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2027 Cost of Living Adjustments for Retirement and Benefit Plans

 

2027 BENEFIT PLAN COST-OF-LIVING
ADJUSTMENTS *

 Charles C. Shulman, Esq.

201-357-0577 212-380-3834

cshulman@ebeclaw.com

The chart below summarizes the  2027 cost-of-living adjustments affecting
401(k), defined benefit, ESOP and other retirement plans, IRAs, HSAs, Social
Security, PBGC premiums, and related tax and benefit thresholds. These updated
limits—issued through IRS guidance, Social Security and PBGC releases, and
federal penalty inflation adjustments in the Federal Register—reflect the new
contribution caps, compensation limits, savings incentives, and compliance
amounts that apply for the 2027 plan and tax year, compare to prior years.

 

* See Notice 2026-66 (2027 retirement plan limits), Rev.
Proc. 2026-35 (fringe benefit 2027 limits), Rev. Proc. 2026-24 (health plan
2027 limits), Rev. Proc. 2026-22 (ACA employer mandate penalties), Notice
2026-48 (saver’s match), Social Security News 2027 COLA Release (benefit
increase and SS wage cap for 2027),  PBGC

2027 Premium Rates & PBGC 2027 Monthly
Guarantee,  DOL Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation
Adjustments for 2027, and PGBC Civil Monetary Penalty Inflation Adjustments for
2027.

 

 

BENEFIT PLAN COST-OF-LIVING
ADJUSTMENTS

2026

2027

Retirement Plan Limits

402(g)
Elective Deferral Limit
–
Annual limit on pre-tax salary deferrals to 401(k), 403(b) and 457(b) plans – IRC §§ 402(g)(1), 402(g)(3) &
457(e)(15)

$24,500

$25,500

Age
50 Catch-Up Contribution Limit
– Additional “catch-up” deferrals beyond the 402(g) limit for
participants age 50 or older in 401(k), 403(b), and governmental 457(b) plans
– IRC § 414(v)(2)(B)(i). 

Under
SECURE 2.0, beginning in 2025 the catch-up limit for those ages 60-63 was
$11,250 and that mount is indexed  – IRC § 414(v)(2)(E)

 

$8,000

 

 

 

$11,250 for those age 60-63

 

$8,500

 

 

 

 

$11,750 for ages 60–63

Mandatory Roth Catch-Up Wage Threshold –
Beginning in 2026, catch-up contributions must be Roth if prior-year FICA
wages exceed the applicable threshold –
IRC § 414(v)(7)

$150,000

(in the prior year)

$155,000
(in prior-year wages)

DB Annual
Benefit Limit
– Maximum
annual benefits for defined benefit plans (straight-life annuity at age 62) – IRC § 415(b)

$290,000

$300,000

DC Annual
Contribution Limit
– Maximum
annual employer and employee contributions (excluding catch-up) for defined
contribution plans & SEP IRA –
IRC §§ 415(c)(1)(A) & (c)(2) & 408(j)

$72,000

$75,000

Annual
Compensation Limit
– Maximum
annual compensation that can be taken into account for qualified plans and
SEPs – IRC §§ 401(a)(17), 404(l) & 408(k)

$360,000

$375,000

Grandfathered
Governmental Plan Compensation Limit –
Higher § 401(a)(17) compensation limit
for certain participants in governmental plans maintained before July 1, 1993
– Treas. Reg. §
1.401(a)(17)-1(d)(4)(ii)

$535,000

$555,000

Highly
Compensated Employee (HCE) Threshold
– Prior-year compensation threshold for determining highly
compensated employee status  for
nondiscrimination testing in the following year – IRC § 414(q)(1)(B)

$160,000

$170,000

Key
Employee Officer Compensation Threshold for Top Heavy Testing
– Annual compensation threshold for
determining whether an officer is a key employee for top-heavy plan testing – IRC § 416(i)(1)(A)(i)

$235,000

$245,000

Emergency
Savings Account Limit – Maximum participant contribution balance,
excluding earnings, in pension-linked emergency savings accounts (PLESAs) –
IRC § 402A(e)(3)(A)

$2,600

$2,700

Starter 401(k) Deferral Limit –
Annual elective deferral limit for starter 401(k) and safe harbor 403(b)
plans  (higher amounts if age 50 or
over)
– IRC §§ 401(k)(16)(D) & 403(b)(16)(D)

$6,000

$6,500
($7,600 if age 50+)

QLAC
Premium Limit
– $150,000
 maximum premiums for qualified longevity
annuity contracts (QLACs),  under increased
from to $210,000 under SECURE 2.0 and indexed for inflation
– Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(9)-6 Q&A 17

$210,000

$220,000

ESOP
Distribution Extension Limits
– (i) minimum account balance permitting extension of
distributions beyond 5 years; and (ii) additional account balance (or
fraction) permitting each additional year of distributions – IRC § 409(o)(1)(C)(ii)

(i)  $1,455,000

 

(ii) $290,000

(i) $1,505,000


(ii) $300,000

Mandatory
Lump-Sum Cashout Limit –
Maximum
involuntary cashout amount, increased by SECURE 2.0 from $5,000 to $7,000 for
distributions after 2023 (not indexed). Amounts over $1,000 are generally
subject to automatic IRA rollover– IRC §§ 411(a)(11)(A) &
401(a)(31)(B)(ii)

$7,000

$7,000

SIMPLE Salary Deferral Limit –  SIMPLE 401(k) or SIMPLE IRA elective
deferral limit (10% higher if fewer than 25 employees or if certain higher
employer contributions are made) –
IRC § 408(p)(2)(E)

$17,000

 

($18,100 for applicable employers)

$17,500

 

($19,100 for applicable employers)

SIMPLE
Age 50 Catch-Up Limit
– Additional
catch-up deferrals for participants age 50 or older in SIMPLE 401(k) and
SIMPLE IRA plans, with a 10% increase for certain small employers or those
making higher contributions.

Under
SECURE 2.0, a higher catch-up limit applies at ages 60–63 of $5,250 beginning
in 2025 (indexed) – IRC § 414(v)(2)(B)(ii), (E).

$4,000

(if 50 or older)

 

$5,250 if age 60-63

$4,000

(if 50 or older)

$5,250 if age 60–63

SEP Minimum
Compensation Threshold – Minimum annual compensation required for an employee
to qualify for participation in a Simplified Employee Pension (SEP) plan –
IRC § 408(k)(2)(C)

$800

$800

Saver’s
Credit (2026) / Saver’s Match (2027)
–
In 2026, a nonrefundable saver’s credit of 10%,
20%, or 50% of eligible retirement contributions, based on AGI (continues in
2027 for eligible ABLE account contributions). Beginning in 2027, SECURE 2.0
§ 103 replaces the credit with a federal retirement account contribution of
up to 50% of the first $2,000 contributed ($1,000 maximum per individual),
phased out based on MAGI  (amounts
shown are for joint filers) – IRC §§ 25B, 6433.

 

50% if AGI ≤ $48,500;

20% from $48,501 to $52,500;

10% at $52,501 to $80,500

50% if MAGI ≤ $41,000;

phased out from $41,001 to $70,999;

no match at $71,000 or above

 

IRA
Limit
–
Traditional IRA and Roth IRA contribution limit is indexed – IRC §§ 219(b)(5)(A), 408(a)(1)
& 408A(c)(2)

$7,500

$7,500

Spousal
IRA Contribution Limit
– A
spousal IRA or spousal Roth IRA where both spouses contribute is double the
above.

$15,000

$15,000

IRA
Catch-up Contribution
–
Age 50 & older “catch-up” for IRAs & Roth IRAs (not currently
adjusted but under SECURE 2.0 § 108 may be adjust beginning in 2025) – IRC § 219(b)(5)

$1,100

$1,100

Phaseout where IRA Owner is also Covered by an
Employer Plan
– Adjusted gross income (AGI) phase-out of
deductible contribution to IRA if individual is also covered by
employer-sponsored retirement plan for: (i) married filing jointly, (ii)
single or (iii) married filing separately –
IRC § 219(g)(1)-(5)

(i) $129,000 – $149,000,

(ii) $81,000 – $91,000,

(iii) 0 – $10,000

(i) $133,000 – $153,000,

(ii) $83,000 – $93,000,

(iii) 0 – $10,000

Phaseout where Spouse of IRA Owner is Covered by
an Employer Plan
– MAGI phase-out of deductible contribution to
IRA if contributor is not covered by an employer-sponsored plan but spouse is
covered by an employer-sponsored plan –
IRC § 219(g)(7)

$242,000-$252,000

$250,000-$260,000

Phaseout of Roth IRA Contributions – MAGI
phase-out deduction for contributions to the Roth IRA
for (i) married filing jointly, (ii) single or (iii) married filing separately
– IRC § 408A(c)(3)(B)

(i) $242,000 – $252,000, (ii) $153,000 – $168,000, (iii) 0 –
$10,000

(i) $250,000 – $260,000,

(ii) $158,000 – $173,000,

(iii) 0 – $10,000

PBGC Premiums & Guarantee

PBGC Flat-Rate Premium – PBGC
flat-rate premium per participant for a single-employer plan
(under ERISA § 4006 &
PBGC Premium Rates webpage)

$111

$116

PBGC Variable-Rate Premium – PBGC
variable-rate premium for single-employer plans (i) per $1,000 of Unfunded
Vested Benefits (no longer indexed after 2025, per SECURE 2.0), and (ii) p
er participant cap.

(i) $52
(ii) $751

(i) $52
(ii) $783

Multiemployer
Premium
–
PBGC premium for multiemployer plan per participant

$40

$42

PBGC
Guaranteed Benefit
–
PBGC guaranteed benefits under ERISA § 4022 where PBGC is the trustee (for
annual single life annuity beginning at age 65)

$93,477.24

($7,789.77 a month)

$97,363.68
($8,113.64/month)

Health Plan Limits

Health
FSA Limit
–
Health FSA (flexible spending account) limit – IRC § 125(i)

$3,400

$3,500

Heath
FSA Carryover
–
Health FSA carryover amount

$680

$700

HRA
Contribution Limit

–Maximum employer contribution for excepted benefit HRA – Treas. Reg. §
54.9831-1(c)(3)(viii)(B)

$2,200

$2,250

QSEHRA
Limit
–
Qualified small employer HRA (QSEHRA) for business with less than 50
employees and maximum payments for (i) single coverage and (ii) family
coverage – IRC § 9831(d)

(i) $6,450

(ii) $13,100

(i) $6,700
(ii) $13,550

HDHP
Deductible
–
High Deductible Health Plan (with HSA) minimum deductibles for (i) self-only
or (ii) family coverage – IRC
§ 223(c)

(i) $1,700

(ii) $3,400

(i) $1,750
(ii) $3,500

HSA Limit – Health Savings Account (HSA)
deduction limit for (i) single & (ii) family – IRC § 223(b)(2)

(i) $4,400

(ii) $8,750

(i) $4,500
(ii) $9,000

HDHP
Out of Pocket
–
HDHP (with HSA) maximum out-of-pocket amounts for (i) self-only & (ii)
family coverage – IRC § 223(c)

(i) $8,500

(ii) $17,000

(i) $8,700
(ii) $17,400

 

 

 

MSAs – Existing Archer Medical Savings
Accounts have annual deductible range (i) for single coverage & (ii) for
family coverage, and out-of-pocket maximum (iii) for single coverage and (iv)
for family coverage – IRC § 220(c)(2)(A)

(i) $2,900 – $4,400, (ii) $5,850 – $8,750, (iii) $5,850 (iv)
$10,700

(i) $3,000–$4,550
(ii) $6,050–$9,050
(iii) $6,050
(iv) $11,050

ACA
Out of Pocket Maximum
–
Affordable Care Act (ACA) out-of-pocket maximum (cost-sharing) for
non-grandfathered group health plans for (i) self & (ii) family – 42 USC
§ 18022(c); 45 CFR § 156.130(a)

(i) $10,600

(ii) $21,200

(i) $12,000
(ii) $24,000

ACA
Affordability Rate
–
ACA health plan “affordability” rate of pay (percentage of household income)
for premium tax credit – IRC § 36B(c)(2)(C)(i)(II)

9.96%

10.22%

ACA
Pay or Play Penalties
–
ACA employer shared responsibility assessments (i) if do not offer coverage
to 95% of full-time employee, penalty for each FTE; and (ii) if do offer
coverage to 95% of FTEs but is not “affordable” penalized only for employees
who buy Marketplace coverage and receive premium tax credit – IRC § 4980H

(i) $3,340

(ii) $5,010

(i) $3,780
(ii) $5,670

Fringe Benefits

Transportation
Fringe
–
Qualified transportation & parking benefit – IRC § 132(f)(2)

$340

$350

Adoption
–
Adoption credit or exclusion from income (i) amount and (ii) AGI phaseout –
IRC §§ 23(a)(3) & 137(a)(2)

(i) $17,670, (ii) $265,080 – $305,080

(i) $18,250
(ii) $273,680–$313,680

LTC
Deduction Limit
–
Long-term care premium deduction limits for individuals (i) age 40 or less,
(ii) age 41-50, (iii) age 51-60, (iv) age 61-70 and (v) over age 70 – IRC §
213(d)(10)

(i) $500, (ii) $930, (iii) $1,860, (iv) $4,960 & (v) $6,200

(i) $500
(ii) $945
(iii) $1,890
(iv) $5,030
(v) $6,290

Social Security

Taxable
Wage Base
–
The taxable wage base subject to FICA (OASDI) tax (SSA COLA Fact Sheet)

$184,500

$192,300

SS
Tax up to Taxable Wage Base –
Social Security (OASDI) tax up to taxable wage base (double for
self-employed)

6.2%

6.2%

Medicare
Tax
–
Medicare tax and no cap on wages (plus 0.9%
Medicare tax for wages in excess of $250,000 (joint filers) / $200,000

(single))

1.45%

1.45%

SS COLA – Social Security cost of living
increase

2.8%

3.6%

SS Annual Earnings Test –
For Social Security benefits claimed before reaching full retirement age (age
67 for anyone born in 1960 or later), annual earnings above the following
threshold reduce benefits(generally $1 for every $2 in earnings over the cap)

$24,480

$25,560

Penalties

DOL
Penalties
–
Sample DOL penalties:(i) Penalty per day for failure to file annual report
(Form 5500) – ERISA § 502(c)(2) (originally $1,000 per day);

(ii)
Penalty per day for failure to provide certain notices for events relating to
limitations for severe funding shortfalls and relating to withdrawal
liability – ERISA § 502(c)(4) (originally $100 per day);

(iii)
Penalty per day for failure to provide blackout or diversification notice – ERISA § 502(c)(7) (originally $100
per day);

(iv) Penalty per day
for failure to file Form M-1 (MEWA) under ERISA §502(c)(5)

(i) $2,739

 

(ii) $2,167

(iii) $173

 

(iv) $1,992 **

2027 adjustment not yet announced

PBGC Penalties

(i) PBGC penalty per day for failure to provide required notices
or other material information with respect to single employer Title IV plans
of up to:

(ii) PBGC penalty per day for failure to provide certain notices
relating to multiemployer plans of up to:

(i) $2,739

 

(ii) $365 **

2027 adjustment not
yet announced

 

** Due to government shutdown
in October 2025 and the inability to calculate the CPI increase from Oct. 2024
and Oct. 2025, as required by the Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment
Act, the DOL and PBGC announced in May, 2026 that the 2025 penalty amounts
remained in effect for 2026.

 

 

Categories
Blog

State-Mandated Retirement Savings Programs (including NY & NJ) – Latest Updates

 

State-Mandated Retirement Savings Programs
 – Latest Updates

By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
cshulman@ebeclaw.com
201.357.0577

May 20, 2026 

I. Background,
DOL Interpretive Bulletin 2015-02

A.
State Mandated Retirement Savings Programs Enacted in a Number of States.
In the past 10 years, a number of states have
enacted laws requiring private employers to facilitate a state-mandated retirement
savings arrangement if they don’t already offer one. The most common model is
the payroll-deduction auto-IRA (generally a Roth IRA). These are usually
structured as a Roth IRA. Most of these programs default to an initial
contribution rate set between 3% and 5%. Employers can remain exempt if they
choose to establish their own private retirement plans like a 401(k).

B.
Interpretive Bulletin 2015-02.

The Department of Labor set forth guidance in 2015 that enabled state-mandated
retirement savings programs. DOL Interpretive Bulletin 2015-02,
DOL Reg. § 2509.2015-02, 80 Fed. Reg. 71936 (Nov. 18,
2015),
provide guidance on how states can
sponsor or facilitate retirement programs without violating ERISA preemption.
It notes that states act as market participants when they offer voluntary
options. These models include (i) marketplace platforms to connect businesses
with private plans and payroll deduction IRAs, (ii) state-sponsored prototype
plans, or (iii) multiple employer plans where the state serves as the lead
sponsor. Such programs are generally permitted if participation is voluntary
and they don’t interfere with the uniform administration of private benefit
plans. The bulletin explicitly distinguishes these ERISA-covered models from
the auto-IRA models that many states now mandate.

II. States With
Mandated Retirement Savings Programs

A.
17 States with Enacted Mandatory Auto-IRA Programs.
Currently, there are at least seventeen
states with active or upcoming mandatory auto-IRA programs for covered
employers. These states include California, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware,
Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Maryland, Minnesota, Nevada, New Jersey, New York,
Oregon, Rhode Island, Vermont, Virginia and Washington State
. Philadelphia is the first city to enact (in May 2026) a
mandatory auto-IRA program for private-sector workers.

B.
Most of the 17 States Use Just a Roth IRA; Employee Threshold Between 1 and 25.
 The auto-IRA is generally a Roth IRA, although
several states, including California & NJ, also allow a traditional IRA
option. The employee threshold is generally 1, 5 or 10 employees (in Virginia,
25 employees). In NYS, affiliated employers under IRC
§ 414 are aggregated.

C. In 17 States, Initial
Deferral Between 3% and 5% and Some have Auto-Escalation.
In most of
the states the initial contribution is 5%, but in some, e.g., CT, NJ & NY
it is 3%. Most contain an annual 1% escalation up to 8 or 10%.

D.
States with Voluntary IRA Programs.

New Mexico has a voluntary IRA and Roth IRA program. Mississippi
and Utah enacted voluntary IRA programs in 2026. Pennsylvania
and Georgia
are considering auto-IRA programs.

E.
States with 401(k) MEP.
Massachusetts
has a voluntary 401(k) multiple employer plan (MEP) for small nonprofits , and
Missouri is launching a voluntary 401(k) MEP for businesses with 50 or fewer
employees.

F.
States With No Mandatory Retirement Savings Program.
The remaining states, e.g., Texas, Florida, Ohio,
either have no active mandates or have only recently begun considering
legislation without passing laws.

G.
No Employer Contribution; Same Limit as Individual IRAs.
The state mandated or voluntary savings
programs prohibit employer matching or non-elective contributions. The annual
contribution limit for the state IRAs or Roth IRAs in 2026 is $7,500 for
individuals under age 50, and $8,600 for those 50 or older.

H. Exemption for Partial Qualified Plan
Coverage.
An employer doesn’t need to cover all workers
to be exempt from these mandates. The exemption for sponsoring a qualified plan
applies even if it covers some, but not all, employees. Official guidance in
California, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois, Maine, Minnesota, New Jersey and New
York specifically confirms this partial coverage rule. Minnesota and New Jersey
explicitly note this includes employers who merely contribute to a
multiemployer trust fund for union employees. Commentators assume that the
other states with mandatory auto-IRA programs also operate under the same
entity-level structure exemption for maintaining or contributing to qualified
plan for some employees and would also exempt employers that contribute to
multiemployer plans to which the employer contributes to.

I.
IRAs are Portable; Distribution Age.

These accounts are fully portable. Employees keep their savings and can
transfer the accounts even if they change jobs. Funds can be rolled into other
IRAs. However, IRS regulations do not permit rolling Roth IRA funds into an
employer-sponsored 401(k). Participants can withdraw their Roth IRA including investment
earnings tax-free and penalty-free at age 59 1/2 and after a five-year holding period.
To withdraw non-Roth amounts without the 10% early distribution penalty, the
participant generally must be at least age 59 1/2. The participant will still
be subject to ordinary income tax on the distribution of these non-Roth
amounts.

III. New York
Secure Choice Savings Program

A.
New York Secure Choice Savings Program with Roth IRAs for Employers With 10 or
More Employees that do Not Otherwise Participate in a Qualified Retirement
Plan.
New York State initially enacted its NYS
Secure Choice Savings Program in 2018 as a voluntary option for employers with
under 100 employees. New York later amended the law in October 2021 to make
participation mandatory for covered employers. Following several implementation
delays, the program officially launched in October 2025. An employer is a covered
employer in New York if the employer (i) employed 10 or more workers in the
state at all times during the previous calendar year, (ii) has been in business
for at least two years, and (iii) hasn’t offered a qualified retirement plan in
the preceding two years. An employer should formally certify its exemption on
the state portal at https://www.newyorksecurechoice.com if it already sponsors
a qualified plan.

B.
Roth IRA Only; 3% Deferral Rate; No Auto-Escalation.
For New York only the Roth IRA is available.
The initial contribution is 3% of total pay. There is no auto-escalation, although
employees may elect an annual escalation or higher contribution percentages up
to 10%. Employees can opt out or choose different elections at any time. Employers
cannot make matching contributions and cannot contribute to the plans.

C.
Under the New York Secure Choice Savings Program, the 10 Employee Threshold
Would Also Include Controlled Group Affiliates of the Employer.
 New
York General Business Law, Article 43, Section 1300, regarding the NYS Secure
Choice Savings Program, defined “employer” as an
entity with 10 or
more employees engaged in a business, industry, profession, trade, or other
enterprise in New York state, whether for profit or not for profit.
Section 1300 also provides that all terms
carry the same meaning as used in comparable contexts in the Internal Revenue
Code. It is generally assumed that this will include the controlled group rules
of IRC §§ 414(b) and (c) and the affiliated service group rules of IRC §
414(m). Other states do not specifically incorporate controlled group aggregation
rules.

D. If Qualified Plan Offered Only to Part of
Workforce Such as Union Employees.
New York
General Business Law Article 43, Section 1300(4) provides an exception from NYS
Secure Choice mandate the employer
has “offered a qualified retirement plan,
including, but not limited to, a plan qualified undersections 401(a), 401(k),
403(a), 403(b), 408(k), 408(p) or 457(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986
in the preceding two years. See also,
https://newyorksecurechoice.zendesk.com/hc/en-us
with details on this.

