a motion to dismiss is pending, and (iv)
require plaintiffs to prove that service provider fees were neither reasonable
nor necessary. Proponents argue this restores the “innocent until proven
guilty” principle for plan fiduciaries.
DOL New Enforcement Guidance and
Restrictions of DOL Information Sharing with Plaintiff Bar
Recent
congressional hearings exposed a troubling alliance between the DOL and
plaintiff attorneys. On July 22, 2025, the House Committee on Education and the
Workforce investigated the DOL EBSA’s use of secret common interest agreements.
It was recently discovered and reported at the hearing that the EBSA uses these
of secret common interest agreements with plaintiff attorneys to spoon-feed
confidential investigative data to those law firms. This practice gives
plaintiff attorneys unfair leverage in the case. Lawmakers heavily criticized
this practice, with some calling it a blatant abuse of the law. See https://tinyurl.com/412636.
In response, the DOL Inspector General launched an official audit into the
information sharing by EBSA and plaintiff attorneys. A bill was also introduced
in Congress, the Balance the Scales Act (H.R. 2958), to force the agency to
disclose all future common interest agreements.
To address
this controversy and other issues, the DOL issued Field Assistance Bulletin
2026-01 on April 14, 2026, which significantly shifts the EBSA 2026 enforcement
priorities. It outlines that the DOL will shift its focus to (i) egregious
conduct and loyalty breaches, (ii) avoid regulation by enforcement, (iii)
require senior leadership review for critical initiatives, and (iv) ensure
timely investigations. Also, the bulletin specifically prohibits agency staff
from coordinating enforcement activities with plaintiff attorneys pursuing
private actions. The bulletin also sets strict investigation deadlines, with
routine investigations required to close within 18 months, and complex cases
required to close within 30 months.
Evolving
Theories: Pleading Standards and Loss Causation
Supreme Court
Seeks Solicitor General Input. Following Cunningham, the Supreme
Court invited the Solicitor General to express the views of the United States
on whether to grant certiorari in two ERISA class actions highlighting
significant circuit splits. On December 9, 2025, the Solicitor General urged
the Court to grant certiorari in Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Johnson and Pizarro
v. Home Depot, Inc. (both cited below) and supported plan sponsor and
fiduciary defendants on the merits. This reflected a shift toward a more
pragmatic interpretation by endorsing meaningful-benchmark pleading standards
and rejecting expansive burden-shifting theories of loss causation.
Pleading
Standards in Parker-Hannifin and Intel Corp.
In Parker-Hannifin Corp. v. Johnson, 122 F.4th 205 (6th Cir. 2024), the
Sixth Circuit allowed an investment-performance challenge to proceed without
requiring the plaintiff to plausibly allege a “meaningful benchmark,”
which allows the court to determine whether plaintiffs have alleged plausible
claims to survive a motion to dismiss, an approach taken by some circuits,
while other circuits merely require a showing of meaningful comparability.
While the Solicitor General urged the Court to hear the case and reverse the
Sixth Circuit’s lenient standard, the Supreme Court is still considering
whether to grant certiorari as of March 2026. However, the Court has already
agreed to resolve this specific “meaningful benchmark” split in a
related case, Anderson v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, the
Court granted certiorari in January 2026.
Loss
Causation in Pizarro v. Home Depot, Inc. In Pizarro
v. Home Depot, Inc., 111 F.4th 1165 (11th Cir. 2024), the Eleventh Circuit held
that ERISA plaintiffs retain the burden of proving loss causation even after establishing
a breach of fiduciary duty and a loss, rejecting a burden-shifting framework
adopted by several other circuits. The Solicitor General supported this view,
arguing that the burden should remain with the plaintiffs. Following the filing
of the Solicitor General’s brief, the plaintiffs chose to abandon their appeal,
and the Supreme Court therefore dismissed the petition on January 8, 2026.
Meaningful
Benchmarks in Anderson v. Intel. In Anderson
v. Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee, 137 F.4th 1015 (9th Cir. 2025),
participants in its retirement plans alleged that trustees imprudently
invested in risky hedge funds and private equity that yielded lower returns
than traditional investments. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the
participants’ claims, ruling that they failed to plausibly allege a breach of
fiduciary duty under ERISA as the complaint did not provide meaningful benchmarks with similar investment
aims, risks, and objectives. The Supreme
Court granted review on January 16, 2026, to resolve whether plaintiffs
challenging investment underperformance must identify a “meaningful
benchmark” at the pleading stage to satisfy ERISA’s duty of prudence.
Looking Ahead
11-17-26 Addendum
Update — November 17, 2026: Further Developments in ERISA
Litigation
Since
this article was posted on April 23, 2026, several developments have reinforced
the growing judicial and legislative scrutiny of meritless ERISA class actions.
Supreme Court Review of ERISA Pleading Standards. On October
6, 2026, the Supreme Court heard oral argument in Anderson v. Intel Corp.
Investment Policy Committee, No. 25-498, involving the requirement that
plaintiffs challenging investment underperformance identify a meaningful
benchmark. The Ninth Circuit had dismissed the claims because plaintiffs failed
to identify sufficiently comparable investments. During oral argument, several
Justices appeared receptive to requiring meaningful comparisons, although the
appropriate degree of comparability remains disputed. A decision is expected
during the Court’s 2026–2027 Term. Unlike Cunningham v. Cornell University,
which addressed prohibited transactions under ERISA § 406, Anderson
concerns the pleading requirements for fiduciary imprudence under § 404. See Supreme
Court docket.
Judicial Safeguards Against Weak Claims. Courts have
continued exploring the procedural protections identified in Cunningham.
In Dalton v. Freeman, No. 2:22-cv-00847, 2025 WL 3771345 (E.D. Cal. Dec.
31, 2025), the court required plaintiffs to respond under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 7(a)(7) to defendants’ prohibited-transaction exemption defense.
However, the case subsequently proceeded toward discovery, illustrating the
limitations of this safeguard. In Peeler v. Bayada Home Health Care, Inc.,
No. 1:24-cv-00231-MR, 2026 WL 208630 (W.D.N.C. Jan. 27, 2026), the court
dismissed claims for lack of Article III standing, emphasizing that Cunningham
did not eliminate the requirement of concrete injury.
Legislative Developments. The ERISA
Litigation Reform Act (H.R. 6084), which the House Education and Workforce
Committee ordered reported on March 17, 2026, remains pending. The legislation
would impose more demanding pleading requirements, including provisions
addressing statutory exemptions and meaningful investment benchmarks, and would
restrict discovery while certain dismissal motions are pending. No legislation
reversing Cunningham has been enacted.
DOL Enforcement and Information Sharing. The DOL’s
April 14, 2026 Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01 remains an important change in
enforcement policy. It emphasizes serious violations, discourages regulation
through enforcement, establishes 18-month and 30-month administrative
investigation targets subject to exceptions, and restricts coordination with
private plaintiffs’ attorneys. These policies do not alter the rights of
private litigants or create enforceable deadlines for investigations. See DOL
Field Assistance Bulletin 2026-01.
Practical Significance. Although Cunningham continues to
expose routine service-provider arrangements to prohibited-transaction
litigation, courts and policymakers are considering ways to prevent weak claims
from imposing disproportionate litigation costs. The forthcoming Anderson
decision may provide important additional guidance concerning speculative
investment-performance claims. Meanwhile, plan fiduciaries should continue
documenting the reasonableness of service-provider compensation, investment
selection, and ongoing monitoring procedures.