The
NYS Secure Choice Savings Program Employer FAQs – at
https://newyorksecurechoice.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/31467718990615 –
answers the question: “
I already offer a 401(k) or other
qualified retirement plan to some employees but not all. Do I have to offer
this program too?”  And the answer
given is “No, if you offer an employer-sponsored retirement plan to any
of your employees, you can certify your exemption, and you will not need to
facilitate the program.” 
Commentators
assume that the same should be true if the employer contributed to a
multiemployer pension or 401(k) plan for only the union employees and nonunion
employees were not covered by a plan.  

E.
Portability and Investments.

The NYS Secure Choice Roth IRA is fully portable from employer to employer. New
York initially places funds in a Conservative Principal Protection Fund for 30
days. It then moves the funds to a Target Retirement Date Fund based on an
assumed retirement age of 65, unless another fund is selected by the employee.

F.
New York Enrollment Deadlines – the Latest is July 15, 2026.
New York enrollment deadlines are: for employers
with 30 or more employees, March 18, 2026; for  employers with 15 to 29 employees, May 15,
2026; and for employers with 10 to 14 employees, July 15, 2026.

G.
Potential Penalties in NYS
. In NYS,
lack of compliance with the NYS Secure Choice Savings Program mandates, triggers
a warning in the first year, and could reach (i) $250 per employee in the
second year, (ii) $500 in the third year, and (iii) $1,000 per employee in
subsequent years. Specific failure-to-register penalties may still be under
review.

IV. NJ Secure
Choice Savings Program – RetireReady NJ

A.
RetireReady NJ Program – Threshold Lowered to 10 Employees in Jan. 2026.
New Jersey enacted its Secure Choice Savings
Program Act on March 28, 2019, codified in N.J.S.A. 43:23-13 through 32. It was
amended on January 20, 2026. NJ P.L. 2025, c. 379. The NJ program launched on
June 30, 2024. NJ Secure Choice Savings Program was rebranded as RetireReady NJ
prior to the launching. The mandate originally covered employers with 25 or
more employees.

B. Enrollment Deadline in NJ for 25+
Employees Was in Nov. 2024, Future Deadline for 10+ Employees TBD.
The
registration deadline for employers with 25 or more employees passed on
November 15, 2024. The January 2026 amendment reduced the employer threshold in
NJ from 25 to 10 employees. Once implemented, employers with 10 or more workers
will be required to participate if they have operated for two years and lack a
qualified plan. The employer should formally certify its exemption on the state
portal at retireready.nj.gov if it already sponsors a qualified plan. New
Jersey does not incorporate controlled group rules, and an entity-by-entity
determination can be made.

C.
Default Roth IRA at 3% With Auto-Escalation.

Employers cannot make matching contributions and cannot contribute to the
plans. New Jersey savers may choose either a Roth or a traditional IRA, though
the Roth IRA is the default option. NJ sets a default employee contribution
rate of 3% of gross pay, but the 3% initial rate automatically escalates by 1%
each January until it reaches a 10% cap. Employees can opt out entirely at any
time.

D. Exemption for Offering of a Qualified Plan
Just to Union Employees Or Just to Some of Employees?
New Jersey
RetireReady exempts employers that already offer their own retirement savings
plan, as stated in
https://retirereadynj.zendesk.com/hc/en-us/articles/22909195207831. The NJ
webinar FAQs at https://www.nj.gov/treasury/securechoiceprogram/documents/pdf/webinar-answers.pdf
states that (i) an employer is entirely exempt if they offer an
employer-sponsored plan to any portion of their workforce, (ii) contributing to
a union retirement plan exclusively for union members satisfies this
requirement, and (iii) the employer isn’t required to be the primary plan
sponsor or offer the plan to all employee..

E.
Portability; Target Date Funds; Withdrawals.

RetireReady NJ accounts are fully portable from employer to employer. New
Jersey relies primarily on various targeted market-based investments similar to
target date funds. You can roll the funds into another IRA. However, IRS rules
generally don’t permit rolling Roth IRA funds into an employer 401(k).
Participants can generally withdraw their own IRA or Roth IRA contributions at
any time without tax or penalty. Withdrawing investment earnings usually
requires a qualified distribution. To avoid income tax and a 10% additional
tax, the participant generally must be at least age 59 1/2 and have held the
account for a five-year period.

F.
NJ Penalties.
New Jersey
issues a written warning in the first year of noncompliance. It then fines
employers (i) $100 per employee in the second year, (ii) $250 in the third and
fourth years, and (iii) $500 from the fifth year onward.



[1] Charles C. Shulman, Esq., Teaneck,
New Jersey, cshulman@ebeclaw.com, 201-357-0577, has extensive experience in
employee benefits and executive compensation law, including drafting,
negotiating and advising on qualified plans, ERISA liability, nonqualified plans,
executive compensation, equity-based awards, health, welfare and fringe benefit
plans, employment agreements, fiduciary issues, employment law matters, and
related M&A work. He is the author of numerous articles on a variety of
employee benefit & executive compensation topics, including the seminal
chapter “Employee Benefits and Executive Compensation in Mergers &
Acquisitions,” and the west treatise “Qualified Retirement Plans.” He is
admitted to the N.Y. and N.J. bars, inducted as a fellow in the American
College of Employee Benefits Counsel and a Contributing Editor of the WK
Journal of Pension Planning & Compliance and the Journal of Deferred
Compensation. He holds a J.D. & LL.M from N.Y.U. School of Law.

 

 

Addendum: New York and New Jersey Enrollment Deadlines 11-17-26

New Jersey—New deadlines for employers with 10–24 employees. Following the January 2026 expansion of RetireReady NJ to employers with 10 or more employees, New Jersey announced two additional enrollment deadlines: December 1, 2026, for employers with 20–24 employees, and February 17, 2027, for employers with 10–19 employees. These deadlines are confirmed by the New Jersey Secure Choice Savings Board’s September 2026 employer guidance. Employers that already offer a qualified retirement plan remain exempt but should certify their exemption through the RetireReady NJ portal.

New York—Additional enrollment deadline. The initial New York Secure Choice enrollment deadlines for employers with 10 or more employees expired between March and July 2026. The program has announced a further deadline of November 18, 2026, for newly eligible employers. Employers that already offer a qualified retirement plan may certify their exemption through the New York Secure Choice portal.

Both programs continue to require covered employers to facilitate employee payroll-deduction IRAs rather than establish employer-funded retirement plans.

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ERISA Fiduciary Advice: The Regulatory Landscape for 2026

 

ERISA Fiduciary Advice: The Regulatory Landscape for 2026

By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
cshulman@ebeclaw.com
201.357.0577

March, 2026

Recent court decisions have effectively nullified the Department of Labor’s 2024 Retirement Security Rule. Two federal courts stayed the rule, finding that the DOL likely exceeded its authority, and in November 2025 the DOL withdrew its appeals. In March 2026, the DOL published a notice recognizing the judicial vacatur of the 2024 Retirement Security Rule. As a result, fiduciary status for investment advice continues to be governed by the reinstated 1975 five-part test and the original version of PTE 2020-02, alongside the SEC’s Regulation Best Interest.

The Department of Labor’s effort to revise the fiduciary investment-advice standard has become a recurring subject of rulemaking and litigation. Major definitional changes were proposed under successive presidential administrations. The most recent development came in March 2026, when the DOL published a notice recognizing the judicial vacatur of the 2024 Retirement Security Rule. As a result, the 2024 rule and its accompanying amendments to the prohibited-transaction exemptions never took effect. ERISA fiduciary advice therefore continues to be governed by the 1975 five-part test and the reinstated original PTE 2020-02.

I. The 1975 Rule and the 2016 Fiduciary Rule

ERISA’s investment-advice fiduciary definition originates in 1975, when the Ford Administration adopted a regulation providing that a person is a fiduciary only if all elements of a five-part test are satisfied. 40 Fed. Reg. 50842 (Oct. 31, 1975); DOL Reg. § 2510.3-21(c). The 1975 five-part test dictates that a person providing investment advice for a fee is a fiduciary with respect to a plan’s or IRA’s assets only if the advice (i) concerns the value or sale of investment property, (ii) is given on a regular basis, (iii) is provided under a mutual understanding that it will serve as (iv) a primary basis for the retirement investment decision, and (v) is individualized to the investor.

The 2016 Fiduciary Rule replaced the 1975 rule. The 2016 rule imposed fiduciary status when a person made an investment recommendation regarding retirement plan or IRA assets, including one-time advice such as rollovers, under circumstances where the adviser either (i) acknowledged acting as an ERISA fiduciary or (ii) provided advice under an agreement that the advice was based on the recipient’s particular needs. This expansion brought brokers, insurance agents, and others, who were previously held only to a lower suitability standard, under ERISA’s stringent duties of care and loyalty, thereby protecting retirement savers from conflicted advice. To allow financial institutions to continue receiving common forms of compensation, such as commissions, the rule introduced new prohibited-transaction class exemptions, most notably the Best Interest Contract Exemption (BICE), which mandated adherence to Impartial Conduct Standards and required a written contract acknowledging fiduciary status. 81 Fed. Reg. 21002 (Apr. 8, 2016).

However, in 2018, the Fifth Circuit vacated the 2016 Fiduciary Rule in full, holding that the DOL exceeded its statutory authority. Chamber of Commerce v. U.S. DOL, 885 F.3d 360 (5th Cir. 2018).

During the first Trump Administration, the DOL issued 2020 technical amendments to DOL Reg. § 2510.3-21, removing the vacated 2016 Fiduciary Rule from the regulations and reinstating the 1975 test. See 85 Fed. Reg. 40589 (July 7, 2020).

At the same time, the DOL adopted PTE 2020-02, Improving Investment Advice for Workers & Retirees, 85 Fed. Reg. 82798 (Dec. 18, 2020). This exemption remains operative.

In 2019, the Securities and Exchange Commission adopted Regulation Best Interest (“Reg BI”), requiring broker-dealers, when making recommendations to retail customers, to act in the customer’s best interest and not place their own financial interests ahead of the investor’s. Reg BI created a federal securities-law “best interest” standard distinct from the ERISA fiduciary definition. See Regulation Best Interest, Exchange Act Release No. 34-86031, 84 Fed. Reg. 33318 (July 12, 2019). Reg BI remains in effect.

II. The 2024 Retirement Security Rule

In April 2024, under the Biden Administration, the DOL issued the 2024 Retirement Security Rule, which was intended to replace the 1975 five-part test with a modernized fiduciary definition based on adviser representations and investor expectations. Retirement Security Rule—Definition of an Investment Advice Fiduciary, 89 Fed. Reg. 32122 (Apr. 25, 2024).

Under the 2024 Retirement Security Rule’s three-element test, a financial professional would become an ERISA fiduciary if (i) an investment recommendation was made to a retirement investor, (ii) it was provided for a fee, and (iii) the adviser either affirmatively stated fiduciary status or held itself out as a trusted adviser providing individualized best-interest guidance. The rule also included amendments to PTE 2020-02 designed to standardize conduct requirements across advisory and insurance channels.

These changes were scheduled to take effect on September 23, 2024, but were stayed by litigation.

III. The 2024 Litigation, 2025 Appeal Dismissal, and 2026 Vacatur

Before the 2024 Retirement Security Rule took effect, two federal district courts stayed it. These cases were Federation of Americans for Consumer Choice, Inc. v. DOL, 742 F. Supp. 3d 677 (E.D. Tex. 2024), and American Council of Life Insurers v. DOL, Docket No. 4:24-cv-00482, 2024 WL 3572297 (N.D. Tex. 2024). Both courts concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed in arguing that the DOL again exceeded its statutory authority by extending fiduciary obligations to sales practices and one-time recommendations.

In November 2025, the DOL filed an unopposed motion to voluntarily dismiss its consolidated appeals. Mot. to Dismiss, Federation of Americans for Consumer Choice v. DOL, Case Nos. 24-40637 & 24-10890 (5th Cir. Nov. 2025). The Fifth Circuit granted the dismissal on November 28, 2025, leaving the district-court stays intact. The DOL then published an official Notice of Court Vacatur, 91 Fed. Reg. 18213 (Mar. 20, 2026). Because the 2024 exemption amendments were part of the same rulemaking, they also never took effect and were officially void.

IV. Where Things Stand Now and What to Expect

Following the withdrawal of the DOL appeal and the March 2026 notice of vacatur of the 2024 Retirement Security Rule, that rule is not operative. The controlling fiduciary framework remains the 1975 five-part test in DOL Reg. § 2510.3-21, which was restated in the March 2026 notice. 91 Fed. Reg. 18213 (Mar. 20, 2026).

The DOL republished the operative text of PTE 2020-02 in the March notice. It did not include the preamble sections that courts had invalidated. Nevertheless, financial institutions must continue navigating the practical overlap between ERISA fiduciary standards and the SEC’s 2019 Regulation Best Interest rule, 84 Fed. Reg. 33318 (July 12, 2019).

Addendum

Further developments in April 2026 clarified the application of the reinstated 1975 five-part test to rollover recommendations.

In its March 20, 2026 notice, the DOL not only restored the 1975 fiduciary definition but also concluded that the entire preamble to PTE 2020-02 was effectively vacated. Although federal courts had expressly invalidated only portions of that preamble, the DOL determined that the remaining interpretive guidance was too closely intertwined with the invalidated provisions to be reliable. The operative provisions of PTE 2020-02, however, remain in effect. 91 Fed. Reg. 13503, 13504–05 (Mar. 20, 2026).

A further development occurred on April 24, 2026, when the DOL and the Federation of Americans for Consumer Choice filed a joint stipulation dismissing litigation challenging the DOL’s 2020 interpretation of rollover advice. The stipulation confirmed that the DOL had reinstated Advisory Opinion 2005-23A (Dec. 7, 2005), commonly known as the Deseret Letter, and would no longer rely on the broader interpretation contained in the 2020 preamble.

Under that advisory opinion, a recommendation by a person who is not otherwise a plan fiduciary to roll assets from an ERISA plan into an IRA generally does not, standing alone, constitute fiduciary investment advice with respect to the plan. The analysis remains subject to the facts and circumstances and the requirements of the 1975 five-part test.

These developments substantially narrow the circumstances in which a one-time rollover recommendation establishes fiduciary status under ERISA. They do not, however, eliminate fiduciary obligations where the five-part test is otherwise satisfied, nor do they repeal PTE 2020-02. Financial institutions relying on that exemption must continue to satisfy its applicable conditions, including its impartial conduct standards.

The DOL has also stated that it has no current plans to undertake new notice-and-comment rulemaking concerning the definition of investment advice fiduciary. For now, the reinstated 1975 five-part test, the restored 2005 rollover guidance, and the operative provisions of PTE 2020-02 provide the governing federal framework.

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Compliance Update: The Rapidly Expanding Scope of the IRC § 162(m) Limit on Deductibility of Compensation in Excess of $1 Million

  

Compliance Update: The Rapidly Expanding Scope of the
IRC § 162(m) Limit
on Deductibility of Compensation in Excess of $1 Million

By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
cshulman@ebeclaw.com
201.357.0577

Feb. 11, 2026

The Internal Revenue Code § 162(m) $1 Million Deduction Limit if a
Publicly Held Corporation Is in the Group.
Businesses can usually deduct the
full amount of salaries and bonuses they pay to their employees as a necessary
business expense. However, Section 162(m) of the tax code creates a massive
exception for public companies. It provides that once a “covered employee”
(typically a top executive) makes more than $1 million in a single year, the
company can no longer deduct any pay above that $1 million threshold. This
means the company must pay corporate income taxes on that “excess” pay as if it
were profit, which effectively increases the cost of employing top talent.
While this rule was once a simple calculation for the CEO and a few top
officers, recent laws have expanded it to cover more employees and even private
companies that are part of a larger business group.

Executive Summary. The federal tax landscape for executive compensation
has shifted dramatically over the last few years. While the $1 million
deduction limit under IRC § 162(m) was once a predictable math exercise for
public companies, a number of developments have significantly widened the
regulatory net: (i) the One Big Beautiful Bill Act of 2025 (“OBBBA”) expansion
pulls in private entities and non-corporate businesses that are affiliated with
publicly held corporations; (ii) the American Rescue Plan Act of 2021 (“ARPA”)
“Next Five” rules target non-officers; and (iii) the September 2024 IRS Audit
Technique Guide threatens legacy contracts. Starting in 2026, many previously
exempt private entities will find themselves subject to these limits for the
first time. This memo outlines the critical changes your tax and HR teams must
address immediately to avoid unexpected tax hits.

1. The OBBBA Expansion: Controlled Group Aggregation (Effective 2026). The One Big
Beautiful Bill Act of 2025 (Pub. L. 119-21, § 70603), signed into law on July
4, 2025, represents the most significant recent change to § 162(m) since 2017.
It moves the law from “Affiliated Groups” to the much broader “Controlled
Group” definition found in IRC § 414(b), (c), (m), and (o). Historically, only
corporate subsidiaries were usually included, but now partnerships and LLCs
with 80% common control are pulled in under IRC § 162(m)(2). Also, this change
means a public company’s $1 million limit must be shared across every member of
that group that pays the executive. Companies can no longer isolate
compensation in a private subsidiary to preserve a deduction. This expansion
brings partnerships and unincorporated trades or businesses under common
control into the regulatory net if they are affiliated with a public
corporation, meaning a private subsidiary’s deduction may be limited even if it
is not the public entity itself.

2. The Tier 2 Revolution: The Next Five (Effective 2027). Under the American
Rescue Plan Act of 2021, the definition of a “covered employee” expands for tax
years beginning after December 31, 2026 (i.e., 2027 for calendar-year
corporations). ARPA creates a two-tiered system for tracking high earners.
Specifically: (i) Tier 1 includes the CEO, CFO, and the three other
highest-compensated executive officers (as determined under SEC rules), who
remain “covered employees” permanently under the “once a covered employee,
always a covered employee” rule; (ii) Tier 2 adds the next five highest-paid
employees, who need not be officers; and (iii) unlike Tier 1, Tier 2 employees
remain covered only for the years in which they rank among the top five
highest-paid employees.

The January 2025 proposed amendments to Treas. Reg. § 1.162-33 (90 Fed.
Reg. 4691 (Jan. 16, 2025)) provide interpretive guidance on how Tier 2
employees are identified and ranked. The proposed regulations clarify that Tier
2 employees are ranked using tax-based compensation principles (e.g., Form W-2
Box 1 wages), rather than the SEC proxy disclosure framework used for Tier 1
determinations. They also include an anti-avoidance rule under which
individuals are treated as employees if they perform “substantially all”
services for the corporation, even if they are technically paid by a
Professional Employer Organization (PEO). In addition, multinational groups
must aggregate foreign-paid compensation from Controlled Foreign Corporations
(CFCs) when determining the “Next Five.” Because Tier 2 status is not
permanent, a one-time compensation spike does not result in a lifetime
deduction limitation for that employee.

3. IRS Audit Focus: The Death of Negative Discretion. For companies still
relying on “grandfathered” contracts in effect on November 2, 2017, the margin
for error has vanished. The September 2024 IRS Section 162(m) Audit Technique
Guide (Publication 6014) imposes rigorous scrutiny on these legacy awards, namely:
(i) it focuses on negative discretion, i.e., the committee’s power to reduce a
formula-based bonus payout; (ii) the IRS now argues this power means the
contract was not “binding” back in 2017 because the amount was not fixed; and
(iii) any material modification, like moving up a payment date without a
discount for the time value of money, will eliminate the grandfathered status
and lose the deduction. One has to be extremely careful with any changes to
these old deals to ensure no inadvertent modifications have occurred.

Immediate Action Items. To prepare for these shifts, we
recommend the following steps: (i) map out your entire organizational structure
under the § 414 controlled group rules to identify every entity now subject to
proration; (ii) begin “shadow tracking” your top five non-officer earners now
to prepare for the 2027 Tier 2 list; (iii) have counsel review any remaining
grandfathered awards against the 2024 Audit Guide; and (iv) identify any high
earners formally employed by third parties (like PEOs) who may now be subject
to the limit. Early coordination among payroll, benefits, and finance teams is
essential. The controlled group aggregation rules already apply for taxable
years beginning after December 31, 2025, and the Tier 2 rules take effect for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2026, so systems should be updated
now rather than at year-end.

 

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Mandatory Roth Catch-Up Contributions Take Effect January 1, 2026

 

Mandatory Roth
Catch-Up Contributions Take Effect January 1, 2026

By Charles C.
Shulman, Esq.
cshulman@ebeclaw.com
201.357.0577

December 17, 2026

The IRS has issued important final regulations under
SECURE 2.0 requiring age-50 catch-up contributions to be made on a Roth
(after-tax) basis for employees whose prior-year wages exceed a specified
threshold ($150,000 when first applied in 2026). Although Congress originally
scheduled this change for 2024, the IRS delayed mandatory implementation until
2026 and provided additional time for plan amendments. The regulations include
detailed guidance on determining which employees are subject to the Roth requirement,
how payroll systems must apply it, optional coordination rules for related
employers, and correction of errors. Employers offering catch-up contributions
should ensure that Roth features are available and administrative procedures
are updated.

I. Overview

The IRS and Treasury have issued final regulations, T.D.
10033, 90 Fed. Reg. 44527 (Sept. 16, 2025), implementing IRC §414(v)(7), which
was enacted as part of the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022 and fundamentally changes how
age-50 catch-up contributions operate for higher-wage participants.

Although the statute originally provided that mandatory Roth
catch-up contributions would apply to taxable years beginning after December
31, 2023, subsequent IRS transition relief postponed operational enforcement.
As a result, mandatory Roth-only catch-up contributions become effective for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2025, and therefore apply beginning
January 1, 2026.

While the final regulations provide that full regulatory
compliance is generally required beginning in 2027, plans may rely on
reasonable, good-faith interpretations through the 2026 transition period. This
memorandum summarizes the catch-up contribution framework as it applies under
the final regulations, explains the Roth-only mandate, and outlines the
applicable amendment and compliance deadlines.

II. Background: Catch-Up Contributions Under §414(v)

Under IRC §414(v), individuals who are age 50 or older (or
who will attain age 50 by the end of the taxable year) may make additional
catch-up contributions beyond the §401(a)(30)/§402(g) elective deferral limits.
These limits have increased over time, reaching $8,000 for 2026 for §401(k) and
§403(b) plans. Catch-up contributions are exempt from the ADP test, the §415(c)
annual addition limits, and the top-heavy rules for the year made.

Although plans are not required to offer catch-up
contributions, those that do must satisfy the universal availability
requirement of Treas. Reg. §1.414(v)-1(e), under which all catch-up-eligible
participants must have the same effective opportunity to make them.

The SECURE 2.0 Act also introduced enhanced catch-up limits
for participants ages 60–63 beginning in 2025. Those enhanced limits equal the
greater of $10,000 (indexed after 2025) or 150% of the regular catch-up amount,
subject to the applicable statutory calculation. SIMPLE plan catch-up limits
are subject to separate increases under SECURE 2.0.

III. SECURE 2.0 Roth Catch-Up Mandate

Section 603 of SECURE 2.0 added IRC §414(v)(7), which
requires that catch-up contributions for participants with prior-year FICA
wages exceeding a statutory threshold be made as designated Roth contributions.
For 2023–2025, the statutory threshold is $145,000; beginning in 2026, the
threshold is indexed in $5,000 increments, increasing to $150,000 for
determinations based on 2025 wages. The Roth mandate applies to §401(k),
§403(b), and governmental §457(b) plans; SIMPLE IRAs and SEP arrangements are
excluded.

Although the statutory effective date was originally set for
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2023, IRS Notice 2023-62 delayed the
mandatory application of §414(v)(7) for two years. As a result, participants
are not required to make Roth-only catch-up contributions in 2024 or 2025. The
final regulations confirm this transition relief and provide that the Roth-only
mandate first becomes operationally required for taxable years beginning after
December 31, 2025—meaning that 2026 is the first year in which plans must
enforce Roth-only catch-up contributions.

IRS Notice 2023-62 also permits reasonable, good-faith
interpretations of §414(v)(7) during the transition period. The final
regulations generally become applicable beginning in 2027, unless a plan elects
earlier application.

IV. Key Features of the Final Regulations and Their
Effective Dates

The final regulations at Treas. Reg. §1.414(v)-2 and related
amendments define who is subject to the Roth catch-up requirement, how the rule
applies in operation, and what correction and administrative procedures are
necessary. The following provisions are particularly relevant for plan
sponsors.

Who is subject to the Roth catch-up requirement.
Under Treas. Reg. §1.414(v)-2(a)(2), a participant is subject to the Roth-only
mandate if the participant is otherwise catch-up-eligible and had FICA wages
from the employer sponsoring the plan that exceeded the applicable threshold
for the preceding calendar year. The test is mechanical and employer-specific.
A participant whose 2025 wages exceed $150,000 must make all 2026 catch-up
contributions on a Roth basis.

Optional wage aggregation rules. Under Treas. Reg.
§1.414(v)-2(b)(4), plans may elect, but are not required, to aggregate FICA
wages across (i) employers using a common paymaster, (ii) employers in a
controlled group or affiliated service group, or (iii) predecessor and
successor employers in an asset transaction. If the plan does not elect
aggregation, wages are tested separately for each employer, even within a
single multiple-employer plan.

Scope of the Roth requirement and interaction with
elective deferral limits.
The Roth mandate applies only to elective
deferrals that qualify as catch-up contributions under Treas. Reg.
§1.414(v)-1(c)(3). Higher-wage participants may still make pre-tax elective
deferrals up to the §401(a)(30)/§402(g) limit. Roth treatment becomes mandatory
for catch-up contributions. The final regulations clarify that earlier
designated Roth contributions count toward satisfying the Roth requirement,
avoiding an all-or-nothing Roth conversion.

Universal availability rules and high-wage participants.
The final regulations clarify that a plan does not violate universal
availability merely because it does not permit catch-up contributions for
participants who exceed the wage threshold. In practice, one plan in a
controlled group may offer full Roth catch-ups while another may deny catch-ups
entirely to higher-wage participants, without violating Treas. Reg.
§1.414(v)-1(e).

Deemed Roth catch-up elections. Under Treas. Reg.
§1.401(k)-1(f)(5), plans may use deemed Roth elections for participants subject
to §414(v)(7), provided participants retain an effective opportunity to make
alternative elections. Deemed elections must cease within a reasonable period after
a participant is determined no longer to exceed the wage threshold or an
amended Form W-2 establishes that the participant is not subject to the
requirement.

Plans lacking a Roth contribution feature. Under
Treas. Reg. §1.414(v)-2(b)(2), if a plan does not include a designated Roth
contribution program under §402A(b), a participant subject to the Roth
requirement has a maximum catch-up limit of zero. Sponsors wishing to preserve
catch-up contributions for higher-wage employees must therefore add a Roth
feature.

Correction mechanisms. Treas. Reg. §1.414(v)-2(c)
establishes correction rules for operational failures, including (i) correction
through Form W-2 reporting before issuance or (ii) in-plan Roth rollovers
reported on Form 1099-R. Plans using these correction methods must include an
appropriate deemed Roth catch-up election in their plan documents. Relief
applies to certain de minimis failures not exceeding $250 and failures
resulting from late amended Forms W-2.

V. Effective Dates and Required Amendments

The interaction of statutory language, IRS transition
relief, and regulatory applicability produces the following compliance
timeline.

The Roth-only requirement under §414(v)(7) does not apply in
2024 or 2025 because of the administrative transition relief in IRS Notice
2023-62. The first year in which plans must require Roth-only catch-up
contributions is 2026, based on 2025 FICA wages.

The final regulations generally apply to taxable years
beginning after December 31, 2026. Thus, 2027 is the first year in which plans
must comply with the detailed regulatory framework, unless the plan elects
earlier application under Treas. Reg. §1.414(v)-2(e)(2)(iv). Certain
governmental and collectively bargained plans have later applicability dates.

At the time of publication, the applicable SECURE 2.0
amendment guidance generally contemplated amendments by the end of the 2027
plan year for nongovernmental plans, with later deadlines for certain
governmental plans. Subsequent IRS guidance concerning required amendments is
discussed in the November 2026 addendum below.

Accordingly, plan sponsors may operate under a reasonable,
good-faith interpretation of §414(v)(7) through 2026, even if the final
regulatory language has not yet been added to the plan, provided that 2026
operations correctly enforce Roth-only treatment for participants exceeding the
wage threshold.

VI. Action Steps for Plan Sponsors

Plan sponsors should ensure that preparations for the 2026
Roth-only operational mandate are completed. Employers should (i) adopt a Roth
contribution feature if catch-up contributions are to remain available to
higher-wage participants beginning in 2026; (ii) coordinate with payroll
providers to ensure accurate prior-year FICA wage determinations; (iii) update
participant communications and election materials; (iv) evaluate controlled
group practices, since different plans may permissibly adopt different approaches
for higher-wage participants; (v) implement operational procedures for deemed
Roth elections and correction methods during the transition period; and (vi)
monitor applicable plan amendment deadlines.

VII. Conclusion

The September 2025 final regulations represent one of the
most significant changes to catch-up contribution administration in more than a
decade. Plan sponsors should be operating Roth-only catch-up contributions
beginning in 2026 and should ensure that Roth features, deemed election
procedures, and correction mechanisms are in place before the 2027 regulatory
applicability date. Continued coordination with payroll providers and
recordkeepers will be essential to ensure proper administration and ongoing compliance.

 

Addendum: 11-17-26 – 2027 Limits and Plan Amendment
Deadlines

2027 Roth catch-up limits. IRS Notice 2026-66
increases the mandatory Roth catch-up wage threshold to $155,000 for 2027,
based on 2026 FICA wages. The regular age-50 catch-up limit increases to
$8,500, while the enhanced catch-up limit for ages 60–63 increases to $11,750.
With the regular elective deferral limit increasing to $25,500, the maximum
combined deferrals are $34,000 and $37,250, respectively.

Extended amendment deadline. In September 2026, the
IRS clarified in Employee Plans News, “Clarifying Deadlines for SECURE
and SECURE 2.0 Required and Discretionary Plan Amendments,” that required
amendments implementing SECURE 2.0 §603 generally will not be due until December
31, 2029
, rather than the previously anticipated 2027 deadline, under the
remedial amendment framework of Rev. Proc. 2022-40. Certain discretionary
SECURE 2.0 amendments remain subject to earlier deadlines, generally December
31, 2026, under IRS Notice 2024-2. The extension does not affect operational
compliance: the Roth catch-up mandate has applied since January 1, 2026, and
the detailed final regulations generally become applicable in 2027. 

 

 

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Forfeitures in Qualified Plans: (i) Proposed Regulations; and (ii) Fiduciary Class Action Suits

 

Forfeitures in Qualified Plans: (i)
Proposed Regulations; and (ii) Fiduciary Class Action Suits

By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.

November 7, 2025

I. Part 1 – 2023 Proposed Regulations Regarding Forfeitures

2023 Proposed Regulations Regarding Forfeitures. The IRS has
long permitted using forfeitures of defined contribution plans to pay plan
expenses or reduce future contributions (and not just to reduce plan expenses),
as long as this is documented in the plan. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-313; Rev.
Proc. 2016-51 § 6.02(4)(c); IRS newsletter, Retirement News for Employers
(Spring 2010). In February 2023, the IRS issued proposed regulations with
specific rules for forfeitures of defined benefit plans and for forfeitures of
defined contribution plans. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.401-7, 88 Fed. Reg. 12282
(Feb. 27, 2023). These regulations are proposed to apply for plan years
beginning on or after January 1,  2024,
once finalized, and they have not yet been finalized. But Prop. Treas. Reg.
§1.401-7(d) and the Preamble provide that taxpayers may rely on these proposed
regulations for periods preceding the effective date of the regulations.

Three Options For Forfeitures In Defined Contributions Plans. The 2023
proposed regulations provide that for forfeitures under a qualified defined
contribution plan, the plan must provide that forfeitures will be used for one
or more of the following purposes: (i) to pay plan administrative expenses;
(ii) to reduce employer contributions under the plan; or (iii) to increase
benefits in other participants’ accounts (in a nondiscriminatory fashion) in
accordance with plan terms. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.401-7(b)(1).

12-Month Deadline to Allocate Forfeitures in Defined Contribution
Plans.
The 2023 proposed regulations also provide that for defined
contribution plans, the forfeitures must be used no later than 12 months
following the close of the plan year in which the forfeitures were incurred
under the plan, and this rule must be stated in the plan. Prop. Treas. Reg.
§1.401-7(b)(2).
[1] As stated in
the Preamble, this deadline is intended to simplify administration by providing
a single deadline for the use of forfeitures that applies for all types of
defined contribution plans and to alleviate administrative burdens that may
arise in using or allocating forfeitures if forfeitures are incurred late in a
plan year. Forfeitures incurred during any plan year that begins before January
1, 2024, will be treated as having been incurred in the first plan year that
begins on or after January 1, 2024. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.401-7(c). 

The Preamble gives an example that if there are $25,000 of
forfeitures in a plan year, and the plan incurs only $10,000 in plan
administrative expenses before the end of the 12-month period following the end
of that plan year, there will be $15,000 of forfeitures that remain unused
after the deadline established in these proposed regulations, and the plan
would incur an operational qualification failure because forfeitures remain
unused at the end of the 12-month period following the end of that plan year.

Forfeitures in Defined Benefit Plans may not be Used to Increase
Benefits to any Employees under the Plan but are Instead Utilized as an
Actuarial Gain That Reduces Future Required Employer Contributions.
Code §401(a)(8)
provides that a defined benefit plan will not be qualified unless the plan
provides that forfeitures must not be applied to increase the benefits any
employee would otherwise receive under the plan. The 2023 proposed regulations
provide that for forfeitures in defined benefit plans the plan must provide
that forfeitures may not be applied to increase the benefits any employee would
otherwise receive under the plan, unless there is a plan termination or freeze
of contributions the plan. Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.401-7(a). This rule is also in
the original 1963 Treas. Reg. §1.401-7. (The proposed regulations do not
contemplate using forfeitures in defined benefit plans to offset plan expenses,
because actuarial assumptions regarding future contributions already account
for the forfeitures.)

The Proposed 2023 Regulations Provide that Forfeitures in Defined
Benefit Plans may be Used to Reduce Future Contributions.
Prop. Treas.
Reg. §1.401-7(a). However, in contrast to the original 1963 regulations, which
stated that defined contribution plan forfeitures must be used as soon as
possible to reduce the employer’s contributions under the plan, the proposed
2023 regulations have removed this requirement because reasonable actuarial
assumptions under the Internal Revenue Code already account for the forfeitures
as an actuarial gain that reduces future required employer contributions.
Instead, the proposed regulations provide that for defined benefit plans, the
effect of forfeitures may be anticipated in determining the costs under the
reasonable actuarial assumptions set forth in IRC §§430(h)(1), 431(c)(3)
433(c)(3). Prop. Treas. Reg. §1.401-7(a). As noted above, taxpayers may rely on
these proposed regulations for periods preceding the effective date of the
regulations.

 

II. Part 2. Recent Wave of Litigation re Use of Plan Forfeitures to
Reduce Employer Contributions Rather than to Reduce Participant Administrative
Expenses

Forfeiture Class Action Litigation. Class action
litigation related to retirement plan forfeitures has surged
dramatically since late 2023 and continued through 2025. The primary trend
involves lawsuits challenging the common practice of using forfeited, unvested
employer contributions to offset future employer contributions to the
retirement plans (for example the employer match in 401(k) plans), rather than
using them to cover plan expenses that otherwise may be charged to
participants’ accounts. 

Dozens of Class Action Lawsuits. Close to 80
class action lawsuits have been filed since September 2023 in the U.S.
regarding use of forfeitures of retirement plans to reduce future contributions
rather than to reduce administrative claims that may be charged to participants,
including cases against HP Inc., Intuit, JPMorgan Chase and Qualcomm (all
discussed below). Plaintiffs argue that the decision on how to use forfeitures,
when a plan document provides discretion, is a “fiduciary
act” under ERISA. They contend that fiduciaries breach their duty of
loyalty and prudence by choosing to benefit the employer (by reducing employer
contributions) over plan participants (by reducing participant-borne
administrative fees).

Some District Courts Have Summarily Dismissed the Claims and Others
Have Allowed Claims to Proceed to Litigation
. District
court rulings in forfeiture class actions have been inconsistent, with some
cases dismissed in favor of plan sponsors. See, e.g., Hutchins v. HP
Inc
., 767 F. Supp. 3d
912 (N.D. Cal. 2025) (in putative class action by former employee alleging
breach of fiduciary duties when plan sponsor decided to use 401(k) plan
forfeitures to reduce employer contributions rather than to pay administrative
costs, the court found that the employer’s use of forfeitures to reduce future
employer contributions did not breach fiduciary duties, as it complied with the
plan document and ERISA requirements; case is being appealed by the plaintiffs
in the Ninth Circuit, and the DOL has filed an amicus brief in favor of HP Inc.); Sievert
v. Knight-Swift Transportation
, 780 F. Supp. 3d 870 (D. Ariz. 2025) (the
court dismissed the suit, finding that the plan document permitted the use of
forfeitures to reduce future employer contributions; the decision was further
supported by longstanding IRS regulations allowing such practices in defined
contribution plans); Wright v. JPMorgan Chase & Co et al., 2025 WL
3798391 (C.D. Cal. June 13, 2025) (dismissed with prejudice so that it cannot
be refiled in the district; court ruled that the 401(k) fiduciaries properly
followed the plan’s explicit terms, which granted discretion to use forfeitures
to offset employer contributions).

Others forfeiture class action district court cases have allowed the
cases to proceed. Buescher v. North American Lighting, 2:24-cv-02076,
2025 WL 1927503 (C.D. Ill. June 30, 2025) (the court allowed the case to
proceed, finding that the plaintiff had sufficiently alleged that the plan
committee used an imprudent process in allocating forfeitures, which could
support a breach of fiduciary duty claim); Perez-Cruet v. Qualcomm,
23-cv-1890-BEN, 2024 WL 2702207 (S.D. Cal. May 24, 2024) (the court allowed the
case to proceed, finding that the use of forfeitures to reduce future employer
contributions instead of offsetting plan expenses could have eliminated
participant fees, which is partially passed onto employees); Rodriguez v.
Intuit, Inc.
, 744 F. Supp. 3d 935 (N.D. Cal. 2024) (motion to dismiss
largely denied; one of the first high-profile companies hit with this type of
lawsuit; district court initially denied most of its motion to dismiss in 2024,
giving the plaintiffs an early win and validating the legal theory; case
ultimately settled in 2025).

The outcomes often hinge on the specific language of the plan
documents.

Some Dismissed District Court Cases Are Being Appealed to the
Federal Courts of Appeal.
Several dismissed forfeiture cases are currently on appeal in the Ninth
Circuit (Hutchins v. HP Inc., discussed above), Third Circuit (Cain
v. Siemens Corp
. and Barragan v. Honeywell Int’l), Eighth Circuit (Matula
v. Wells Fargo
) and Eleventh Circuit (Cano v. Home Depot, Inc.). These
appellate decisions in late 2025 and 2026 will likely bring greater clarity to
the legal landscape.

DOL Amicus Brief in Support of Plan Sponsors in Hutchins v. HP Inc.
The DOL, in a July 9, 2025 amicus brief No. 25-826 for Hutchins
v. HP Inc.
, before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, on appeal from
dismissal by district court in 767 F. Supp. 3d 912 (N.D. Cal. 2025), supported
the plan sponsor, stating that while the allocation of
expenses is a fiduciary decision, the plan language in that specific case gave
the plan sponsor, in its non-fiduciary “settlor” capacity, control
over funding decisions. The DOL’s stance suggests a high bar for plaintiffs to
plead a breach of duty.

IRS Rules Allow Forfeitures to Reduce Employer Contributions. The IRS has
long permitted using forfeitures of defined contribution plans to pay plan
expenses or reduce future contributions (and not just to reduce plan expenses),
as long as this is documented in the plan. See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-313; Rev. Proc.
2016-51 § 6.02(4)(c); IRS newsletter, Retirement News for Employers (Spring
2010). The IRS has long permitted using forfeitures of defined
contribution plans to pay plan expenses or reduce future contributions (and not
just to reduce plan expenses), as long as this is documented in the plan. See,
e.g., Rev. Rul. 71-313; Rev. Proc. 2016-51 § 6.02(4)(c); IRS newsletter,
Retirement News for Employers (Spring 2010). Also, Prop. Treas. Reg.
§1.401-7(b)(1), 88 Fed. Reg. 12282 (Feb. 27, 2023), which may be relied up
currently, specifies that for forfeitures under a qualified defined
contribution plan, the plan may provide that forfeitures will be used for one
or more of the following purposes: (i) to pay plan administrative expenses;
(ii) to reduce employer contributions under the plan; and/or (iii) to increase
benefits in other participants’ accounts (in a nondiscriminatory fashion) in accordance
with plan terms.

Risk Mitigation by Providing Plan Language Giving Order of Priority
for Treatment of Forfeitures.
To mitigate litigation risk, plan sponsors are advised to amend
plan documents to explicitly state the order of forfeiture allocation, such as
first reducing employer contributions, followed by covering plan expenses.
Sponsors should also ensure forfeitures are used promptly to avoid issues with
unallocated funds, in light of proposed Treasury regulations that could impose
a deadline of December 31, 2025, for compliance.

 

 



[1]  Rev. Rul. 80–155, 1980–1 CB 84, discusses
distribution of forfeitures with respect to distributions to participants and
that plans should be valued at least annually. As noted in the Preamble, an IRS
newsletter, Retirement News for Employers (Spring 2010) noted that although
some defined contribution have forfeited amounts in a plan suspense account
accumulating over several years, the Internal Revenue Code does not allow this
practice, and it is advisable that no forfeitures in a suspense account should remain
unallocated beyond the end of the plan year in which they occurred or the
immediately succeeding plan year, and the treatment of the forfeitures should
be described in the plan.

 

Categories
Blog

2025 Executive Order on Democratizing 401(k) Access to Alternative Assets

 

Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
Employee Benefits & Executive Compensation
www.EBECIaw.com cshulman@ebeclaw.com
T. 201.357.0577 M. 212.380.3834

Oct. 13, 2025

On
August 7, 2025, President Trump issued an executive order titled
“Democratizing Access
to Alternative Assets for 401 (
k ) Investors”,
which directs
the Department of Labor to revise existing guidance and consider regulatory
changes to facilitate alternative asset inclusion in 401(k) plans.

On June 3, 2020, under the first Trump administration, the
DOL issued an
Information
Letter
stating
that ERISA does not expressly prohibit private equity investments within a
professionally managed asset allocation fund offered in a 401(k) plan. On Dec.
21, 2021, under the Biden administration, the DOL issued a
Supplemental Statement that
discouraged fiduciaries from considering alternative assets in 401(k)
retirement plan investments, casting doubt on the 2020 letter. The 2021
Supplemental Statement warned that fiduciaries of small, individual account
plans were not likely suited to evaluate such investments, effectively
precluding access for most plan sponsors.

The 2025 Executive Order directs the DOL the SEC to reassess
existing fiduciary guidance under ERISA and consider regulatory changes that
would enable plan sponsors to include alternative assets in professionally
managed asset allocation funds. It also calls for the creation of safe harbor
provisions to protect fiduciaries from excessive


litigation
when making prudent investment decisions involving alternative assets, with the
goal of ensuring that fiduciaries can balance the potential for higher
long-term returns and diversification against the risks and costs associated
with these complex investments. It mandates proposing rules or safe harbors
within 180 days to reduce litigation risks, which deter fiduciaries due to
fears of excessive fee or underperformance lawsuits.

The Executive Order defines
“alternative assets” broadly, including private market investments, real estate
holdings,

md longevity
risk-sharing pools.

•                                                                          ■>er 21 st, 2021,
Supplemental Statement that discouraged

■ (k) plans.

The Executive Order signals a
policy shift to expand 401(k) access to alternative assets by reducing
regulatory and litigation barriers. However, while awaiting further regulatory
clarity from the government and even after such guidance, there are certain
factors to keep in mind when considering adding alternative investments to a
401(k)

plan:

1.  
ERISA’s
core fiduciary duties of prudence, loyalty, and diversification remain
unchanged, and fiduciaries must act solely in participants’ best interests,
using care, skill, and diligence when considering alternative assets like
private equity, real estate, or cryptocurrencies.

2.  
Future
DOL guidance under the Trump administration may be challenged in court or
reversed by a future administration.

3.  
There is
still a potential for increased fiduciary liability for plan administrators due
to (i) the risk that the alternative investments will significantly
underperform or lead to participant losses, and (ii) inherently complex and
illiquid nature of alternative assets and (iii) the higher fees.

4.  
A
thorough , well-documented process for selecting and monitoring investments is
critical to comply with ERISA’s fiduciary obligation and help defend against
potential litigation.

5.  
Plan
sponsors and fiduciaries should strengthen due diligence, update investment
policy statements, increase participant education and monitor regulatory
developments to navigate this evolving landscape.

6.    
Congressional
action may be needed for significant litigation reform due to ERISA’s private
right of action.

7.  
Alternative
assets pose risks due to illiquidity, high fees, valuation complexities, and
volatility, requiring fiduciaries to balance potential returns and
diversification benefits against these challenges.

8.  
The
participant-directed nature of 401(k) plans, which relies on participants
making their own investment choices, may not be well suited for alternative
assets, which often require sophisticated knowledge and long-

term commitment.

Categories
Blog

“Affiliated Service Group” Rules for Qualified Plans

 “Affiliated Service Group”
Rules for Qualified Plans

By Charles C. Shulman, Esq.

Printed in 51 Journal of Pension Planning and Compliance,
no. 4, at 1 (WK, Winter 2026).
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1aCHAi8m-ZuvFysOcIpTQ-kQyWUqxVHr4/edit 

 October 10, 2025
(updated 3/10/26)

This article explains when separate service or management
entities are treated as a single employer under Internal Revenue Code § 414(m)
for qualified plan and certain welfare plan purposes. It traces the origins of
the affiliated service group rules, distinguishes them from ERISA controlled
group rules, and provides practical guidance on A-Org, B-Org, and management
organization affiliated service groups, including ownership attribution and
recent statutory developments.

1. Affiliated Service Group Rules Generally and
Background

           
Under Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) § 414(m), employees of trades or
businesses that are members of an “affiliated service group” are
treated as employed by a single employer, for purposes of nondiscrimination
testing and other qualified plan rules under the Code (but not
for purposes of liability under Title IV of the Employee Retirement Income
Security Act (“ERISA”)).

Reason for Enactment of Code § 414(m) Affiliated Service
Rules

           
Prevention of Nondiscrimination Circumvention. Code § 414(m) was enacted
in 1980 to ensure that certain nondiscrimination rules that are intended to
prevent qualified plans disproportionately benefiting highly-compensated
employees, could not be circumvented through the use of separate entities. Many
professionals, relying on the Kiddie-Garland line of decisions, had placed
their common-law employees into partnerships composed of their professional
service corporations to exclude rank-and-file employees from participation in
the qualified retirement plans of the professional corporations.

           
Response to Kiddie and Garland Precedents. The affiliated service group
rules under Code § 414(m) were enacted as part of the Miscellaneous Revenue Act
of 1980 in response to two cases—Thomas Kiddie, Inc. v. C.I.R., 69 T.C. 1055
(1978), and Garland v. C.I.R., 73 T.C. 5 (1979), where two sets of physicians
incorporated their medical practices as PCs (or in the case of Garland one
physician incorporated his medical practice) and these physician PCs (or in the
case of Garland one PC and one physician) formed a partnership with the
partnership employing the non-doctor employees of the medical practice. The
physician PCs were allowed in these cases to set up qualified retirement plans
for the physicians even though no qualified retirement plan was set up for the
partnership’s rank-and-file employees, because, prior to the 1980 legislation,
the physician PCs were not aggregated with the partnership medical group for
nondiscrimination purposes under the Code rules.

           
In response to this perceived abuse, Code § 414(m) was enacted under the
Miscellaneous Revenue Act of 1980, requiring that certain related service
organizations must be treated as a single employer.

           
Expansion of Affiliated Service Group Aggregation to Management Service
Organizations
. The Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Act of 1982 §
246(a) expanded the affiliated service group rules by adding new Code §
414(m)(5) to include a management service organization that regularly performs
management functions for another organization (or for a group of related
organizations) as an affiliated service group with such organization(s).

2. Where Affiliated Serviced Group Rules are Applied

           
Qualified Plan Requirements Subject to Aggregation. Pursuant to Code §
414(m)(4), employees of trades or businesses that are members of an affiliated
service group are treated as employed by a single employer for the following
qualified plan rules: (i) minimum coverage under Code § 410(b),  nondiscrimination
testing under § 401(a)(4) and regulations (including general test and benefits,
rights and features test), ADP/ACP testing under § 401(k) & 401(m), minimum
participation under § 401(a)(26), minimum participation under § 410, minimum
vesting under § 411, annual addition limit under § 415, top-heavy limit under §
416 and compensation limit under § 401(a)(17) (Code §§ 414(m)(4)); and (ii)
simplified employee pension (SEP) rules under Code § 408(k) and Simple
retirement accounts rules under Code § 408(p) (Code § 414(m)(4)(B)).[1]

           
Application to Welfare Benefits and the ACA. The affiliated service
group rules are also applicable to the following welfare plan requirements: (i)
medical reimbursement plan coverage under Code § 105(h), cafeteria plans under
Code § 125, accident and health plan rules of Code § 106 and fringe benefit
rules of Code § 132 (Code § 414(t), 105(h)(8) & 125(g)(4)); (ii) Affordable
Care Act mandated coverage rules for employers with 50 or more employees on a
controlled group basis, to provide affordable healthcare benefits or pay
certain penalties under Code § 4980H(a) & (b) (Code § 4980H(c)(2)(C)(i);
Treas. Reg. § 54.4980H-1(a)(16)); and most likely (iii) COBRA continuation
coverage rules, for although ERISA § 607(4) only references the
“controlled group” rules of Code § 414, Code § 414(t) and Rev. Rul.
2003-70 reference Code § 414(b) & (c) and § 414(m).

           
Not Applicable to Title IV Liability or § 409A. However, in contrast to
ERISA controlled group rules under Code § 414(b) & (c), affiliated service
group rules under Code § 414(m) do NOT apply to: (i) liability under Title IV
of ERISA (ERISA § 4062(a) only references Code § 414(b) & (c), not (m)); or
(ii) Code § 409A restrictions on nonqualified deferred compensation plans (Code
§ 409A(d)(6) only references Code § 414(b) & (c), not (m)). Also,
affiliated service group rules (like controlled group rules) would not apply
to: (i) prohibited transaction rules; (ii) other excise taxes; (iii)
consequences of plan disqualification; (iv) Title I reporting and disclosure
obligations; and (v) contractual liabilities for promised benefits.

3. Controlled Group Rules Separate from Affiliated
Service Group Rules

           
Distinction Between Controlled Group and ASG Frameworks
.Under the Code and
ERISA, employees of certain related “controlled group” entities, as
defined in § 414(b) & (c) of the Code, are treated as employed by a single
employer, for purposes of liability under Title IV of ERISA, qualified plan nondiscrimination
testing under the Code and various other rules. For a thorough discussion of
the ERISA controlled group rules, see my recent article, “ERISA’s
‘Controlled Group’ Rules – A Timely Review
,” published in 51 Journal
of Pension Planning and Compliance, no. 1, at 1 (WK, Fall 2025).

           
Concurrent Application of Multiple Aggregation Standards. Note that the
rules for treatment of an “affiliated service group” as a single
employer under Code § 414(m) and the rules for treatment of “controlled
group” entities as a single employer under Code § 414(b) & (c) are to
be applied separately. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-1(a), 48 Fed. Reg. 8293
(Feb. 28, 1983), provides that if aggregation is required under either of Code
§ 414(b) or 414(c) and also under § 414(m), the requirements with respect to
all of the applicable provisions must be satisfied. As interpreted in Tech.
Advice Memo. 201715001 (April 14, 2017), both the controlled group set of rules
and the affiliated service group of rules must be applied, and therefore Entity
2 could be in the same controlled group of Entity 1 under § 414(c) even though
Entity 2 is an affiliated service group of Entity 3. In that case Entity 1 and
Entity 2 each had a qualified defined contribution plan, the Code § 415(c)
limits would apply on a controlled group aggregated basis.

4. Types of Affiliated Service Groups

           
A-Org or B-Org Affiliated Service Groups Under Code § 414(m)(2). An
affiliated service group under § 414(m) is a group consisting of:

      i. a “first service
organization
” (“FSO”)—which is a “service
organization,” and is defined in § 414(m)(3) as an organization whose
principal business is the performance of services;

      AND

      ii. one of the following:

      (a) an “A-Org”
under § 414(m)(2)(A)—a service organization (i.e., one whose principal business
is the performance of services); (1) that is a “shareholder or partner of
the FSO” (without regard to the amount of percentage interest), and (2)
that “regularly performs services for” the FSO or is “regularly
associated with” the FSO in performing services for third parties;

      OR

      (b) a “B-Org”
under § 414(m)(2)(B)—any organization other than an A-Org if (1) a
“significant portion” of the B-Org’s business is the performance of
services for the FSO or for an A-Org, and (2) at least 10% of such organization
is owned by highly compensated employees[2] of the FSO (both prongs must be met to be
a B-Org affiliated service group).

           
Organization. The proposed IRS regulations under Code § 414(m)(2)
provide that an “organization” under § 414(m) includes a corporation,
partnership, sole proprietorship or any other type of entity regardless of its
ownership form. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(e)(1), 48 Fed. Reg. 8293 (Feb.
28, 1983).[3]

5. Constructive Ownership

           
Application of Attribution Rules. Code § 414(m)(6) and other IRS
guidance provides that in determining ownership under § 414(m), the family and
entity ownership attribution rules of Code § 318(a) apply.

           
Attribution From Entities to Individuals. Stock or partnership interests
owned, directly or indirectly, by or for a corporation, partnership, estate, or
trust are considered as being owned proportionately by or for its shareholders,
partners, or beneficiaries. An individual owning (otherwise than by the
application of the rule immediately above) any stock in a corporation or
interest in a partnership is treated as owning the stock or partnership
interests owned, directly or indirectly, by or for his partner. Code §
318(a)(2). Code § 318(a)(2)(C) looks through to underlying interests owned by a
corporation if there is a 50% ownership by a person in the corporation.
However, stock owned by or for a partnership or partner will be considered
owned proportionately by the partner or owned by the partnership without regard
to whether there is a 50% ownership interest.[4]

           
Attribution From Individuals to Entities. Under IRC § 318(a)(3)(A) &
(B), stock owned by a partner of a  partnership or a beneficiary of an
estate is considered owned by the partnership or estate. Similarly, interests
owned by a beneficiary of a trust (excluding certain tax-exempt employees’
trusts) are attributed to the trust, unless the beneficiary’s interest is a
remote contingent interest of 5% or less. IRC § 318(a)(3)(B)(ii). For corporate
attribution, if a person owns 50% or more in value of the stock in a
corporation, that corporation is considered as owning the stock owned by such
person. IRC § 318(a)(3)(C). However, in the case of a partnership, interests
held by a partner are attributed to the partnership without regard to whether
there is a 50% ownership interest.

           
SECURE 2.0 Reforms to Family Attribution. The SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022
amended Code § 414(m)(6)(B) to streamline family attribution rules, effective
for plan years beginning in 2024, so that: (i) community property laws are
ignored when applying family attribution rules under Code § 318, allowing
businesses owned by spouses to be treated as separate for aggregation purposes,
even in community property states, if there is no direct ownership or
management in each other spouse’s businesses; and (ii) if stock ownership is
not attributed to a spouse due to legal separation (via divorce or separate
maintenance decree) under Code § 318(a)(1)(A)(i), it generally will not be
attributed to the spouse via minor children (under age 21) under the minor
child attribution rule.

6. Determination of Affiliated Service Group Status as
Part of Determination Letter Prior to 2017

           
Historical Availability of IRS Rulings. Prior to 2017, IRS Form 5300 and
Rev. Proc. 2016-6, § 14, provided for IRS determination letter requests for
affiliated service group status under Code § 414(m) (but only as part of the
process of submitting a qualified plan for a determination as to its qualified
status. Instructions to Form 5300). IRS Publication 7005 (last updated April
2016)—Employee Benefit Plans Explanation No. 10 Affiliated Service Group
(determination letter flow-chart) was used to assist IRS agents in making
affiliated service group determination letter rulings.

           
Absence of Independent Private Letter Rulings. Note that even before
Rev. Proc. 2017-4, an IRS private letter ruling request, separate from the IRS
determination letter requested, was not available for affiliated service group
status, as stated in Rev. Proc. 2016-4, § 6.03.

           
2017 Elimination of ASG Determinations. Rev. Proc. 2017-4, which
modified the procedures for requesting determination letters, provides that
beginning in 2017 the IRS will no longer issue determination letters as to
whether the plan sponsor is part of an affiliated service group. Rev. Proc. 2017-4,
2017-1 I.R.B. 146, § 2.02 (procedures for requesting determination letters were
modified to reflect that employers that maintain individually designed plans
may no longer request determination letters on whether a plan sponsor is part
of an affiliated service group).

7. A-Org Affiliated Service Group

A-Org Group

           
An “A-Org” affiliated service group under § 414(m)(2)(A) is a
group consisting of:

      i. a “first service
organization
” (“FSO”)—which is a “service
organization,” which is defined in § 414(m)(3) as an organization whose
principal business is the performance of services;

      AND

      ii. an A-Org under §
414(m)(2)(A)—which is a service organization (i.e., one whose principal
business is the performance of services); (1) which is a “shareholder or
partner of the FSO” (without regard to the amount of percentage interest),
and (2) “regularly performs services for” the FSO or is
“regularly associated with” the FSO in performing services for third
parties.

Code § 414(m)(2)(A).

De Minimis Ownership of A-Org in FSO

           
There is no ownership threshold of the A-org in the FSO, and even a de minimis
ownership should suffice.[5]

Standard for A-Org Regularly Performing Services for FSO
(or with FSO)

           
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(b) provides that the determination of
“regularly performing services for” or “regularly associated
with” is made on the basis of facts and circumstances with one factor
being the amount of earned income the “A” Org derives from performing
services for the FSO or for the third party.

           
The proposed regulations give three examples of what regularly performing
services or regularly associated means: (1) Where an attorney forms a
professional service corporation and that PC is a partner in a law firm, and
the PC and the law firm are regularly associated in performing services for
third persons, they are affiliated service groups. (2) Where a corporation
which is a shareholder of, and regularly performs services for another
corporation, and both are service organizations but neither is a professional
service corporation, there is no affiliation because there is no FSO. (3) A law
firm branch which is a PC and also a partner in the national firm, will be
considered affiliates since the branch is a partner in the national law firm and
is regularly associated with the national law firm in performance services for
third persons. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(b)(3). Examples 1 and 3 imply
some clearly “regular” requirement. If only a small portion of the
partner or shareholders activities were performed with the FSO it would appear
that the “regularly” requirement would not be met.[6]

FSO as Professional Service Corp if A-Org is a
Corporation

           
IRS proposed regulations provide that for purposes of the A-Org affiliated
service group test, if the first service organization is a corporation it will
not be an FSO unless it is organized under state law as a “professional
service corporation” providing professional services, i.e., services
provided by certified or public accountants, actuaries, architects, attorneys,
chiropodists, chiropractors, medical doctors, dentists, professional engineers,
optometrists, osteopaths, podiatrists, psychologists, and veterinarians. Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-1(c), 48 Fed. Reg. 8293 (Feb. 28, 1983). The exemption
is pursuant to Code § 414(m) (1). (In contrast, however, with respect to B-Org.
affiliated service group test, even if the FSO is a corporation that is not a
professional service corporation, it can still be considered to be an FSO.)[7]

Test A-Org in Both Directions

           
A-Org (or B-Org) affiliated service group status must be tested in both
directions, looking at the possibility that the first entity is the FSO and the
second entity is the A-Org, as well as the possibility that the first entity is
the A-Org and the second entity is the FSO, because an entity that may not be
an FSO may still be an A-Org and vice versa.

Examples of FSO and A-Org Affiliated Service Group

           
Example. Dr. Sarah Thompson, a surgeon, is incorporated as Sarah
Thompson, MD, PC, and the PC is a partner in Artful Contours Surgical Group.
Sarah Thompson, MD, PC is regularly associated with Artful Contours Surgical
Group in plastic surgery offered to the public. Artful Contours Surgical Group
is an FSO, and Sarah Thompson, MD, PC is an A-Org because it is a partner in
Artful Contours Surgical Group and is regularly associated with Artful Contours
Surgical Group to perform services for third parties. Accordingly, Sarah
Thompson, MD, PC and Artful Contours Surgical Group constitute an affiliated
service group and must be treated if they were employed by a single employer
under Code § 414(m)(2)(A).

           
Traditional Partnership-PC Structure. A typical example of an
“A-Org.” affiliated service group is a law or medical partnership
(FSO) in which one or more of the partners is incorporated (A-Org.). The
incorporated partner owns the shares of his professional corporation and is licensed
to practice law or medicine under the laws of the state in which he is
incorporated. The incorporated partner and the partnership are regularly
associated in performing services for third persons (i.e., clients or
patients), or the incorporated partner regularly performs services for the
partnership.

           
Example of Complexities in Imaging and Ancillary Health Services. In the
health field and other areas more difficult issues arise. For example, suppose
a physician in sole practice owns a limited partnership interest in an imaging
facility (i.e., X-ray, MRI, equipment). The imaging facility partnership’s
profits are based on a charge to patients for the X-ray or imaging procedure;
it does not receive any income from the radiologist’s charge for interpreting
the image. The amount she receives from the facility is not directly related to
the number of patients the physician refers to the facility, although the more
profit the limited partnership makes, the greater the physician’s share. It is
possible that the proposed regulations would treat the physician as an A-Org.
and the imaging facility partnership an FSO, because the physician is a service
organization licensed to practice medicine, and is a partner in another
organization which may be a service organization and together they may be
viewed as rendering service to third persons. However, it is questionable
whether the doctor and the facility are associated in rendering service to
third persons since the doctor acts only as a referrer. If the facility were a
corporation, rather than a partnership, these issues might not even arise
because of the limitation in the proposed regulations, discussed above, that
the FSO, if it is incorporated, be a professional service corporation, as that
term is defined in the proposed regulations. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c)
generally.

A-Org Flowchart

           
The following flowchart illustrates the above A-Org affiliated service group
rules.

8. B-Org Affiliated Service Group

B-Org

           
A “B-Org” affiliated service group under § 414(m)(2)(B) is
a group consisting of:

      i. a “first service
organization
” (“FSO”)—which is a “service
organization,” which is defined in § 414(m)(3) as an organization whose
principal business is the performance of services;

      AND

      ii. a B-Org under §
414(m)(2)(B)—which is an organization other than an A-Org if (1) a
“significant portion” of the B-Org’s business is the performance of
services for the FSO or for an A-Org of a type historically performed in such
service field by employees, and (2) at least 10% of such organization is owned
by highly compensated employees[8] of the FSO. Both prongs must be met to be
a B-Org affiliated service group.

Code § 414(m)(2)(B).

Significant Portion of B-Org’s Business is Performance of
Services of a Type Historically Performed in such Service Field by Employees

The services must be of a type historically performed by
employees in the service field of the FSO or the A-Org. The “historically
performed” test will be met if it was not unusual for the service to be
performed by employees of the organization in that service field in the United
States on December 13, 1980. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c)(3).

Proposed regulations provide that “significant
portion” is a facts-and-circumstances test but further provides that, if
gross receipts constitute less than 5% of all services, such receipts are
deemed not to be a significant portion. If gross receipts constitute 10% or
more of all receipts, such receipts are deemed to be a significant portion.
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c)(2) (proposed in 1983).

A significant portion of the business of the organization is
the performance of services for the relevant organization if the “Total
Receipts Percentage” is greater than 10%. The Total Receipts Percentage is
the ratio of the gross receipts of the organization derived from the FSO and/or
A-Organization(s) to the total gross receipts of the organization. If the
“Service Receipts Percentage” is less than 5% it will not be
considered a significant portion. The Service Receipts Percentage is the ratio
of the gross receipts of the organization derived from performing services for
the FSO and/or A-Organization(s) to the total gross receipts of the
organization derived from performing services. A facts and circumstances test
will apply if neither test is met. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c)(2).

10% of B-Org Held by Officers, Highly-Compensated
Employees or Owners of FSO or A-Org

As explained in the proposed regulations, 10% or more of the
putative B-Org. organization must be held, in the aggregate, by persons who are
designated group members (i.e., the officers, highly compensated employees, and
the common owners of an organization) of the FSO or the A-Org., determined by
applying the constructive ownership rules. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c). A
“common owner” is a person who is an owner of a FSO or of an A-Org.
if at least 3% of the interests in the organization are, in the aggregate, held
by persons who are owners of the putative B-Org., determined using constructive
ownership rules. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c). Note that, although Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c)(4)(ii) refers to a “common owner of at least
three percent” interest, Code § 414(m)(2)(B)(ii) was amended after the
proposed regulations were issued to substitute “highly compensated
employees (within the meaning of section 414(q))” for “officers,
highly compensated employees, or owners.”

With respect to B-Org affiliated service group test, even if
the FSO is a corporation that is not a professional service corporation, it can
still be an FSO.

Test B-Org in Both Directions

B-Org (or A-Org) affiliated service group status must be
tested in both directions, looking at the possibility that the first entity is
the FSO and the second entity is the B-Org, as well as the possibility that the
first entity is the B-Org and the second entity is the FSO, because an entity
that may not be an FSO may still be a B-Org and vice versa.

Examples of FSO and B-Org as Affiliated Service Group

The Proposed Treasury Regulations give the following as an
example of a B-Organization. R is a service organization with 11 partners, each
of whom owns 1% of the stock in Corporation D. Corporation D provides services
to the partnership of a type historically performed by employees in the service
field of the partnership. A significant portion of the business of the
corporation consists of providing services to the partnership (i.e., the Total
Receipts Percentage is 10% or more). If R is an FSO, Corporation D is a B-Org.
because a significant portion of the business of D is the performance of
services for the partnership of a type historically performed by employees in
the service field of the partnership, and more than 10% of the interests in D
are held, in the aggregate, by the designated group members (consisting of the
11 common owners of the partnership). If the ownership of the 11 partners in D
stock was reduced to as little as 3% and at least 7% of D’s stock was held by
highly compensated employees of R who were not owners of R, the result would be
the same. Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(c)(8), example (1).

Another example: Desert Horizon Financial Partners is a
financial services partnership with 11 partners. Each partner of Desert Horizon
owns one percent of the stock in Sagebrush Support Services, Inc. Sagebrush
Support Services, Inc. provides services to the partnership of a type
historically performed by employees in the financial services field. A
significant portion of the business of Sagebrush Support Services consists of
providing services to Desert Horizon Financial. Considering Desert Horizon Financial
Partners as the FSO, Sagebrush Support Services, Inc. is a B-Org because: (i) a
significant portion of its business is in the performance of services for the
partnership of a type historically performed by employees in the financial
services field; and (ii) more than 10% of the interests in the B-Org, Sagebrush
Support Services, Inc., is held, in the aggregate, by the highly-compensated
employees of the FSO (consisting of the 11 partners of Desert Horizon Financial
Partners). Therefore, Sagebrush Support Services, Inc. (the B-Org) and Desert
Horizon Financial Partners (the FSO) constitute an affiliated service group
under Code § 414(m)(2)(B).

B-Org Flowchart

           
The following flowchart illustrates the above B-Org affiliated service group
rules.[9]

9. Management Organization Affiliated Service Groups
Under Code § 414(m)(5)

           
Management Organization Affiliated Service Group; Principal Business of One
Organization to Perform Management Functions in Another Organizaiton.
An
affiliated service group also includes, under Code §
414(m)(5),
a management organization affiliated
service group, which is a group consisting of: (1) an organization the
“principal business” of which is performing on a “regular and
continuing basis” “management functions” for a recipient
organization (or group of “related” recipient organizations as
defined below)
;  and (2) such other organization.[10]

           
1987 Proposed Regulations with Broad Interpretations of Management
Activities; Withdrawn 1993.
Proposed regulations on § 414(m)(5), proposed
in Aug. 27, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 32502, but later withdrawn April 27, 1993, 58
Fed. Reg. 25587, provided that “principal business” means that more
than 50% of the organization’s gross receipts stem from the performance of
management functions for the recipient organization. Withdrawn Proposed
Regulation § l.414(m)-5(b).

           
Management Activities as Detailed in 1987
Proposed Regulations.
The proposed regulations on § 414(m)(5) that were
later withdrawn defined “management functions” broadly to include
management activities and services involving the determination, implementation
or supervision of: (i) daily business operations (e.g., production, sales,
marketing, purchasing and advertising), (ii) personnel (e.g., staffing,
training, supervising, hiring and firing), (iii) employee compensation and
benefits (e.g., salaries and wages, paid vacations and holidays, life and
health insurance and pensions), (iv) short-range and long-range business
planning (e.g., product development, budgeting, financing, expansion of
operations, and capital investment), (v) organization structure and ownership
(e.g., corporate formation, stock issues, dividends and mergers and
acquisitions), and (vi) any other management activity or service. Management
activities and services also include professional services that relate to these
activities. Withdrawn Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.414(m)-5(c)(1), proposed in Aug. 27, 1987, 52 Fed. Reg. 32502, but later withdrawn under President Clinton’s Regulatory Burden
Reduction Initiative April 27, 1993, 58 Fed. Reg. 25587
.[11]

           
Broad Definition of Organization. . For purposes of Code §
414(m)(5), an “organization” is defined in the most expansive sense
to include a sole proprietorship, partnership, corporation, trust, estate, or
any other type of entity regardless of its ownership format. Withdrawn Prop.
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-5(a)(2); Joint Committee of Taxation General Explanation
to TEFRA 1982. This ensures that the management organization rules apply even
where an individual or unincorporated entity performs the management functions,
preventing the use of specific legal structures to avoid aggregation.

           
Historically Performed by Employees as Opposed to Outside Service Providers.
The management functions must be of a type “historically performed by
employees,” a standard designed to distinguish between (i) core
administrative services being “spun off” to avoid pension rules and
(ii) legitimate third-party vendor relationships. Code § 414(m)(5); Withdrawn
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-5(c)(1). Under this test, a function is considered
historically performed if it was not unusual for employees in that particular
business field to perform such functions themselves, rather than hiring outside
service providers, as of September 3, 1983. Withdrawn Prop. Treas. Reg. §
1.414(m)-5(c)(2). This benchmark is intended to protect traditional service
provider relationships, such as those with independent accounting or payroll
firms, that have historically operated as independent businesses.

           
Principal Business, i.e., More than 50% of its Business Activities, on a
Regular and Continuing Basis.
An organization is typically considered a
management organization if more than 50% of its business activities involve
performing management functions and other services for a recipient
organization. This determination is generally made using a two-tax-year rolling
percentage based on gross receipts (or facts and circumstances if more
appropriate). Withdrawn Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-5(b).[12]

           
The Scope of Related Recipient Organizations. “Related
organizations” is defined in Code § 414(m)(5) by reference to Code §
144(a)(3). Code § 144(a)(3) states that persons are related if (A) the
relationship between such persons would result in a disallowance of losses
under Code §§ 267 or 707(b), or (B) such persons are members of the same
controlled group of corporations (as defined in Code § 1563(a), except that
“more than 50%” is used instead of “at least 80%”).[13] Under Code § 267(b), related persons
include an individual and a corporation more than 50% owned by the individual,
and a corporation and a partnership if the same person owns more than 50% of
both the stock of the corporation and the capital or profits of the
partnership, and certain similar relationships, and Code § 267(c) applies
constructive ownership of stock rules. Code § 707(b) applies to a partnership
and a greater than 50% owner of capital or profits therein, or to two
partnerships where the same persons own more than 50% of capital or profits of
each partnership. Therefore, if each recipient organizations is not related to
each other, the principal business test of 414(m)(5) test is not me since there
are not 50% or more of the receipts of the management organization are from the
individual PA.

           
1987 Proposed Regulations Often Looked to by Practitioners in Absence of
Other Guidance Even Though Withdrawn.
Although the reasons for the
withdrawal were not stated, commentators have stated that the proposed
regulations were thought to be too stringent an interpretation of the statute
and met with considerable negative reaction. However, many practitioners do
looked to these withdrawn proposed regulations for guidance because: (i) 
these proposed regulations may provide some indication of the intentions of the
IRS with respect to management organizations affiliated service groups; (ii)
future guidance is not likely to be more onerous than the withdrawn proposed
regulations, since these proposed regulations were thought to be too stringent;
(iii) the proposed regulations were withdrawn under a broad regulatory burden
reduction initiative, but not due to some inherent defect; and (iv) there is
virtually no other guidance regarding these rules.

           
IRS Examination Guidelines for Management Functions (Last Updated 2016). IRS
Publication 7005 (Revised April 2016)—Employee Benefit Plans Explanation No. 10
Affiliated Service Group, www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/p7005.pdf,
which is a checklist to assist IRS agents in 5300 414(m) determination letter
requests (which was available prior to 2017), provided regarding § 414(m)(5),
that: (i) whether an organization’s principal business is performing management
functions on a regular and continuing basis for another organization is
essentially a facts and circumstances question; (ii) factors to be considered
could include the percentage of the organization’s gross receipts that are
derived from performing management functions for the other organization and the
amount of time individuals actually spend performing these functions; (iii) a
sufficient period of time (e.g., more than one year) must be considered to
ensure that the “regular and continuing basis” condition is met; and
(iv) the particular activities and services that the organization provides for
the other organization must also be considered in order to determine that these
activities and services are in the nature of management functions.

Examples of Management Organization Affiliated Service
Group

           
Example 1: The Two-Tax-Year Rolling Test.
In 2025, Management Co. derives
40% of its gross receipts from management services for Recipient Inc. In 2026,
that figure rises to 65%. For the 2026 plan year, Management Co. satisfies the
“principal business” test because its average gross receipts from the
recipient over the two-tax-year period (2025 and 2026) exceed 50%.
Consequently, Management Co. and Recipient Inc. are treated as a single
employer for the 2026 plan year, even though the threshold wasn’t met in the
first year alone.  

           
Example 2: Aggregation of Related Recipients.
A manager provides services
to three separate companies: Company A, Company B, and Company C. The manager
derives 20% of its income from each company (60% total). If the three companies
are unrelated, the manager does not meet the 50% principal business test for
any single recipient. However, if Companies A, B, and C are part of a
controlled group under Code § 414(b), they are treated as a single
“recipient group.” In this case, the manager’s 60% total receipts
exceed the 50% threshold, and the manager is aggregated with all three
companies.           

           
Example 3: Professional Services as Management Functions.
A group of
doctors forms a separate Billing and Professional Support entity. The support
entity provides billing services and also employs several physicians who
perform medical services for the primary clinic. Because the support entity is
performing the same type of professional services (medical care) that the
clinic provides to the public, those professional services are automatically
treated as “management functions.”  These receipts are added to
the billing service receipts to determine if the support entity meets the 50%
principal business test.

           
Example 4: Aggregation of Aggregated Groups. Geneva BioPharma Corp. and
Aris Therapeutics constitute a controlled group of entities under Code §
414(b). Nexus Services and Horizon Management Group constitute an affiliated
service group under Code § 414(m)(2). Assume Nexus Services or Horizon Management
Group (or both) perform management functions and other services for Geneva
BioPharma Corp. or Aris Therapeutics (or both), and the performance of these
management functions or services satisfies the requirements of a principal
business on a regular and continuing basis. Nexus Services and Horizon
Management Group are treated as a single management organization, and Geneva
BioPharma Corp. and Aris Therapeutics are treated as a single recipient
organization for purposes of Code § 414(m)(5). Geneva BioPharma Corp., Aris
Therapeutics, Nexus Services, and Horizon Management Group would constitute an
affiliated service group under Code § 414(m)(5).

10. Conclusion

           
Practitioners must diligently analyze the relationships between entities whose
principal business is the performance of services or management to determine if
an affiliated service group exists, and the ramifications of such a finding.
The affiliated service group rules are complex, and each case must be analyzed
carefully.



[1] Note that Code § 269A which, if applicable,
permits a reallocation of income, credits, exclusions, etc., between the
personal service corporation and its employer owners. However, IRS Private
Letter Ruling 8737001 (April 13, 1987) held that a sole shareholder
professional corporation which was in a medical partnership was not formed or
availed of for the principal purpose of avoiding federal income within the
meaning of Code § 269A.

[2] Code § 414(m)(2)(B) would not encompass
legitimately classified independent contractors.

[3] The same rule was provided in regulations
proposed in 1987 under § 414(m)(5) but the § 414(m)(5) proposed regulations
were withdrawn in 1993.

[4] Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(m)-2(d) referred
to the constructive ownership rules of Code § 267(c). However, these proposed
regulations were issued before the constructive ownership reference in Code §
414(m)(6)((B) was changed by the Deficit Reduction Act Of 1984 from § 267(c) to
§ 318(a).

[5] See, e.g., Strauss and Shaw, Regs. Leave
Questions on Affiliated-Service Groups, 53 Tax’n for Acct. 92 (Aug. 1994).

[6] See Danziger, Controlled Groups, Affiliated
Service Groups, Leased Employees and Other Aggregation Rules Under Code
Subsections 414(b), (C), (m), (n) and (0), C759 ALI-ABA 105 (1992) that notes
that the proposed regulations give little guidance as to what regularly
performing services for or regularly associated with means. It poses the query
as to what if two entities render no services to each other and their
relationship is limited to routine referrals, does this referral relationship
constitute regularly associated with providing services to third parties. It
notes that one should consider the facts and circumstances.

[7] Note that while the § 414(m) regulations
proposed in 1983 have never been finalized, various provisions of the proposed
§ 414(m) regulations have been cited in IRS private letter rulings and in the
Internal Revenue Manual. Furthermore, Prop. Treas. Reg. § 414(m)-1(c) regarding
a non-PC corporation not being an FSO for A-Org. affiliated service group
purposes is specifically cited in IRS Publication 7005 (Revised June 2011) —
Employee Benefit Plans Explanation No. 10 Affiliated Service Group.

[8] Code § 414(m)(2)(B) would not encompass
independent contractors.

[9]  These A-Org and B-Org flowcharts are
from IRS Employee Plans Continuing Professional Education materials (Controlled
and Affiliated Service Groups) (2004).

[10] See, e.g., Grande v. Grant Thornton LLP,
2013 WL 5450379 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 30, 2013) (court examined whether Grant
Thornton and its related entities could be treated as a single employer for
retirement plan purposes under Code §§ 414(b), (c), and (m); court notes that
even without common ownership, the high degree of functional integration and
shared management services between a professional firm and its regional or
service-specific entities can trigger aggregation under the affiliated service
group of Code § 414(m)(5), if principal business of one entity is to perform
management functions for the other entity on a regular and continuing basis);
Rogers v. I D Design, Inc., 2009 WL 10668634 (N.D. Ga. Mar. 6, 2009) (holding
that several related furniture retail and wholesale entities were not an
affiliated service group under Code § 414(m)(5) because, despite shared
ownership and shared administrative / accounting personnel, the plaintiffs
failed to produce evidence that the “principal business” of any one
entity was the performance of management functions for the others;
consequently, the entities were not aggregated, and the employer remained
exempt from COBRA under the small business exception); Beals Bros. Management
Corp. v. C.I.R., 300 F.3d 963 (8th Cir. 2002) (Code § 414(m)(5) used to
aggregate a management corporation with an operating sawmill company; because
the management entity’s primary business was performing oversight for the
sawmill, they formed an affiliated service group; this required the management
entity’s ESOP to satisfy nondiscrimination testing against the combined
workforce of both companies, a standard it could not meet because it excluded
all non-highly compensated sawmill employees).

[11] Management activities also include
professional services that relate to these management functions. Id.
Furthermore, if an organization performs the same type of professional services
for a recipient that the recipient provides to third parties, those services
are deemed management functions regardless of whether they were historically
performed by employees. Id.

[12] See, IRS Field Service Advice TL-N-6910-95,
1995 WL 1918546 (a management organization can be aggregated with a specific
recipient even if it serves multiple unrelated clients, provided the
“principal business” test is met for that particular recipient or
related group; performing services for organizations that are not part of an
affiliated service group does not prevent the formation of an affiliated
service group with another organization that meets the 50% of business
activities requirement); Field Service Advice TL-N-6910-95, 1995 WL 1918536
(deriving more than 50% of gross receipts from a single recipient is a primary
factor in identifying a management organization; however, this is a
facts-and-circumstances test and other factors include the amount billed and
the actual time individuals spend performing management functions; at a
minimum, management functions must be performed for at least two years to
satisfy regular and continuing; even if organizations are related, if the
management functions performed for a specific related entity are de minimis,
e.g., only 2% of gross receipts, that specific entity might be excluded from
the aggregated ASG group).

[13] Code § 267(b) defines related person as
including: (i) members of the same family, (ii) an individual and a corporation
more than 50% owned by the individual, and (iii) a corporation and a
partnership if the same persons more than 50% of both the stock of the
corporation and the capital or profits of the partnership, and certain similar
relationships, and Code § 267(c) applies constructive ownership of stock rules.
Code § 707(b) applies to a partnership and a greater than 50% owner of capital
or profits therein, or to two partnerships where the same persons own more than
50% of capital or profits of each partnership. Code § 1563(a) is very similar
to Code § 414(b) discussed above.

 

Categories
Blog

Right to a Jury Trial in ERISA Cases

Right to a Jury Trial in ERISA Cases

Charles C. Shulman, Esq.
cshulman@ebeclaw.com
201.357.0577

June, 2025

See link below to article.

There is a recent trend in some federal cases to allow requests for
jury trials for ERISA claims, such as claims for benefits or breach of
fiduciary duty claims, even though historically such claims were treated as
equitable claims, not entitled to a jury trial. Three district cases allowing
jury trials are in the Second Circuit and relate to excessive fee cases.  Jury trial verdicts are unpredictable,
particularly in complex ERISA fiduciary cases. 
In light of the possibility of a jury trial in excessive fee cases,
increased emphasis and care should be taken in the selection and overseeing of
service providers, bids from multiple recordkeepers should be compared and 401(k)
plan investment funds should be selected and monitored based on advice of
independent financial advisors.

1.    Right
to Jury Trial in ERISA Legal Claims

ERISA
does not explicitly address a plaintiff’s right to a jury trial, and its
legislative history provides no clarification. Federal courts have looked to
the Seventh Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, which guarantees the right to a
jury trial in federal common law cases, but not in equitable cases.
Historically, most ERISA claims have been viewed as equitable or partially
equitable and not entitled to a jury trial. However, some recent cases granted
jury trial requests for ERISA claims that seek benefits under the plan or seek
to make the plan whole for monetary losses due to fiduciary breaches.

 

2.    Jury Trials in Legal but Not Equitable Claims

Federal Caselaw
Holds that the
Right to a Jury Trial is for Legal but Not Equitable Claims. The Supreme Court has addressed
the issue of the right to a jury trial for legal but not equitable claims on a
number of occasions. For example, in the recent case of Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Jarkesy, 603 U.S. 109 (2024), the Court held that that the SEC’s
pursuit of civil penalties in securities fraud cases even within an
administrative setting, was still considered a legal claim, not an equitable
claim, and therefore the defendants could assert their right to a jury trial.  

Two-Part Test to Determine if Right to Jury Trial Exists.
To determine whether a particular action will resolve legal rights or
equitable rights, courts examine both the nature of the issues involved and the
remedy sought. See, e.g., Granfinanciera, S.A. v. Nordberg, 492
U.S. 33, 42 (1989), holding that Granfinanciera, S.A. had the right
to a jury trial when sued by the trustee in bankruptcy to recover
allegedly fraudulent monetary transfer, stated that there are two tests to
determine if a jury trial is allowed: (i) the court compares the statutory
action to 18th-century actions brought in the courts of England prior to the
merger of the courts of law and equity; and (ii) the court examines the remedy
sought and determine whether it is legal or equitable in nature.  The
Court noted here and in other cases that the second test is more important than
the first.

3.    Jury Trial for ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) Denial of Benefits Claims

Cases Denying Jury Trial for ERISA
§ 502(a)(1)(B) Claims for Benefits under the Plan.
Most cases have denied jury trials
for an ERISA denial of benefits claim under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), viewing such
claims as equitable, similar to enforcing a trust. Under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), a
civil action may be brought by a participant or beneficiary to recover benefits
due under the terms of his plan, to enforce his or her rights under the terms
of the plan, or to clarify his or her rights to future benefits under the terms
of the plan. For examples of cases that have denied jury trials in §
502(a)(1)(B) denial of benefits claims because they involve primarily equitable
claims, see, e.g., Kramer v. American Electric Power Executive Severance Plan,
128 F.4th 739 (6th Cir. 2025) (employee brought action under ERISA §
502(a)(1)(B) for denial of severance benefits under executive severance plan and
interference under ERISA; plaintiff asserted constitutional right to a jury
trial for ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) denial of benefits claim; court held that ERISA
claim for denial-of-benefits is equitable in nature; thus, plaintiff was not
entitled to a jury trial on ERISA claim for benefits); Graham v. Hartford Life
& Accident Ins. Co., 589 F.3d 1345 (10th Cir. 2009) (the Seventh Amendment
guarantees no right to a jury trial in an ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) action for
benefits because the relief is equitable rather than legal); Wilkins v. Baptist
Healthcare Sys. Inc., 150 F.3d 609, 616 (6th Cir. 1998) (former employee
brought ERISA claim against employer and benefit plan administrator, alleging
that the administrator’s denial of disability benefits violated ERISA; court
held that a claim for denial of benefits was not a case for money damages and
therefore plaintiff was not entitled to a jury trial); Biggers v. Wittek
Industries, Inc., 4 F.3d 291 (4th Cir. 1993) (claim for benefits under an ERISA
welfare plan was covered by ERISA, and because ERISA preempts his common law
contract claim, the claim should have been tried by the court under the
principles of ERISA); Bair v. General Motors Corp., 895 F.2d 1094 (6th
Cir. 1990) (former employee sued former employer under ERISA, seeking special
early retirement benefit; court rejected appellant’s argument that he was
entitled to a jury merely because issues of contract law are involved in his
claim).

Some Cases Allowing Jury Trials for ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B) Denial
of Benefits Claims.
Some cases have held that jury trial requests were
allowed even in claims for benefits under ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), as they were
held to involve legal claims, like claims for damages. See, e.g., Cox v.
Keystone Carbon Co., 861 F.2d 390 (3d Cir.1988) (court acknowledged the
difference between the relief provided ERISA § 502(a)(1)(B), which is “legal,”
and the relief provided ERISA § 502(a)(3)(A) & (B), which is “equitable,” citing
Tull v. United States, 481 U.S. 412 (1987); remanded to district court to determine
whether the § 502(a)(1)(B) claim was presented to it and if so, whether he was
entitled to a jury trial thereunder); Rhodes v. Piggly Wiggly Alabama
Distributing Co., Inc., 741 F. Supp. 1542 (N.D. Ala. 1990) (an action under
ERISA § 502(a)(1) is legal in nature and there is a Seventh Amendment right to
jury trial).

4.    Fiduciary Breach Claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2) are Held by Most
Courts to be Equitable Claims Not Entitled to a Jury Trial

With regard to ERISA fiduciary claims under ERISA §
502(a)(2) to remedy fiduciary breaches under ERISA § 409(a), most courts have
held that ERISA fiduciary claims are equitable in nature and are not entitled
to a jury trial. See,
e.g., Acument Global Technologies, Inc.. v. Towers Watson & Co., 998 F. Supp.
2d 111 (S.D.N.Y. 2014) (rejecting jury demand in ERISA fiduciary breach case
because the remedy sought was the classic remedy against a fiduciary, namely, a
surcharge to repair the damage his breach of duty inflicted upon the corpus that
the fiduciary was charged to protect, which is an equitable claim); Bauer-Ramazani
v. Teachers Insurance and Annuity Association of America-College Retirement and
Equities Fund, No.
1:09–CV–190, 2013 WL 6189802 (D. Vermont 2013) (granting motion to strike jury
demand in ERISA claim for breach of fiduciary duty, because the remedy plaintiffs
seek under ERISA, the value of the use of the plan assets and disgorgement of
any investment profits made through the use of plaintiffs’ funds, are equitable
in nature); Carver v. Bank of New York Mellon, No.
15-CV-10180, 2017 WL 1208598 (S.D.N.Y. 2017) (court
concludes that the remedy sought by plaintiffs for defendants’ alleged breach
of fiduciary duty is equitable in nature; defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’
demand for a jury trial was therefore granted); Divane v. Northwestern
University, 953 F.3d 980 (7th Cir. 2020), vacated on other grounds, 142 S. Ct.
737 (2022) (court stated there would be no right to jury trial for fiduciary
claim); In Re First American Corp. ERISA Litigation,
No. SACV
07-01357-JVS, 2009 WL 536254
(C.D. Cal. 2009) (overwhelming weight of authority in the federal courts holds
that actions under ERISA § 502(a)(2) by participant, beneficiaries or
fiduciaries to remedy alleged fiduciary violations of ERISA § 409(a) are
equitable in nature and have no 7th Amendment jury trial right); Harmon v.
Shell Oil Co.,
No. 3:20-cv-00021, 2023 WL 2474503 (S.D. Tex. Mar. 13, 2023) (given the equitable nature
of the claims and relief that plaintiffs seek, court denied jury request); Popovchak
v. UnitedHealth Group Inc., 692 F.Supp.3d 392, (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 19, 2023)  (suit against claims administrators alleging failure
to adequately reimburse beneficiaries for medical services in violation of plan
and their fiduciary duties; court held beneficiaries adequately alleged that
claims administrators breached their fiduciary duty of loyalty; beneficiaries
adequately alleged losses resulting from administrators’ alleged conduct; and
beneficiaries did not have Seventh Amendment right to jury trial with regard to
breach-of-fiduciary-duty claims, because it was not clear whether plaintiffs
sought legal damages for their fiduciary duty claims, and the Second Circuit
has long held that ERISA benefits claims do not trigger the right to a jury
trial, the court grants defendants’ motion to strike plaintiffs’ jury demand
without prejudice).

5.    Several Recent District Court Cases in the Second Circuit Have Allowed
Jury Trials even for Fiduciary Breach Claims under ERISA § 502(a)(2)

Three recent district court decisions in the Second Circuit have
granted jury trials in ERISA fiduciary breach cases.

a.    Jury Trial Allowed in Garthwait v. Eversource
Energy Service Company (D. Conn.) and rather than go to Jury Trial, Defendants
Settled for $15 Million
.  In Garthwait
v. Eversource Energy Service Company, No. 3:20-CV-00902, 2022 WL 17484817 (JCH)
(D. Conn. Dec. 7, 2022), the court allowed a jury trial for the plaintiffs’
claim for Eversource to restore (“make good”) any losses caused by breaches of
fiduciary duty related to the company’s 401(k) plan. In that case, participants
in the 401(k) plan alleged breach of fiduciary duty by allowing underperforming
investments in the 401(k) plan’s choice of funds. The court held that the make-good
claim was a legal remedy rather than an equitable remedy because it sought
monetary damages to compensate for the losses caused by the alleged breaches,
and therefore plaintiffs request for a jury trial with respect to the make-good
claims was valid.  The case was
subsequently prepared for a jury trial scheduled for April 2023, but as a
result of the risks of a jury trial the parties reached a $15 million
settlement in September, 2023.

b.    Jury Trial Allowed in Vellali v. Yale
University (D. Conn.) but Jury Acquitted on Basis of “Could Have” Standard; Plaintiffs
Appealing to Second Circuit
. In Vellali v. Yale University, 662 F.Supp.3d
238 (D. Conn. Mar. 17, 2023), a class of participants in Yale University’s
403(b) Retirement Account Plan brought suit under ERISA § 502(a)(2) against the
plan fiduciaries for breach of fiduciary duties and other ERISA claims in
connection with alleged excessive recordkeeping and administrative fees, noting
that the plan used multiple recordkeepers, and selected an imprudent choice of investment
funds. The plaintiffs made a jury request. The district court stated that the
remedy is legal in nature since they seek to recover damages out of the
defendant’s assets rather than to recover specifically identifiable funds, and
the court therefore held that the plaintiffs have the right to a jury trial in
this case on their claims for money damages.

       The jury in the Vellali v. Yale
University case
found in June 2023 that Yale University fiduciaries had
breached their fiduciary duty of prudence by allowing unreasonable
recordkeeping and administrative fees, but that the plaintiffs didn’t prove any
resulting damages since Yale University demonstrated that a prudent fiduciary
“could have” made the same decisions as to recordkeeping and
administrative fees. The jury also sided with Yale University on the
appropriateness of investment monitoring and share class selection. The
plaintiffs appealed to the Second Circuit claiming that the jury instructions
in the trial did not adequately guide the jury on how to assess damages,
specifically regarding the “could have” versus “would have”
standard for determining if a prudent fiduciary would have made the same
decisions as the defendants. The appeal is pending.

c.    Jury Trial Allowed in Khan v. Board of
Directors of Pentegra Defined Contribution Plan (S.D.N.Y.) and Jury Awarded $38
million for Unreasonable Recordkeeping and Administrative Fees.
In Khan v.
Board of Directors of Pentegra Defined Contribution Plan, No. 20-CV-07561, 2023
WL 6237862 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 26, 2023), participants in the Pentegra Defined
Contribution Plan for Financial Institutions (a pooled 401(k) plan) brought
suit under ERISA § 502(a)(2)
alleging that plan fiduciaries at Pentegra and the Board breached their ERISA
fiduciary duties by allowing unreasonable recordkeeping and administrative fees.
The plaintiffs amended their claim to request a jury trial. The Southern
District of New York in the 2023 case found that the ERISA § 502(a)(2) claim against the fiduciaries
involves legal and equitable claims, and therefore held that the case should be
bifurcated with the claim for money damages being tried before a jury, and the
remaining equitable claims and prohibited transaction claims should be tried
before the court.

       On April 23, 2025, a jury in the U.S. District
Court for the Southern District of New York rendered a unanimous verdict in
Khan v. Board of Directors of Pentegra Defined Contribution Plan, that the
defendants breached their fiduciary duties under ERISA in connection with
administration and fees charged for participation in the Pentegra pooled 401(k)
plan, and as a result, the jury awarded the plaintiffs damages exceeding $38
million. A court decision regarding the equitable and prohibited transaction
claims had not yet been issued, and according to a May 2, 2025 S.D.N.Y. court
order, the parties in Khan v. Board of Directors of Pentegra Defined
Contribution Plan, have reached a settlement in principle for the remaining
claims.

6.    Points to Consider in Light of Possibility of Jury Trials for
Excessive Fee Cases

●    The intricacies of ERISA excessive fee cases
make jury trials particularly unpredictable.

●    In light of the possibility of a jury trial
in excessive fee cases, increased emphasis and care should be taken in the
selection and overseeing of service providers and in reviewing the fee
structures from time to time.

●    RFPs from multiple recordkeepers should be
compared.

●    401(k) plan investment funds should be
selected and monitored based on advice of independent financial advisors, and
the funds’ returns and risks should be benchmarked.

●    Recordkeepers with a relationship with the plan
sponsor should be avoided.

●    It should be interesting to see if this
trend to allow jury trials in ERISA fiduciary excessive fee cases spreads
beyond the Second Circuit.

Also Published in Journal of Pension Planning & Compliance (WK, Winter 2026) 

at https://drive.google.com/file/d/11PU_wpBJNl-PZmAMO3bfVLphahKqzMlI/

Categories
Blog

ERISA’s “Controlled Group” Rules – A Timely Review


 ERISA’s “Controlled Group” Rules –

A Timely Review

                                                                                                                Oct. 12, 2025 (updated)

 Charles C. Shulman, Esq.*

Printed in 51 Journal of Pension Planning and
Compliance no. 1 at 1 (WK, Fall 2025).  
https://drive.google.com/file/d/1UyhCIi1Oa_-gZwZcnRcShBShEZLvQXFQ/

 

* Charles C. Shulman, Esq.,
Teaneck, New Jersey, cshulman@ebeclaw.com, 201-357-0577, has extensive experience
in employee benefits and executive compensation law, including employee
benefits compliance and M&A work, advising on various issues relating to
qualified and nonqualified plans, welfare plans, ERISA liability, fiduciary
issues, executive compensation issues and negotiations and employment issues.
He is admitted to the NY & NJ bar, a fellow of the American College of
Employee Benefits Counsel and a Contributing Editor of the Journal of Deferred
Compensation. He has a J.D. & LL.M from N.Y.U. School of Law
.  

       Under the
Internal Revenue Code (“Code”) and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act
(“ERISA”), employees of certain related “controlled group” entities, as defined
in §§ 414(b) & (c) of the Code, are treated as employed by a single
employer, for purposes of liability under Title IV of ERISA, for qualified plan
nondiscrimination testing under the Code and for other purposes listed below
.

            These rules are not new, but this
article includes changes made by the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022, first effective in
2024, and an August 2025 case and other recent cases regarding private equity
investment-plus ownership and potential partnership-in-fact ownership.

            This article is broken into four
parts: (i) applicability of controlled group rules and parent-child and
brother-sister tests; (ii) controlled group attribution rules for option
holders, 5% owners and family members; (iii) controlled group liability issues
re individual owners with an unincorporated trade or business; and (iv)
controlled group liability issues with portfolio companies of multiple private
equity owners.

            Note that under Code § 414(m), employees
of certain entities that are part of an “affiliated service group” are also
treated as employed by a single employer, for purposes of nondiscriminatory
coverage testing under the Code (but not for liability under Title IV of
ERISA). These rules were also amended by the SECURE 2.0 Act. The “affiliated
service group” rules under Code § 414(m) will be discussed in a separate upcoming
article.

 1. Applicability of Controlled Group Rules and
Parent-Child and Brother-Sister Tests

Controlled
Group Tests  

             There are two alternate tests to
determine controlled group status under the Code and ERISA: (i) a
parent-subsidiary controlled group test; and (ii) a brother-sister controlled
group test.

 Applicability
of Controlled Group Rules

             It is often incorrectly assumed that
the ERISA controlled group rules are only applicable for purposes of ERISA
Title IV (defined benefit plan) liability; but, in fact, controlled group rules
are also relevant in a host of contexts (some affecting defined contribution
plans or nonqualified plans as well).

             Controlled group rules
under ERISA and related laws apply for: (i) Title IV pension termination
liability under ERISA § 4062(a); (ii) ERISA § 4069(a) (transaction with a
principal purpose to evade pension termination liability); (iii) PBGC premiums
under ERISA §§ 4006 & 4007 (§ 4007(e)(2)); (iv) minimum funding obligations
under Code § 412 (§ 412(c)(11)(B)); (v) Code § 4971 excise tax for failure to
meet minimum funding (§ 4971(e)(2)); (vi) PBGC lien for unpaid contributions
exceeding $1 million (ERISA § 303(k)); (vii) single employer plan distress
termination where all members of the controlled group must be in financial
distress under ERISA § 4041; (viii) multiemployer pension plan withdrawal
liability (ERISA §§ 4201(a) & 4001(b)(1)); (ix) Code § 404(a) limits on
deductions (Code § 404(a) & (g)); (x) qualified plan nondiscrimination
rules, primarily with respect to the minimum coverage tests under Code § 410(b),
the defined benefit plan minimum participation tests under Code § 401(a)(26),
the general test for contributions and benefits under Code § 401(a)(4)
regulations, the benefits, rights and features under Treas. Reg. § 1.401(a)(4)-4
and certain other nondiscrimination  and
qualification rules that could be affected by a controlled group affiliate (Code
§§ 414(b) & (c)); (xi)
simplified employee pension nondiscrimination
test under
Code § 408(k)(3); (xii) Code § 409A limitations on
nonqualified deferred compensation plans (for purposes of the definition of
service recipient, the determination of when a separation from service occurs, plan
aggregation rules, and the six-month delay for specified employees of public
companies) (Code § 409A(d)(6)); (xiii) COBRA continuation coverage (ERISA § 607(4);
Code § 414(t)); (xiv) cafeteria plan
nondiscrimination tests
of Code § 125, self-insured medical reimbursement
nondiscrimination test of Code § 105(h),
and certain fringe benefit
nondiscrimination tests in Code
§ 132 (Code §§ 414(t), 105(h)(8) & 125(g)(4)); and (xv) Affordable Care Act
mandated coverage rules for employers with 50 or more employees on a controlled
group basis, to provide affordable healthcare benefits or pay certain penalties
under Code § 4980H(a) & (b).[1]
The WARN Act also has inter-corporate liability if companies are so intertwined
in their affairs that they appear separate but are actually part of a single
enterprise (caselaw interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 2101(a)(1)).[2]

         ERISA
controlled group rules would NOT apply to, e.g., (i) prohibited transactions, (ii)
other excise taxes, (iii) consequences of plan disqualification,
[3]
(iv) Title I reporting and disclosure obligations, or (v) contractual
liabilities for promised benefits, etc.

 Parent-Subsidiary
Controlled Group Test

          Parent-subsidiary
test.
A parent-subsidiary controlled group will exist if there is a chain
of entities conducting trades or businesses that are connected through a ”controlling
interest” with a common parent, with controlling interest defined: (i) in the
case of corporation as at least 80% of the total combined voting power of all
classes entitled to vote OR at least 80% of the total value of all shares of
the subsidiary; (ii) in the case of a trust or estate an 80% actuarial interest
in the trust or estate; (iii) in the case of a partnership (or other entity
taxed as a partnership) an 80% interest in profits OR capital of the
partnership; and (iv) in the case of a sole proprietorship 100% ownership of
the trade or business. Code § 1563(a)(1) referenced by Code § 414(b); Treas.
Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(b)(2).

             Voting power. Voting power under
Code §§ 414(b) & 1563(a)(1) means the power to control the corporation’s
business through the election of the board of directors, as illustrated in various
cases and rulings.
[4]

             Parent-child controlled group not
applicable if individual owns the other entities, but there is no entity that
owns the other entities
. Parent-child controlled group would not apply if
an individual (not a trade or business) owns the other entities. If an
individual owns individually 80% in several entities, but there is no entity
that owns the other entities, and it’s not the individual’s trade or business
that owns the other entities but rather the individual. However, the
brother-sister controlled group, discussed below, would likely pull the
entities owned by the individual into a single controlled group.

             Section 415 50% Standard.  For purposes of the Code § 415 limitations on
qualified plan benefits and contributions, the controlling interest for
purposes of the parent-subsidiary test is reduced from 80% to 50%. Code § 415(h);
Treas. Reg. § 1.415(a)-1(f).

             Examples of parent-subsidiary
control groups

             Parent-subsidiary example 1: Partnership
A owns stock having 80% of the total combined voting power of all classes of
stock entitled to vote of Corporation B. Partnership A also owns 80% of the
profits interest in Partnership C. Partnership A is the common parent of a
parent-subsidiary controlled group of trades or businesses consisting of
Partnership A, Corporation B, and Partnership C. See Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(e)
Ex. 1. See also, Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-l(a)(2)(ii) Ex. 1 & 2.

            Parent-subsidiary example 2: Corporation
A owns 80% of the only class of stock Corporation S1 and of Corporation S2.
Corporations S1 and S2 each own 40% of the only class of stock of Corporation
S3. Corporation A is the common parent of a parent-subsidiary controlled
group consisting of corporations A, S1, S2 and S3 (with the indirect 40%
ownership interests of Corporation S3 combined). See diagram below. See also, Treas.
Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(e) Ex. 2, and Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-l(a)(2)(ii) Ex. 3.





















             Exclusion of certain remaining ownership
interests in parent-subsidiary test for 50% owned entities.
Certain
ownership interests are excluded in determining the parent-subsidiary
controlled group. Specifically, if the parent owns (a) 50% or more of the vote
or value of subsidiary corporation, (b) 50% or more of the actuarial interest
of subsidiary trust or (c) 50% or more of the profits or capital of subsidiary
partnership, then any remaining ownership interest in the subsidiary will be
ignored if the remaining interest is held by (i) principal owner, officers,
partners or fiduciaries of the parent, (ii) employees of the subsidiary if
subject to a “put” to employer on termination of employment or other
substantial restriction, (iii) a trust which is part of
  a deferred compensation plan of foreign
affiliates or (iv) controlled tax-exempt organizations. Ignoring the remaining
ownership interest will have the effect of increasing the parent’s ownership
interest in the entity, and if the increased ownership interest is 80% or more
of the entity, it could bring the parent and subsidiary entity it into a
parent-subsidiary controlled group. Code § 1563(c)(2)(A); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-3(b).

 Brother Sister Controlled Group Test

             Brother-sister
test.
A brother-sister controlled group exists where there are two or more
trades or businesses which meet two tests: (i) the same five or fewer persons
who are individuals, estates or trusts[5]
commonly own together 80% or more of “control,” as defined above, in each of
the entities; and (ii) these five or fewer individuals, estates or trusts also
own together 50% or more of the “identical” ownership (effective control) in
the entities, with identical ownership meaning that ownership is taken into
account only to the extent it is identical with respect to each of the entities
(i.e., one looks only at the lowest percentage ownership in any of the common
entities and count only that lowest percentage ownership).
Code § 1563(a)(2);
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(c).

             Thus,
the brother-sister test includes an 80% common (combined) control component and
a 50% identical ownership component.
Under the identical ownership component, if corporations X, Y and Z are partially
owned by individual A with a 20%, 30% and 40% interest, respectively, the
identical ownership interest that is counted for individual A is only 20%.

             Example of brother-sister test. Record
the ownership percentage of each person in the group across all companies. Determine
each person’s
lowest ownership percentage across all of the
companies (the identical ownership).

 

Individuals

Company A

Company B

Identical Ownership

Alex

40%

50%

40%

Ben

50%

30%

30%

Total

90%

(common
control equals or exceeds 80%)

80%

(common
control equals or exceeds 80%)

70%

(identical ownership exceeds 50%)

 

Company
A and B are in a brother-sister controlled group since (1) five or fewer
individuals commonly own at least 80% of each of the entities (in the above
example Company A is commonly owned 90% by Alex and Ben, and Company B is
commonly owned 80% by Alex and Ben, both of which equal or exceed 80%); and (2)
when adding up identical ownership in each entity, i.e., the lowest percentage ownership
by each individual in each company, the identical ownership exceeds 50% (in the
above example Alex’s identical ownership in both companies A & B is 40% and
Ben’s identical ownership in both companies A & B is 30%, thus yielding
identical ownership by Alex and Ben of 70% of both companies, which exceeds
50%). See diagram below. See also, examples in Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(e) Ex.
4 and Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-l(a)(3)(iii) Ex. 1.



             Brother-sister test excludes
stock ownership of individuals who do not hold an interest in each of the
entities under Vogel Rule.
Under the Supreme Court case of U.S. v. Vogel
Fertilizer Company, 455 U.S. 16 (1982), stock ownership of individuals who do
not hold an interest in all of the entities is disregarded even for the 80% component of the brother-sister test. The
Court in Vogel found that the statutory term “brother-sister
controlled group” connotes a close horizontal relation between the
corporations, suggesting the same persons must satisfy the 80% ownership
requirement for each corporation. Analyzing the structure of the statute, the
Court noted that “five or fewer persons” is the conjunctive subject
for both the 80% test and the 50% test. This structural parallel led the Court
to deduce that the 80% test must also require common ownership among the
shareholders used for the 50% test. The Court invalidated prior Treas. Reg. §
1.1563-1(a)(3), rejecting its “singly or in combination” language.
The Court highlighted that the Treasury Department’s representations before
Congress explicitly included a common ownership requirement in the 80% test,
making the “singly or in combination” language of those regulation
contradictory to those initial proposals. This Vogel clarification has
been incorporated into the more recent version of Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-1(a)(3),
which provides in § 1.1563-1(a)(3)(ii)(C) that the five or fewer
persons whose stock
ownership is considered for purposes of the 80% requirement must be the same persons whose stock ownership is considered for purposes of the more-than-50%
identical ownership requirement.

             Example of application of Vogel
Rule.
For example, if the above example were expanded to include a third shareholder,
Cathy, with a 20% interest in Company B but a 0% ownership in Company A, and
other changes as shown below, we exclude Cathy’s ownership in both companies,
even in Company B, since she does not have any ownership in Company A, and without
counting Cathy’s 20% interest in Co. B, there is not common (combined) control
of 80% or more in Company B, and therefore the brother-sister test for companies
A and B is not met.

 

Individuals

Company A

Company B

Identical Ownership

Alex

70%

70%

70%

Ben

30%[not counted under Vogel]

0%

0%

Cathy

0%

30%
[not counted under Vogel]

0%

Total

70% (not including 30% of Ben since he does not have any
identical ownership), so common control does not equal or exceed
80%)

70% (not including 30% of Cathy under “Vogel” since she
does not have identical ownership in the other entities, so common control
does not
equal or exceed 80%)

70%
(identical ownership exceeds
50%)

 The regulations as amended in Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(c)(1),
53 Fed. Reg. 6603 (March 2, 1988) provide, incorporating Vogel: “The term ‘brother-sister
group of trades or businesses under common control’ means two or more
organizations conducting trades or businesses if (i) the same five or fewer
persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts own (
directly and with the
application of § 1.414(c)-4
) a controlling interest [80% or more] in each
organization, and (ii) taking into account the ownership of each such person
only to the extent such ownership is identical with respect to each such
organization, such persons are in effective control [more than 50%] of each
organization. The five or fewer persons whose ownership is considered for
purposes of the controlling interest requirement for each organization must be
the same persons whose ownership is considered for purposes of the effective
control requirement.”
 

 Note that if Cathy was married to Alex, and ownership
takes into account spousal ownership under Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-4(c), Alex
may be deemed to own Cathy’s interest in Company B, but if Cathy had no
interest, employment, management or restriction on sale role in Company B and
Company B majority passive investments, Cathy’s ownership would not be
attributed to Alex. Also, since Cathy has no interest in Company A, there would
not be 80% common ownership in Company A, and therefore Companies A and B would
not be brother-sister entities.

 Exclusion of certain remaining
ownership interests in brother-sister test for 50% owned entities

             Certain
ownership interests are excluded in determining brother-sister controlled
group. Specifically, if five or fewer persons own 50% or more of an entity, the
remaining ownership is ignored if held by (i) a qualified plan, (ii) employees
of the entity if it is subject to substantial conditions (e.g., an asymmetrical
right of first refusal), or (iii) controlled exempt organizations.

 Combined Controlled
Group Rule

             Combined Controlled Group. There
is also a combined group test under which a group of three or more
organizations consists of at least one parent-subsidiary group, the parent of
which is a member of a brother-sister group. Code § 1563(a)(2); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(d).
[6]

             Example of combined controlled
group.
For example, Walter, an individual, owns a controlling interest in
Partnership X and Partnership Y, and Partnerships X and Y together meet the
requirements for the brother-sister controlled group. Partnership X also owns a
controlling interest in Company Z meeting the requirements for the
parent-subsidiary controlled group. Since Partnership X is the parent of a
parent-subsidiary controlled group and is also a member of a brother-sister
controlled group, Partnership X, Partnership Y and Company Z are members of the
same combined controlled group. See Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(e) Ex. 8.

 Other
Issues Relating to Controlled Group Rules

             Treasury stock and nonvoting
preferred stock disregarded
. In determining control for the
parent-subsidiary or brother-sister controlled group tests, stock does not
include treasury stock or nonvoting preferred stock. Code § 1563(c)(1)(A);
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-3(a). Thus, stock does not include (i) treasury stock reacquired
and held by the company, or (ii) nonvoting stock that is limited and preferred
as to dividends.
[7]

             Controlled group for tax-exempt
organizations
. In testing common control for tax-exempt organizations
(where there is no ownership control), 2007 regulations provide that common
control exists between tax-exempt organizations if at least 80% of the
directors or trustees of one organization are either representative of, or
directly or indirectly controlled by the other organization.
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-5(b),
72 Fed. Reg. 41128 (July 22, 2007) (revised § 403(b) regulations).[8]

            Anti-Abuse rule in regulations. There
is also an anti-abuse provision in the regulations for in the section dealing
with tax-exempt organizations, but which would apply to other abuses in the
controlled group area.[9]

 

            Bankruptcy.
On occasion courts have disregarded stock ownership in a bankruptcy context
where there was no actual ownership.[10]

2. Controlled
Group Attribution Rules for Option Holders, 5% Owners and Family Members

             Attribution
Rules for Option Holders.
Constructive ownership in an entity can exist if
there is an option to acquire a controlling interest of the entity. Code § 1563(e)(1);
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(1).
[11]

             Courts split on whether option
attribution rules can be used to diminish other shareholders’ interests
. Courts
are divided on the issue of whether the option attribution rule can be used to
diminish other shareholder interests. Some courts and the PBGC hold that option
attribution can be used to dilute other shareholder interests.[12] Other
courts have taken the view that the option attribution rule may only be used to
increase ownership of the optionee but not to dilute ownership of other
shareholders
.[13]

             Attribution
rules for 5% owners
. For purposes of the parent-subsidiary and
brother-sister tests, the following ownership attribution rules apply to
corporations, partnerships and estates and trusts: If an individual owns 5% or
more of an entity, the individual is deemed to own a proportionate part of any
interests owned by that entity. Code § 1563(e)(2), (3) & (4) and Treas.
Reg. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(2), (3) & (4).
[14]

             Spousal attribution rules and SECURE 2.0 Changes. For purposes of the
parent-subsidiary and brother-sister tests, the following family attribution
rules apply: an individual is deemed to own the interest in an entity that his
or her spouse owns, provided that they are not divorced or legally separated.
However, the spousal attribution rule does not apply where all of the
following conditions are met: (i) the individual does not actually own any
interest of the entity in which the spouse has an interest (hereinafter
referred to as “such entity”), (ii) the individual is not a director or
employee of such entity, (iii) the individual does not participate in the
management of such entity, (iv) not more than 50% of such entity’s income is
derived from passive sources (such as royalties, rents, dividends, interest and
annuities), and (v) the spouse’s ownership in such entity is not subject to conditions
which substantially restrict or limit the spouse’s right to dispose of such interest
and which run in favor of the individual (or his or her minor children).
Code
§ 1563(e)(5); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(5).
Amendments
made by the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022 § 315 adding Code § 414(b)(2)(A), effective
for plan years
beginning
after December 31, 2023, provide
that where the individual and his
or her spouse reside in community property states, the community property laws
can be disregarded for purposes of the § 414(b) controlled-group rules.[15]

             Minor child attribution rules and
SECURE 2.0 Changes.
An individual is deemed to own stock owned by his
children under age 21.
Code § 1563(e)(6); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(5). However, as provided by the SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022 § 315
adding Code § 414(b)(2)(B) & (C), effective for plan years beginning after
December 31, 2023, despite the normal attribution of ownership to a minor
child, a business owned by one parent and a business owned by the other parent (not
subject to spousal attribution, e.g., by reason of legal separation or divorce
or other reason) will not be considered to be in the same controlled group
solely by reason of attribution to the minor child.[16]

             Parent/child attribution rules.
If an individual owns more than 50% of an entity, he or she is deemed to own
any interests owned in that entity by his adult children, grandchildren,
parents and grandparents.
Code § 1563(e)(6)(B); Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(6)(ii). There is no attribution rule for siblings.

3. Controlled Group Liability
Issues re Individual Owners with an Unincorporated Trade or Business
 

            Individual
owners are generally not liable for a corporation’s ERISA liability
. Generally,
an individual owner or shareholder of a corporation are not liable for the
corporation’s multiemployer withdrawal liability or single employer termination
liability under the controlled group rules.[17]

            Piercing Corporate Veil. One
exception to the above rule, though, would be where the doctrine of piercing
the corporate veil (alter ego) is applicable, for example, where there is
fraud, disregard by the owner of the separate character of the corporation or
shareholders undercapitalize the corporation.
[18]

            Liability
of owner if owner engages in an unincorporated trade or business
.  Another important exception – where an individual
owner (or shareholder if meeting a controlled group test) of a corporation
could be held liable for the corporation’s ERISA termination or withdrawal liability
– would be where the owner also engages in a trade or business as a sole
proprietor (or partnership) and the unincorporated trade or business could make
the owner individually liable for the corporation’s termination or withdrawal liability.
[19]

             Trade or Business. Neither
ERISA nor the Treasury regulations define “trade or business.” Courts have
generally adopted the standard articulated in the1987 Supreme Court case of
C.I.R. v. Groetzinger, where the Court held that in the context of Code § 162, to
be engaged in a trade or business, the taxpayer must be involved in the
activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary purpose
for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit; sporadic activity, a
hobby, or an amusement diversion does not qualify.
[20]
Several cases have applied Groetzinger in the ERISA context.
[21]

             Personal liability by reason of
having unincorporated home business activity.
A number of courts have found
shareholders liable by reason of some business activity they engaged in as a
sole proprietor, trust or partnership.
[22]
See below regarding private equity funds that engage only in passive investing.

 4. Controlled Group Liability Issues re Portfolio
Companies of Multiple Private Equity Owners  

            Whether
private equity funds are a trade or business.
As discussed further in this
section, only “trades or business” under common control are treated as part of
an ERISA controlled group. As discussed above, under the Groetzinger standard,
to be engaged in a trade or business, the individual must be involved in the
activity with continuity and regularity and that the taxpayer’s primary purpose
for engaging in the activity must be for income or profit; but sporadic
activity, a hobby, or an amusement diversion do not qualify.[23]
With regard to private equity funds, historically, practitioners had generally taken
the view that since they are generally passive investment vehicles with no
employees and minimal involvement in day-to-day operations, they are not trades
or businesses, and therefore separate portfolio companies owned by a private
equity fund would not be in the same ERISA controlled group. However, the PBGC in
a 2007 PBGC Appeals Board Opinion stated that a private equity fund that owned
80% or more of the portfolio company was a trade or business, because it was
engaged in an activity with the primary purpose of income or profit and
conducted business through an agent (the general partner) who managed fund
investments on a regular basis.[24]
According to this ruling, 80%-owned portfolio companies of a private equity
fund would generally be in the same ERISA controlled group, and only in the
unusual case where the facts and circumstances indicate that the private equity
fund does not meet the Groetzinger standard for a trade or business, it would not
be a controlled group.[25]

             Investment plus, e.g., investment
advisory and management services.
A 2010 Eastern District of Michigan case,
Board of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers
National Pension Fund v. Palladium Equity Partners
, found the 2007 PBGC
Appeals Board Opinion to be persuasive and “investment plus” is a trade or
business. However, since there was more than one private equity investment
funds and neither owned 80% of the portfolio company alone, there was still a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the three funds constituted a
partnership or joint venture in fact.
[26]
A more recent August 2025 Western District of Missouri case found liability on
the part of limited partnership investor in bankrupt companies, which had triggered
withdrawal liability, since the limited partnership investor was more than a
passive investor, since it actively managed the portfolio companies
(investment-plus).
[27]

             Partnership-in-fact. Regarding
when multiple funds constitute a partnership in fact,
Luna v.
Commissioner, 42 T.C. 1067 (1964) established eight factors to consider: (i)
the agreement of the parties and their conduct in executing its terms; (ii) the
contributions, if any, which each party has made to the venture; (iii) the
parties’ control over income and capital and the right of each to make
withdrawals; (iv) whether each party was a principal and coproprietor, sharing
a mutual proprietary interest in the net profits or losses, or whether one
party was the agent or employee of the other, receiving for his services
contingent compensation in the form of a percentage of income; (v) whether
business was conducted in the joint names of the parties; (vi) whether the
parties filed Federal partnership returns or otherwise represented that they
were joint venturers; and (vii) whether separate books of account were
maintained for the venture; and (viii) whether the parties exercised mutual
control over and assumed mutual responsibilities for the enterprise.[28]

             2013 Sun Capital case. A 2013
First Circuit case,
Sun Capital Partners
III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund,

found the PBGC Appeals Board Opinion to be persuasive, and confirmed that
private equity funds will be engaged in a trade or business for ERISA
controlled group purposes if there is “an investment plus” by the
fund, e.g., by reason of active involvement in management (as well as control)
of the portfolio companies; but there was still an issue of material fact as to
whether the funds would be considered a partnership-in-fact.
[29]

             2016 Sun Capital district court case.
A later district court case of Sun Capital Partners held that (i) both funds
(the Sun Fund IV with a 70% investment and Sun Fund III with a 30% investment)
were trades or businesses, and (ii) there was common control under ERISA by
reason of Fund III and IV being a “partnership in fact.”
[30]

             Reversal by First Circuit in 2019
Sun Capital Case.
The First Circuit overturned this decision, however, in
Sun Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry
Pension Fund, 943 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2019), cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 372 (2020),
holding that there was not a partnership in fact because the fund documents did
not state that they were a partnership, the funds had different investors, the
funds filed separate tax returns and the funds did not always make parallel
investments.
[31]

             Multiple fund structure. Private
equity funds have often structured investment through multiple funds in part to
keep ownership below 80%, and avoid ERISA controlled group liability, but there
is still some uncertainty on the safety of relying on that structure because
they may be trades or business and there may be a partnership-in-fact (although
the 2019 First Circuit Sun Capital Partners case gives some comfort in that
regard).
[32]

 Affiliated
Service Group Rules

             Under Code § 414(m), employees of certain
entities that are part of an “affiliated service group” are also treated as
employed by a single employer, for purposes of nondiscriminatory coverage
testing and other qualified plan rules under the Code (but not for liability
under Title IV of ERISA). The affiliated service group rules will be discussed
in a separate article.


[1]
Regarding
Code §4980H guidance about controlled group, see definition of “applicable
large employer” in Treas. Reg. §54.4980H-1(a)(16) (entity treated as a single “applicable
large employer” with 50 FTEs under Code §§ 414(b), (c), (m) & (o)),
examples in §54.4980H-2(d) (where entities are treated as a single applicable
large employer) and Notice 2011-36 (all entities under Code §§ 414(b), (c) or
(m) are to taken into account in determining whether there is an applicable
large employer with 50 FTE employees)

            When
conducting due diligence about a company, it is important to examine not only
if the company has or participates in Title IV plans, but also if any
controlled group members may have or participate in such plans.

[2] Administaff Companies., Inc. v. New York Joint Board, Shirt &
Leisurewear Division, 337 F.3d 454, 457–58 (5th Cir. 2003); Pearson v. Component
Tech. Corp., 247 F.3d 471, 477 (3d Cir. 2001); Adams v. Erwin Weller Co., 87
F.3d 269, 271 (8th Cir. 1996); Chauffeurs, Sales Drivers, Warehousemen &
Helpers Union Local 572 v. Weslock Corp., 66 F.3d 241, 245 (9th Cir. 1995).

[3]
However, because the applicable sections relate to qualification of a
retirement plan, failure to recognize the common or related ownership with the
retirement plan sponsor and other corporations or businesses could result in
disqualification of the plan from inception or in operation.

[4] Voting power under Internal Revenue
Code §§ 414(b) & 1563(a)(1) and analogizing to Code § 1504 re 80% or 50% of
the total combined voting power of all classes entitled to vote – means the
power to control the corporation’s business through the election of the board
of directors, as illustrated in numerous Federal case decisions. See,
e.g., Yaffe Iron & Metal Corp. v. U.S., 78-1 U.S. Tax Cas. (CCH) ¶9314, 41
A.F.T.R.2d 78-1057 (W.D. Ark. 1978), affirmed, 593 F.2d 832 (8th Cir. 1979),
cert. denied, 444 U.S. 843 (with regard to the § 1563 requirement of 80%
control as part of brother-sister test, Tax Court held that a stockholder’s
voting agreement is relevant where the effect of an agreement is to vest to two
individuals with over 80% of the combined voting power of all classes of stock;
Eighth Circuit affirmed and cert. was denied); Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. CLP Venture LLC, 760 F.3d 745 (7th Cir. 2014),
cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 964 (2015) (in a case involving multiemployer plan
withdrawal liability, even though a common owner of two corporations owned only
73% of one of the corporations (rather than 80%), the court took into account
an escrow agreement which gave the individual the right to direct voting of the
remaining 27% of the stock and concluded that there was an ERISA controlled
group for purposes of determining withdrawal liability); Erie Lighting Co. v.
C.I.R., 93 F.2d 883, 885 (1st Cir. 1937); Rev. Rul. 69-126, 1969-1 C.B. 218
(participation in management of subsidiary through election of board is
criterion of voting power; upheld by numerous rulings to non-section 1504
cases, e.g., PLR 8128073, PLR 8221112, PLR 7406211920A and GCM 35789); Alumax
Inc. v. C.I.R., 165 F.3d 822 (11th Cir. 1999) (where 50% shareholder had right
to four votes per share including right to elect board members, but for supermajority
matters such as major corporate transactions the 50% shareholder only had one
vote per share, and the board members elected by 50% shareholder likewise had
limits on voting on supermajority corporate transaction issues and were limited
by other directors’ power to delay their actions, the 50% shareholder did not
have requisite 80% voting control for purposes of consolidated returns under Code
§ 1504); Hermes Consol., Inc. v. U.S., 14 Cl. Ct. 398 (1988) (with regard to
Code § 269 voting power is determined not merely by record ownership but by the
ability to approve or disapprove of fundamental changes in the corporate
structure and the ability to elect the corporation’s board of directors).

[5]
This would exclude ownership by partnership or corporations.

[6] The term combined group means any
group of three or more organizations, if (i) each such organization is a member
of either a parent-subsidiary group or a brother-sister group, and (ii) at
least one such organization is the common parent organization of a
parent-subsidiary group and is also a member of a brother-sister group. Treas.
Reg. § 1.414(c)-2(d).

[7]
With regard to “convertible” preferred stock, see Rev. Rul. 71-83, 1971-1 C.B.
268, which held that for purposes of Code § 1504 (which until 1984 was worded
exactly as § 1563), nonvoting preferred stock that is convertible into voting
common stock is still considered “nonvoting stock that is limited and preferred
as to dividends” since at the time the test is made it is still nonvoting, and
therefore should not be counted for the affiliated group rules. However, it is
possible that for purposes of the Code §§ 414 & 1563 controlled group tests, since even stock
options are considered stock under the option attribution rules, convertible
preferred should also be included. See, Williams, “Multiple Corporations,” 55
Tax Management Portfolio § IV.A. On the other hand, the option attribution rule
only applies with respect to options for outstanding stock, which is different
than convertible preferred stock.

[8] A
trustee or director is treated as a representative of another organization if
that person is a trustee, director, agent or employee of the other
organization. Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-5(b). A trustee or director is controlled
by another organization if the other organization has the power to remove the
trustee or director and designate a new trustee or director. Id. Whether there
is the power to remove the trustee or director is a facts and circumstances
determination.

[9]
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-5(f) (“If the Commissioner determines that the
principal purpose of a transaction is to avoid the application of section
414(b) or (c), the Commissioner may treat the organizations involved in the
transaction as if the transaction had not occurred, or may otherwise disregard
the transaction or the ownership interests created by the transaction, and may
treat the organizations as members of the same controlled group or as separate
employers, whatever is appropriate to carry out the purposes of section 414(b)
and (c)).

[10] In
re Challenge Stamping and Porcelain Co., 719 F.2d 146 (6th Cir. 1983) (where
company bought parent of sponsor of pension plan while sponsor was in Chapter
11 reorganization, but bankruptcy court then auctioned off sponsor rendering
stock of parent of sponsor worthless, buyer of parent of sponsor was not liable
for controlled group termination liability since owning 100% of parent of
sponsor was meaningless since even at that time bankruptcy court had full
control of sponsor). See similarly, PBGC v. Ouimet Corp., 711 F.2d 1085 (1st
Cir.1983), cert. denied 464 U.S. 961 (1983) (where subsidiary went bankrupt and
terminated underfunded plan after acquisition by controlled group that included
another bankrupt subsidiary, termination liability was allocated only to the
solvent group members, and not bankrupt corporations’ estates, since applying
the bankrupt’s assets to PBGC’s liability would have reduced assets available
to their creditors and inequitably benefited group members; court noted that
ERISA provides a lien on 30% of the net worth, not asset value and a bankrupt
corporation has negative net worth). See also, Sutherland v. C.I.R., 78 T.C.
395 (1982) nonacq. 1986-2 C.B. 1, 1986 WL 713548 (Tax Court has held that businesses
which are unsuccessful and are ceasing to conduct operations are not required
to be included under the Code § 414(b) or (c) test, since to do so would be to
require the inclusion of an employer which will, in effect, be maintaining an
impermanent plan since it will soon be going out of business).

            See, however, Pension Benefit
Guaranty Corp. v. East Dayton Tool and Die Co., 14 F.3d 1122 (6th Cir. 1994),
cert. denied 513 U.S. 816 (PBGC sought enforcement that a holding company, the
parent of a sponsoring employer in bankruptcy was responsible for unfunded
benefit liabilities of employer’s pension plan; the court held that 80% control
rule applied, even though holding company did not control voting rights of its
stock in employer; Challenge Stamping, cited above, which held that in a
bankruptcy case the stock purchaser never had actual control over the bankrupt
employer that sponsored the pension plan for termination liability was
different that this case, because here the holding company actually controlled
the employer and its Plan for 2-1/2 years).

[11] Code
§ 1563(e)(1), made applicable by § 1563(d)(1)(B) (if any person has an option
to acquire stock, such stock shall be considered as owned by such person);
Treas. Reg. § 1.414(c)-4(b)(1) (if a person has an option to acquire any
outstanding interest in an organization, such interest shall be considered as
owned by such person).   An option to
acquire such an option will also be considered as an option to acquire such
stock or interest. Id.

            If the option to acquire stock is
subject to contingencies, there would generally be no attribution. Central
Transport, Inc. v. Central States, Southeast and Southwest Area Pension Fund,
640 F. Supp. 56 (E.D. Tenn. 1986), affirmed, 8 EBC 2519, 1987 WL 36010 (6th
Cir. 1987; unpublished), cert. denied 484 U.S. 926 (1989) (no withdrawal
liability under ERISA § 4201 since stock purchase agreement made conditional on
federal approval was not an option under § 1563(e)(1) since it was contingent
on federal approval and purchaser had no control over contingency, and
therefore company was not in controlled group under rules of § 414(c) and §
1563). However, if the option is exercisable only after a period of time
without any conditions, there would be option attribution. Rev. Rul. 89-64,
1989-1 C.B. 91 (where an option distributed by a company to an officer in
redemption of the officer’s stock was only exercisable only after the lapse of
a fixed period of time, it is still subject to option attribution under Code § 318(a)(4)).

            There are several cases that
specifically apply the option attribution rule in an ERISA context (all dealing
with multiemployer withdrawal liability). Tri-State Rubber & Equipment,
Inc. v. Central States Southeast & Southwest Areas Pension Fund, 677 F.
Supp. 516 (E.D. Mich. 1987) (seven companies controlled by an individual are
under common control under § 414(c) and have withdrawal liability under ERISA §
4201; person who had option to purchase stock was constructive owner of such
stock under § 1563(c)(1)); IUE AFL-CIO Pension Fund v. Barker & Williamson,
Inc., 788 F.2d 118 (3d Cir.1986) (withdrawal liability exists under § 4201
where parent owns 75% of stock of subsidiary since option to purchase remaining
25% falls within option attribution rule of § 1563(e)(1)); Chicago Truck
Drivers, Helpers and Warehouse Workers Union (Independent) Pension Fund v.
Brotherhood Labor Leasing, 950 F. Supp. 1454 (E.D. Mo. 1996), denial of
reconsideration, 950 F.Supp.1454 (where there was purchase agreement for
immediate acquisition of withdrawing company (Be-Mac) by shareholders of
defendant companies, this was enough to cause Be-Mac to be in controlled group
under option rule, even if a court had later invalidated the sale, since there
were no contingencies in purchase agreement); Teamsters Pension Trust Fund of
Philadelphia v. Brigadier Leasing Associates, 880 F. Supp. 388 (E.D. Pa. 1995)
(unsigned draft agreement which gave withdrawing employer’s CFO an option to
purchase the other owner’s interest in the corporation did not establish
existing of a binding agreement, and therefore other entities owned by CFO were
not in controlled group); New York State Teamsters Conference Pension and
Retirement Fund v. Express Services, Inc., 426 F.3d 640 (2d Cir. 2005) right of
first refusal held by principals of former participating employer in
multiemployer pension plan with respect to possible affiliates did not
establish constructive ownership over purported affiliates; although statute
defining constructive ownership includes an option to acquire stock, a “right
of first refusal” was not same thing as stock option and statute made no
reference to rights of first refusal).

[12] For
the view that the option attribution rule can be used to diminish other
shareholder interests, see, Sorem v. C.I.R., 334 F.2d 275 (10th Cir. 1964) (in
determining whether a redemption was substantially disproportionate there must
be included the total unissued stock on which other shareholders have stock
options under § 318(a)(4)); Henry T. Patterson Trust by Reeves Banking &
Trust Co. v. U.S., 729 F.2d 1089 (6th Cir. 1984) (unissued stock which minority
shareholders have an option to acquire must be treated as outstanding under §
318(a)(4), which thereby increases the denominator and allows the redemption to
be not essentially equivalent to a dividend, thus benefiting the majority
shareholder in allowing him capital gain rather than dividend treatment); Rev.
Rul. 89-64, 1989-1 CB 91 (
stock must be
able to be acquired at the election of the shareholder if there exist no
contingencies with respect to such election;
redeemed
shareholder’s option taken into account); Rev. Rul. 68-601, 1968-2 CB 124
(redeemed shareholder’s option, but not unrelated holder’s option are not
affected by redeemed shareholder’s option).

 

[13] For
the view that the option attribution rule cannot be used to dimmish other
shareholder interests, see, Northwestern Steel and Supply Co., Inc. v. C.I.R.,
60 T.C. 356 (1973) (unexercised stock option owned by minority shareholder
cannot reduce ownership percentage of 80% shareholder under § 1563(e)(1) for
purposes of surtax exemption; note that in this case the option was to acquire
the outstanding shares held by the majority shareholder, rather than an option
to acquire unissued shares); Rev. Rul. 68-601 (unrelated holder’s option not
taken into account).

[14] See
e.g., Paza Staffing Services, Inc. v. C.I.R., 751 Fed. Appx. 223 (3d Cir. 2018)
(Third Circuit upheld Tax Court decision that an ESOP was disqualified for
failing to cover non-highly compensated employees of a related corporation in
violation of Code § 410(b) minimum coverage rules an individual sold all of the
stock of his company Paza Staffing Services to a newly established ESOP in an
ESOP buyout; he then assigned all the employees to Golden Gate, a company he
owned, and then had Paza lease the five employees back from Golden Gate; even
though the stock of the corporation held by the ESOP was not technically a
member of the same controlled group, the court held that, as sole beneficiary
of the ESOP, the owner of Golden Gate was the constructive owner of Paza under
Code § 1563(d)(2) and (e)(3)(A), and therefore the two companies were members
of the same ERISA controlled group, and the employees of Golden Gate were
required to be covered by the ESOP in order to pass IRS nondiscrimination
minimum coverage requirements; therefore the ESOP was disqualified).

[15]  These provisions in the SECURE 2.0
Act of 2022 (Division T of the
Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2023) signed Dec.
29, 2022, were originally intended to be effective for plan years beginning on
or after December 29, 2022, but the IRS has delayed the effective date for the
controlled group changes in the SECURE 2.0 Act to plan years beginning after
December 31, 2023. The
SECURE 2.0 Act also adds Code § 414(b)(3),
that to the extent changes made in new Code § 414(b)(2) result in changes to
the controlled group, the Code § 410(b)(6)(C) transition rule (which allows
disregarding changes until the end of the plan year following the plan year of
specific corporate events) applies until the end of the plan year following the
affected plan year.

[16]  SECURE 2.0 Act of 2022 § 315 adding
Code § 414(b)(2)(B) & (C), with a delayed
effective date to plan years beginning
after December 31, 2023. Specifically, stock or interests of entities held by
the parents that not attributed to the spouse under the spousal attribution
rules, will not be attributed solely as a result of minor child attribution. New
C
ode § 414(b)(2)(B). Likewise, stock or
interests of separate entities held by each of the parents that would be
attributed to a minor child by reason of minor child attribution, but is not
subject to spousal attribution, will not cause the entities to be in the same
controlled group solely because of the minor child attribution
. New Code § 414(b)(2)(C).

[17]
Connors v. Coal America, Inc., 7 Employee Benefits Cas. (BNA) 1300 (D.D.C.
1986) (individual who was officer and shareholder of corporation is not liable
for multiemployer withdrawal liability where there was no allegation of a basis
for piercing the corporate veil); DeBreceni v. Graf Bros. Leasing, Inc., 828
F.2d 877 (1st Cir. 1987) (no multiemployer withdrawal liability on controlling
shareholders and officers); Debreceni v. Bru-Jell Leasing Corp., 710 F. Supp.
15 (D. Mass. 1989) (95% shareholder not individually liable for multiemployer
withdrawal liability); Scarbrough v. Perez, 870 F.2d 1079 (6th Cir.1989)
(indirect owner not liable for multiemployer withdrawal liability); Wilhelm v.
McAnn’s W. 48th Street Restaurant Corp., 34 EBC 1659, 2004 WL 2658066, 34 (N.D.
Ill. 2004) (a shareholder is not personally liable for multiemployer withdrawal
liability of corporation; even N.Y. law does not hold a shareholder jointly and
severally liable for post-dissolution debts of the corporation).

[18]
See, e.g., the following court cases piercing the corporate veil: Lowen v.
Tower Asset Management, Inc., 829 F.2d 1209 (2d Cir.1987) (pierced corporate
veil so as to hold shareholders jointly and severally liable with the
corporations for fiduciary breaches); Board of Trustees of Teamsters Local 863
Pension Fund v. Foodtown, Inc., 296 F.3d 164 (3d Cir. 2002) (summary judgment
to dismiss piercing corporate veil claim by multiemployer pension fund against
individual defendants not granted; noted that under N.J. law to pierce
corporate veil must show that: (i) the corporation is organized and operated as
a mere instrumentality of the other corporation and (ii) the dominant
corporation uses the subservient corporation to penetrate fraud, to accomplish
injustice or to circumvent the law; with factors to be considered including the
failure to observe corporate formalities and non-functioning of other officers
and directors); Reilly v. Reem Contracting Corp., 380 Fed. Appx. 16 (2d Cir.
2010; unpublished) (plumbing company alter-ego of contracting company and
liable for contributions to union benefit funds);  Resilient Floor Covering Pension Fund v. M
& M Installation, Inc., 630 F.3d 848 (9th Cir. 2010) (non-union company may
be liable for withdrawal liability of union company where there was a
commonality between union and non-union firms and an abuse of the union/non-union
structure to avoid payment of withdrawal liability); Trustees of Operating
Engineers Local 324 Pension Fund v. Bourdow Contracting, Inc., 919 F.3d 368
(6th Cir. 2019) (a newly-formed LLC was held to be alter ego of a bankrupt
company that was a signatory to a collective bargaining agreement and was
liable to the union’s pension fund).

            See, however, the following court
cases which did not pierce the corporate veil: Reich v. Compton, 57 F.3d 270
(3d Cir.1995) (refusing to impose liability for prohibited transaction on alter
ego of party in interest under federal common law of ERISA); United Union of
Roofers, Waterproofers, and Allied Workers Local No. 210, AFL-CIO v. A.W.
Farrell & Son, Inc., 547 Fed. Appx. 17 (2d Cir. 2013) (the Second Circuit
held that two businesses that were affiliated and owned by different family
members but were not members of the same controlled group should not be treated
as a single employer for purposes of joint withdrawal liability from a
multiemployer pension plan; the court considered the following factors in
making its determination: (i) interrelation of operations, (ii) management,
(iii) centralized control of labor relations, (iv) common ownership, (v) the
use of common office facilities and equipment, and (vi) family connections
between and among the various enterprises).

[19]
When TWA entered bankruptcy with two pension plans underfunded by $1.2 billion,
the PBGC threatened to pursue Carl Icahn, the 80% shareholder of TWA and his
other corporations. Carl Icahn reached an agreement with the PBGC to make loans
and guarantees to the plans to keep them operating. See, N.Y. Times, Dec. 8,
1992, p. D-5.  Also, in 2006, in
connection with the bankruptcy of one of the plants of R.G. Steel, which had a
$100 million underfunded pension plan, the PBGC filed a lawsuit against the
parent, Renco Group seeking to a lien on its assets as well as on the Hamptons
estate of Renco Group’s founder, and the PBGC settled with the Renco Group
after it agreed to continue to be liable for the underfunded plan and
contribute $20 million to it. NY Times, April 1, 2006. In 2012 the PBGC filed a
suit in the S.D.N.Y. in connection with the bankruptcy of R.G. Steel, a
subsidiary of Renco Group, alleging that Renco Group entered into a transaction
with a principal purpose of evading $97 million unfunded benefit liabilities,
unpaid minimum funding contributions and termination premiums. BNA Pen. &
Ben. Rptr. (Feb. 5, 2013). In 2016 Renco settled with the PBGC to restore the
pension plans of 1,350 retirees of RG Steel. NY Times, March 4, 2016.

[20]
C.I.R. v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35, 107 S. Ct. 980, 987, 94 L. Ed. 2d 25
(1987). This is applied in the ERISA context by, e.g., Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., 974 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.
1992); Connors v. Incoal, Inc., 995 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

[21] The
Groetzinger case is applied in the ERISA context by, e.g., Central States,
Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc., 974 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.
1992) and Connors v. Incoal, Inc., 995 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1993).

[22]
E.g., Central States, Southeast and Southwest Pension Fund v. Personnel, Inc.,
974 F.2d 789 (7th Cir.1992) (no nexus required to show ERISA affiliation;
corporation withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan, where the
corporation’s sole shareholder held certain real estate investments, withdrawal
liability could be imposed on the sole shareholder since the real estate
investment leasing activities constituted a trade or business); Connors v.
Incoal, Inc., 995 F.2d 245 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (no economic nexus required for
determining trade or business under ERISA; a corporation which withdrew from a
multiemployer pension plan, which was owned by a family that also held the
partnership interests in a farm could cause the shareholder to be liable);
Pension Ben. Guar. Corp. v. Center City Motors, Inc., 609 F. Supp. 409 (S.D.
Cal. 1984) (genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether rental
property proprietorship was a trade or business); Board of Trustees of Western
Conference of Teamsters Pension Trust Fund v. Lafrenz, 837 F.2d 892 (9th Cir.
1988) (unincorporated truck leasing operation of husband and wife was a trade
or business, and thus affiliated with a commonly controlled corporation that
withdrew from a multiemployer plan); Central States, Southeast & Southwest
Areas Pension Fund v. Neiman, 285 F.3d 587 (7th Cir. 2002) (the owner of a
defunct trucking company was personally liable for the trucking company’s
multiemployer withdrawal liability because he had an unincorporated trade or
business of providing consulting services to a real estate management company
and to a subsidiary trucking company); Minnesota Laborers Health and Welfare
Fund v. Scanlan, 360 F.3d 925 (8th Cir. 2004) (owner personally liable to
multiemployer plan where he signed collective bargaining agreement as owner of
an unincorporated business, and not merely as an officer of one of the other
unincorporated entities); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. SCOFBP, LLC, 668 F.3d 873 (7th Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 566 U.S. 1022
(2012) (where an entity ceased making contributions to a multiemployer plan,
that two other entities were under common control were also liable; the owner
of all three entities filed for personal bankruptcy and the entities, which
were limited liability companies, were subject to the individual’s ownership;
the two affiliated companies were engaged in a trade or business by virtue of
their regularly leasing real estate holdings to other entities and were not
mere passive investment vehicles and were all subject to multiemployer
withdrawal liability); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Messina Products, LLC, 706 F.3d 874 (7th Cir. 2013) (a husband and wife
who owned a trucking company that incurred ERISA withdrawal liability for
withdrawing from a multiemployer pension plan were held personally liable for
the withdrawal liability since the individual owners were engaged in a trade or
business by renting several properties to the trucking company and were not
merely passive investors, since renting property to one’s own business is
activity for the primary purpose of income or profit performed with continuity
and regularity under the Groetzinger test); Central States, Southeast and
Southwest Areas Pension Fund v. Nagy, 714 F.3d 545 (7th Cir. 2013) (company ceased
employing covered workers and incurred ERISA withdrawal liability; court held that
the individual owner of the company is liable for withdrawal liability since the
individual owner leased property to the company; therefore the individual owner
was engaged in a trade or business); Pension Benefit Guaranty Corporation v.
Findlay Industries, Inc., et al., 902 F.3d 597 (6th Cir. 2018) (the court held
that a family was personally liable for the underfunding of a pension plan; a
privately owned business was under the control of the family; the court held
that the family was personally liable for the underfunding for the commonly controlled
entities; that also made the entities liable for successor liability under
ERISA § 4069(a) for transactions entered into to avoid liability); Local No.
499, Board of Trustees of Shopmen’s Pension Plan v. Art Iron, Inc., 117 F.4th
923 (6th Cir. 2024) (multiemployer pension plan sought withdrawal liability, after
Art Iron, Inc. withdrew from the plan, from the company, as well as from its
sole shareholder Robert Schlatter and his wife Mary Schlatter; court stated
that a trade or business depends on the continuity and regularity of the
activity and whether it was primarily for income or profit; court held that
Robert Schlatter consulting work for the company, which occurred over a number
of years, including the year of pension withdrawal, was a trade or business and
therefore he could be held personally liable for the company’s withdrawal
liability; but his wife’s jewelry business was not a trade or business since it
was not operated with regularity and continuity and therefore she was not
liable).

            But see, Textile Workers Pension
Fund v. Oltremare, 764 F. Supp. 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1989) (mere ownership of real
property without economic nexus to commonly controlled entity not enough to
constitute trade or business); Central States, Southeast and Southwest Areas Pension
Fund v. Fulkerson, 238 F.3d 891 (7th Cir. 2001), cert. denied, 534 U.S. 821 (bankrupt
trucking company owner’s other leasing activities were merely passive holdings
for investment and not a trade or business for purposes of controlled group
multiemployer withdrawal liability); Central States, Southeast and Southwest
Areas Pension Fund v. White, 258 F.3d 636 (7th Cir. 2001) (bankrupt trucking
company owner’s apartment rental activities were not a “trade or business”
under ERISA § 4001(b)(1) for purposes of multiemployer withdrawal liability).

[23] C.I.R.
v. Groetzinger, 480 U.S. 23, 35 (1987), cited above.

[24] PBGC
Appeals Board Opinion dated Sept. 26, 2007, www.pbgc.gov/prac/appeals-board/appeals-decisions
(a single private equity fund owned 80% or more of a portfolio company, and the
portfolio company was liable to the PBGC for pension termination liability; the
issue was whether the private equity fund was a “trade or business” under the
standard set forth in Groetzinger that “trade or business” depends on (i)
whether the taxpayer is engaged in an activity with the primary purpose of
income or profit, and (ii) whether the act is conducted with continuity and
regularity; in the facts of that letter the private equity fund engaged in an
activity with the primary purpose of income or profit, and it conducted its
business through an agent (the general partner) who managed the fund’s
investments on a regular basis; the private equity fund was therefore held to
be in the same controlled group as the portfolio company that sponsored a
pension plan).

[25] See
ABA JCEB Q & As for PBGC (May 2008), Q & A 11, that it is likely that a
private equity fund would be a trade or business, absent unusual facts and
circumstances.

[26] Board
of Trustees, Sheet Metal Workers National Pension Fund v. Palladium Equity
Partners, LLC, 722 F. Supp. 2d 854 (E.D. Mich. 2010) (genuine issue of material
fact existed as to whether three Palladium limited partnerships, as well as
Palladium Equity Partners, LLC which served as advisor, were an ERISA
controlled group parent liable for ERISA multiemployer withdrawal liability of
the Haden group of companies; the court found the 2007 PBGC Appeals Board
Opinion to be persuasive that although investment alone is not a trade or
business, where there is “investment plus,” e.g., investment advisory and
management services by the fund for the benefit of its partners and
compensation for the investment advisory and management services, this would
constitute a trade or business; court found there was a genuine issue of
material fact as to whether the Palladium funds had a business purpose other
than merely investment; the Palladium funds joined their investments to exert
power over financial and managerial activities of the portfolio companies,
selected five of the seven board members and set up several committees to
control the internal operations of the portfolio companies; in terms of
considering the four partnerships as a single partnership for the
parent-subsidiary controlled group test, the court stated that there was a
genuine issue of material fact as to whether the three LP funds constituted a
partnership or joint venture in fact under the Luna standards discussed below; the
facts before the court did not clearly establish whether the Palladium entities
acted as a joint venture or partnership concerning their portfolio companies;
the terms of their agreement and their conduct must be analyzed; there was also
general issue of material fact regarding alter-ego liability).

[27] Longroad Asset
Management LLC v. Boilermaker Blacksmith National Pension Trust, No. 4:23-cv-00738-DGK
2025 WL 2406740 (W.D. Missouri Aug. 19, 2025) (Longroad Capital Partners III,
LP (“Longroad LP”) set up a 95% controlled subsidiary
Broad Street Tank Holding Co., Inc. (“Broad Street”) in order to
acquire through the purchase of the outstanding debt and receipt of all the
assets of the distress company Brown-Minneapolis Tank – Northwest, LLC
(“BMT-NW”), through a special entity BMT -NW Acquisition; in
addition, Broad Street acquired Graver Tank Co. Both BMT-NW Acquisition and
Graver Tank Co. went bankrupt and thereby withdrew from the multiemployer
pension plan; the court held that the Longroad LP and its 95% controlled Broad
Street were a trade or business under the investment-plus analysis and were
jointly and severally liability for the withdrawal of their portfolio companies
BMT-NW Acquisition and Graver that went bankrupt; the asset manager and general
partner were not part of the controlled group).

[28]
Luna
v. C. I. R., 42 T.C. 1067 (1967) (a lump-sum settlement payment received by
petitioner from an insurance company, Pioneer Life & Casualty Co., in
settlement of petitioner’s right to receive renewal commissions on special type
insurance policies, conceived by termination of petitioner’s employment
contract with the insurance company, was taxable to petitioners as ordinary
income;
court concluded that petitioner and Pioneer were not partners or
joint venturers and that no part of the lump-sum settlement paid to petitioner
was proceeds from the sale or exchange of an interest in a of a capital asset
or an interest in a joint venture or partnership and it could not be taxed as a
capital gain).

[29] Sun
Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters & Trucking Industry
Pension Fund, 724 F.3d 129 (1st Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 134 S. Ct. 1492
(2014) (two private equity funds managed by Sun Capital, Sun Fund III and Sun
Fund IV owned 70% and 30%, respectively, of Scott Brass, Inc. which withdrew
from a multiemployer pension plan prior to filing for bankruptcy; the district
court at 903 F.Supp.2d 107 (D. Mass. 2012), had granted the Sun Capital
Partners equity funds’ motion to dismiss since the private equity funds were
passive investors and not a trade or business and the 2007 PBGC Appeals Board
Opinion was unpersuasive because activity of the general partner should not
have been attributed to the investment fund and continuity and regularity of an
activity should not be found merely based on the size of the investment and
profitability; however, the First Circuit reversed and held that at least the
larger of the two Sun funds (Fund IV) was engaged in a trade or business under
an “investment plus” analysis since there was more than mere passive
investment, noting that the funds sought out potential portfolio companies that
were in need of extensive management intervention, the general partners of the
funds had wide-ranging management authority, the funds had the power to appoint
a majority of board members, the general partners of the funds could make
decisions regarding hiring, termination and compensation of employees in the
portfolio companies, and at least with respect to Sun Fund IV (the 70% owners)
the active investment in management provided a direct economic benefit that an
ordinary passive investor would not derive, i.e., management fees the fund
otherwise would have needed to pay its general partner of the fund was offset
by fees the portfolio company was paying to the general partner; thus Fund IV
and possibly Fund III were a trade or business; the purchase of Scott Brass,
Inc. in a 70%-30% split was not done with a principal purpose to evade or avoid
liability under ERISA § 4212(c), because disregarding a 70%-30% split would
leave zero ownership; the court, however, remanded the case to the district
court to determine if Fund III was also a trade or business and to determine if
there was common control by the 70%-30% ownership by reason of being considered
a partnership in fact).

[30] Sun
Capital Partners III, LP v. New England Teamsters and Trucking Industry Pension
Fund, 172 F. Supp. 3d 447 (D. Mass. 2016) (on remand, the district court held:
(i) that under the “investment plus” analysis not only was Sun Fund
IV a trade or business, but Sun Fund III was also a trade or business because
it too had a direct economic benefit that a passive investor would not have,
i.e., an offset of fees otherwise owed by Sun Fund III to its general partner
for managing the investments indirectly paid by the underlying company; and
(ii) with regard to common ownership of SBI, while not specifically meeting the
requirements for an ERISA controlled group because there was no 80% controlling
interest, nevertheless Sun Fund III and Sun Fund IV are a jointly controlled
entity where there was a deemed) partnership-in-fact under tax-law principles
since the two funds often co-invest together, and the general partners were
controlled by the same two people, and despite the lack of permanently fixed
co-investing, these Sun Funds should be considered as joining together as a
“partnership-in-fact” to invest in Scott Brass; the district court
noted that the fund split in ownership was done because the fund was nearing
the end of its investment cycle, a preference for income diversification and a
desire to keep ownership below 80% to avoid ERISA withdrawal liability (though
avoiding controlled group liability was not the principal purpose of the
transaction for purposes of ERISA § 4212(c)).

            Some have questioned the
partner-in-fact theory for controlled group liability because (i)
partnership-in-fact is tax law or state-law concept that may not automatically apply
to ERISA controlled group liability situations, and (ii) the bright line ERISA
controlled group test was being expanded in a way not contemplated by the
statute or regulations, or by ERISA § 4212(c).

[31]
Sun
Capital Partners III, LP v New England
Teamsters & Trucking Industry Pension Fund, 943 F.3d 49 (1st Cir. 2019),
cert. denied, 141 S. Ct. 372 (2020) (court found that private equity funds did
not form a partnership-in-fact to acquire SBI under Code § 7701(a)(2) because a
number of factors in the Luna test had not been met since (i) the funds
disclaimed any sort of partnership, (ii) most of the entities or persons who
were limited partners in Sun Fund IV were not limited partners in Sun Fund III,
(iii) separate tax returns, separate books and separate bank accounts were
maintained and (iv) the funds did not operate in parallel, i.e., they did not
invest in the same companies at a fixed or even variable rate, which shows some
independence in activity and structure; therefore the court held that the
funds; therefore most of the Luna factors were not met; also there is not a
firm indication of Congressional intent that withdrawal liability would be
imposed on these private investors absent guidance from the PBGC; therefore the
funds are not jointly liable for the ERISA withdrawal liability).  

[32]
In certain cases, it may be advisable to
specify in agreements with representations about controlled group members that representations
are (or are not) made with regard to private equity investors and other
portfolio companies.